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INTRODUCTION
The Church and organized religion are now passing through the 
last of three phases following the earthquake of Freudism discoveries 
which have shaken the religious establishment, opened fissures in 
the walls of dogmatism, and caused widespread anxiety and dread in 
men both within and without the Church. "At the turn of the century 
Freud, a Viennese physician^introduced a revolutionary new psychology 
based on the study of human drives, especially those of sex and 
aggression. He also introduced a method for the tapping of the uncon­
scious." (p. 53, Lynch, Iiedbook, Dec., 1966).
Blind reaction and bitter denunciation characterized the first 
phase in the Church’s response to Freud and the general movement which 
he represented. Only exceptional individuals like Oskar Pfister, a 
pastor and psychoanalyst trained under Freud, attempted to bridge the 
widening chasm during this initial stage.
Whereas the initial reaction focused upon the disturbing view of 
’eroticised* man, Freud soon began to write about religion and called 
it a universal obsessive neurosis. Freud explored the psychic, sex­
ual and obsessive reasons for religious development and practices in 
his books Totem and Taboo, Civilization and Its Discontents, The Future 
of an Illusion, anti Kor, : •. Like Archibald Kacleish *s
J.B. modern man was confronted with an apparently comprehensive and 
adequate explanation of Man and his ultimate concerns which not only 
nullified hut also discredited the traditional response of faith. 
Suddenly the Christian Church found itself struggling for survival 
and resorting to apologetics in what appeared to be a life—and—death 
struggle with the quasi-religious exponents of Freudian psychoanalysis* 
The third and most recent development in relations between religion 
and psychoanalysis has been one of conciliation based on dialogue and 
thoughtful consideration. While outwardly more promising than the 
first two stages, this phase is not without its own special problems.
In a sometimes desparate attempt to relate themselves relevantly to 
human reality ministers have all too often substituted the goals and 
roles of psychiatrists and psychotherapists for their own tasks and 
responsibilities as clergymen. Consequently confusion has arisen in 
the fields of both psychiatry and religion requiring further discus­
sion and definition of the roles, goals, boundries, and relations 
between the respective fields and the implications of the truths 
found in each for the theory and practice of the other.
Arthur Rost, a protestant chaplain in a large American mental 
hospital, has rightfully pointed out that the goal of religion can­
not be mental health (p.53» Redbook. Lynch); on the other hand, the 
Church and its clergy cannot simply overlook the question of mental 
health and its own responsibility for bringing important psycho­
analytic insight and procedures! as well as its own unique resources 
to bear on this problem. With penetrating insight and sensiblo bal-
HEALINGS COVENANT AND COUCH
The fields of modern psychiatry and psychoanalysis offer a pro­
found view of man and his existential predicament. Although avowedly 
scientific in nature, these modern medical disciplines do offer an 
informative comparison and in some places a vivid contrast with the 
theological view of man and the process of salvation or ’healing* 
initiated by God in Jesus Christ. This paper will attempt to draw 
upon and in the appropriate places either correct or complement cer­
tain psychiatric and psychoanalytic insi^ths in terms of certain theo­
logical propositions; hopefully this will lead to a better under­
standing of the meaning and consequences of God’s work in the world, 
its implications for pastoral theology and its application in the var­
ious forms of pastoral care. To avoid confusion it might be helpful 
to identify the basic components of the study and how they are related 
to one another.
First there is psychotherapy, or more specifically, existential 
psychotherapy. Then follows a criticism of modern psychotherapeutic 
procedure and theory from a theological perspective. And lastly, an 
attempt will be made to summarily discuss the implications of the 
above mentioned critique for pastoral theology today. Let us there­
fore examine these three items and their relations in more detail.
"Psychotherapy means literally the treatment of the mind. It 
therefore could be applied to all methods of treatment for mental 
illness;” (including physical, pharmaceutical, surgical, etc. as
6discussed in Psychiatry Today by David Stafford-Clark or in An Intro­
duction to Physical Methods in Psychiatry by Sargant and Slater), 
However, in practice its use is restricted to those methods which 
rely for their effect upon an exchange of ideas between patient and 
doctor. Psychotherapy is formal treatment of patients distinguished 
by its dependence upon psychological rather than physical or chemical 
agents, “Psychoanalysis as a treatment method comes logically within 
the broader genus of psychotherapy,"(p,l6, Menninger).
For the purposes of this study it will not be necessary to dis­
tinguish between psychoanalytically-oriented psychotherapy and ortho­
dox psychoanalysis. There are many differences between these two
types and some are important distinctions based primarily on the theore—
Jungtan
tical differences among the various schools(i.e. Jugiaa, Adlerian, 
Sullivani&n, et al.), However, there is another distinction which is 
important and must be made for the purposes of our study. This is 
the distinction between the orthodox and traditional approach to 
psychiatry and psychoanalysis, which is still largely influenced by 
classical Freudian hypotheis, and the relatively new 'existential1 
approach* to the same field.
Because existential psychology and psychiatry is relatively new 
and has not developed into a separate school in its own right, it has 
only challenged certain select principles and techniques as found in 
traditional psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Therefore this study will 
draw heavily upon traditional psychoanalytic theory and inly introduce
the new existential psychiatric insights where they radically disagree 
with or amplify older concepts. For example, existential psychothera­
peutic hypothesis disagrees at various points concerning the analyst- 
analysand relationship; this paper will endeavor to discuss and evaluate 
these disagreements as they arise.
The second element is the theological perspective and criticism 
of the therapeutic process. In order to distinguish this paper from 
a^nerelyjssychological or philosophical discourse a theological criticism, 
both positive and negative in nature, is necessary. Any contemporary 
movement with the reputation, influence, and mystique of psychiatry 
and psychoanalysis is worthy of theological consideration. Because 
psychotherapy is involved in mental healing and the restoration of 
wholeness and wields considerable power to that end, responsible 
theology cannot justify disinterest or indifference; Christian theo­
logy itself reflects upon God's ongoing work of healing and salvation 
as manifest most specifically in Jesus Christ, My main purpose in 
this paper is to show that God's act in history and particularly and 
most perfectly in Jesus as the Christ is the paradigm or prototypic 
model for the healing process as found specifically in modern psycho­
therapy.
Such an assertion implies that the goals of psychotherapy are 
somehow, though in a more limited or specific sense, the same as or 
similar to God's will for man as revealed in his Son. If this is 
found to be true, then we should desire to see what correction, exten-
sion or ultimate dimension might be added by our theological under­
standing, In other words, is psychotherapy carried out under merely 
human auspices and limitations and possibilities or does it contain 
some implicit ultimate dimensions which must be examined theologically? 
I hope to demonstrate in our discussion that such theological concepts 
as 'unconditional acceptance' and 'I—Thou relationships' are not only 
applicable and useful in psychotherapy but that they also permit and 
facilitate a deeper understanding'of its ultimate possibilities and 
meanings. Our aim is not to theologize or artificially infuse reli­
gion into psychoanalytic technique (which may very seriously hinder 
the healing process) but merely to consider the theological implica­
tions and possibilities of the movement both as a secular phenomenon 
and as an increasingly important part of pastoral counseling. There­
fore our goal is not a superimposition of the Gospel onto psychiatric 
theory but is rather a methodological comparison of these two areas.
The theological perspective will be provided primarily by the 
thought of two modern theologians, namely Paul Tillich and Martin 
Buber, These two thinkers were selected for two reasons; (l) both 
have written explicitly about psychotherapy from a theological per­
spective and (2) both are considered to be existential theologians. 
Prior to Tillich and Buber most statements concerning psychotherapy
made be churchmen were apologetic or actually hostile, aimed at de—
furthering
nigrating rather than at opening discussion and Worthing mutual under-
standing. Secondly, the existential approach of these two men provides 
a common medium in regard to the themes contained in the new existential 
psychotherapy which is largely derived from Martin Heidegger's philo­
sophy, itself commonly considered 'existential'.
Buber presents a special problem because he is a Jewish theolo­
gian. Buber's divine Thou has been criticized by Christian theologians 
as having no face or body, as not being incarnate in Jesus Christ. There­
fore Christian theologians liavo had no difficulty in adapting Dubor's 
basic I-Thou categories to both the human dimension and to the face-to- 
face confrontation of man by the divine Thou in Jesus Christ, the God- 
Man. Therefore, although using Buber's writings and ideas, I will take 
the liberty of translating his divine and wholly numinous Thou in terms 
of the divine Thou present in Jesus as the Christ. As we shall see 
later in the paper and especially in relation to the transference 
phenomenon as applied to the divine Thou, it is much easier to project 
fantastic images and infantile wishes onto a so—called 'faceless' God 
in heaven than it is onto a specific figure in whom the Godhead is 
fully and really present, namely Jesus Christ. Because Jesus as the 
Christ paradoxically reveals the divine in the human, the general in 
the specific, the eternal in the temporal, and the 'faceless' Lord in 
the face of a servant, he provides the ultimate dimension while provid­
ing a norm of empirical reality against which to measure one's percep­
tions in the process of therapy and salvation.
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The* third and last element in our study is the hitherto neglected 
but now increasingly important field of pastoral theology with special 
emphasis on pastoral care and counseling, 1110 newly recognized importance 
of this segment of theological study and practice is evident in the 
huge expansion in attention to pastoral theology and counseling in the 
American theological schools and the development of clinical training 
programs on all levels throughout the United States,
Pastoral theology and pastoral counseling relies heavily on the
pertaining
technical and theoretical insights peg g i n g ; to modern psychotherapy
for deeper theological insight and increased effectiveness in its work.
In contrast to professional psychiatry and psychoanalysis pastoral
counseling outrightly combines some bf the principles of psychotherapy
with theological perspective to minister in a healing way to those in
need. Consequently pastoral theology depends more than any other
sector of theological study on a thorough understanding of both fields
(psychotherapy and theology) and their mutual relationship,
%
It is obvious that pastoral counseling, except in rare circumstances 
where an ordained clergyman is fully trained in psychotherapeutic tech­
nique and commissioned by a denomination or local church to pursue 
full-time psychiatric work, differs significantly from professional 
psychotherapy. Pastoral counseling is part of a larger task while 
psychotherapy is a full-time profession. Pastoral counseling is geared 
to shorter, more limited periods with specific persons and is often—
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times connected with his other professional tasks such as marriage 
counseling. On the other hand, the pastor who counsels brings cer­
tain unique tools to bear on the situation which are not only unavail­
able but also unadaptable to secular psychiatric practice. These 
special tools or aids are referred to as the 'means of grace1' which 
include prayer, Scripture, sacraments, and Christian koinonia. Their 
part as aids to healing used by the pastor will be discussed later.
This theological critique of modern psychotherapy may prove to 
have valuable consequences for pastoral theology and these will be 
mentioned from time to time during our discussion. With these three 
elements in mind we might, for didactic purposes, diagram the thrust 
of this study as follows:
PSYCHOTHERAPY—
PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACH 
EXCEPT WHERE EXISTENTIAL *4
CONCEPTS PERTAIN
THEOLOGY-
GOD'S HEALING ACTS 
>  IN HISTORY AND
ESPECIALLY IN 
JESUS CHRIST
PASTORAL THEOLOGY-
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
PASTORAL COUNSELING
With this schema in mind let us consider the first section of our study, 
the paradigmatic comparison of God's saving (healing) acts in Josub 
Christ towards mankind with the analyst-client relationship in psycho­
analysis.
•HEILSGESCmCHTE* AS PARADIGM FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PROCESS
While studying the psychotherapeutic process both in theory and 
technique I was struck by its similarity to what Christian theology 
calls 'heilsgeschichte' or 'salvation history' which is comprised of 
God's redeeming acts in historical time. Certain concepts now in vogue 
have emerged and developed primarily during the last fifty years, some­
times referred to as the age of the behavioral sciences. Such popular 
sociological terms as .'interpersonal relationships' have been adapted 
to philosophy and described as 'existential encounters'; even theology 
has appropriated these thought-forma and theologians such as Eknil Brunner 
and Martin Buber have spoken of 'God-man encounters' and 'I-Thou rela­
tionships'. Thought-forms used to describe the movements within and 
between men have been found helpful in describing intertrinitarian 
movements as well as God's active, revelatory relationship to mankind 
as recorded in Scripture. Whereas the goal and process of psycho­
therapy might be described as 'healing through meeting', so also might 
God's relationship to man be described in a similar way. In other 
words, insofar as God's acts of salvation include the concept of healing, 
then it is the ultimate paradigm or model for healing of all kinds 
and especially in the area of psychotherapy where the therapist is re­
lated to the client in a manner analogous to the way in which God id 
related to man. This is the paradigmatic relationship to which I refer.
It may be objected that such a thesis illigitimately alters and 
thereby distorts psychotherapeutic technique and the theory behind it 
which has been derived relatively recently by a scientific or at least 
•quasi-scientific method. It is not the purpose of this paper to ques­
tion the source or the integrity of the psychoanalytic discipline; but 
insofar as it corresponds to the manner in whihh God deals with man, 
psychotherapy May find its ultimate ground in God's 'heilsgeschichte' 
which has temporal priority and ultimacy.
Before proceeding further let us consider the relation of healing 
to God's work. According to Paul Tillich (Review of Religion. May, 19^6, 
p.348—384) modern theological concepts of salvation are partial and 
unsatisfactory because they do not consider the whole man, both body 
and soul, as well as his sociological relations. The Western tradition 
has especially been preoccupied with individualism and has lost thereby 
the total perspective. Salvation is truly a cosmic event in which 
the world is saved (John 3*16).
An aetiological study of the word 'salvation! reveals that one of 
its derivatives is the concept of 'healing'. Consequently God's 
saving acts are in part connected with a cosmic healing which Tillich 
describes as 'makings whole'• Seward Hiltner, author of the book Pastoral 
Counseling, also describes healing as a 'restoration to functional 
wholeness'. Therefore God's act of healing as included in his saving 
work in history has personal meaning as well as cosmic or universal 
O'tertbnes •,
Karl Menninger (Theory of Psycho-Analytical Technique, p.179) com­
ments that "the intangible gains of psychoanalytic treatment extend out 
into the universe"; the personal gains involved are obvious* As a re­
sult we see that psychotherapy and God's acts are reciprocally related. 
Although psychotherapeutic theory and technique are derived independently 
of theology (particularly obvious in the anti-religious attitude of 
Sigmund Freud), its profundity and effectiveness highly recommends and 
is recommended by the observation that God relates Himself to man in 
a similar manner. Below we shall expand upon the analogy.
THE CONTRACTUAL-COVENANTAL PARADIGM
Far from making God 'the Great Psychoanalyst in the Sky' this paper 
seeks to distinguish God's healing movements from other such thera­
peutic movements and yet to provide an outline for the pastor in his 
counseling and care in the name of Christ.
Karl Menninger has described all psychoanalytic treatment as trans­
actional and contractual; furthermore, it, like other forms of psycho­
therapy, is a long, continuous two-party contract or compact (p.17)* 
"First of all, in any engagement between two individuals in which a 
transaction occurs there is an exchange, a giving and a gain of some­
thing by both parties with a subsequent meeting of needs in a recipro­
cal, mutual way."(Menninger, p.21). This description of contracts in
general and the psychotherapeutic contract in particular is reminis­
cent of covenantal theology which describes God's way of relating him­
self to men. There are, however, certain distinctions which should be 
made. Whereas the prospedtive patient seeks out the analyst, covenant 
theology rests on the initiative and authority of God; God seeks out 
man in his broken and estranged state of existence. However, God has 
prepared man for this new 'contract' via the prior covenants or con­
tracts which were broken by man. Another important difference between 
the psychotherapeutic contract and covenant theology is the fact that 
there is no 'meeting of needs in a reciprocal, mutual way'. Certainly 
God obtains worship, devotion, and adoration from the covenanted people, 
but theology explicity denies that God needs such things as if he were 
incomplete or lacking without them. An inequality exists between the 
covenanted parties of the first and second parts. Therefore the dif­
ferences can be summarized as follows: "Man's faith will be a response 
to what God does, not a bilateral bargain between equal partners." 
(Anderson, The Living Word of the Old Testament. p.353)»
Dr. Menninger points out three other ways in which the psycho­
therapeutic contract differs from other contracts; (l) In contrast to 
sales transactions where the relationships between two parties are 
rather incidental to the goal, relationships between the two parties 
in psychotherapy come very close to being the goal themselves (p. 22). .
Aa we shall see more clearly later in this paper, interpretation and 
non-judgemental acceptance of the client are the mainstays of the 
therapeutic process. Paul Tillich speaks of God's grace in terms of 
God's unconditional acceptance of the unacceptable man. Therefore the 
unique situation which i$" the heart of the therapeutic process is also 
found to exist between God and the world. The New Covenant rests upon 
divine forgiveness. Although God pre-conditions the new relationship 
of unconditional acceptance through Jesus Christ by shattering men's 
pride and self-sufficiency through his discipline, He makes a new be­
ginning in Christ: "For I will forgive their iniquity, and I will re­
member their sin no more."(jer.31:34).
Just as the unconscious material of the client is slowly uncovered 
and accepted by the therapist and thereby the client effects a self- 
acceptance, so also does God's unconditional acceptance of man lead 
to man's own self-acceptance and his acceptance of others, this being 
the first and most important step in healing both mental illness and 
cosmic sin. The very important question concerning the ways divine 
grace differs from analytic acceptance will be discussed later.
(2) "Ordinarily, transactions between people have defined time 
limits. A contract starts at some time and becomes consummated at 
another, specified time. However, as long as the goal of psycho­
therapy is betterment - or amelioration or growth or maturation — 
it is by definition an open-ended venture. It is essentially inter-
minable, since there is no predetermined specification of what is meant 
by mature, healthy or comfortable."(Menninger, p.23). Here again we 
see a theme familiar to Christians. Just as most psychotherapy is a 
continuing process rather than a single-step event, so also is the 
consummation of the divine purpose in history. Persons related to God 
in a new way through Jesus Christ (through grace by faith — covenantal) 
are always in the process of being healed and never 'arrive*, so to 
speak. While the indetermination of the therapeutic process is due to 
the vagueness of the goals which are themselves defined or only vaguely 
defindd in human terms, the indetermination in time of 'heilsgeschichte' 
is due to the mystery connected with God's activity and purpose. Conse­
quently there is an explicit transcendental element in God's therapeutic 
work which is absent in the secular therapeutic area; the consequences 
of this will be discussed later. In any case, the comparison is en­
lightening.
(3) "Whereas most contractual relations are confined to two parties 
who are named and described and identified in the contract, the trans­
action between a psychotherapist and his patient need not be confined 
to these two; it may often involve other people to whom the patient is 
related* Perhaps the major part of all psychotherapy is at least focused 
of tho patient's relationships with othora. Though tho focus is on the 
two parties, the transactions are not limited to a two-party space." 
(Menninger, p.23). Here again the analogy is evident; just as the
therapist is concerned with his client's interpersonal relationships 
as the locus of difficulty or improvement, so also is God concerned 
with our estranged or diseased relations with our fellow men and the 
subsequent restoration of wholeness to interpersonal relationships.
Our acceptance and forgiveness by God in Jesus Christ, the great phy­
sician or therapist of souls, necessarily leads to our acceptance and 
forgiveness of others. Our description is couched in modern psycho­
social terminology but it is undeniable that the New Testament directs 
men toward love of their enemy as well as their neighbor.
Medical as well as psychotherapeutic treatment can be divided into 
$hreo general categories; (l) subtractive treatment which endeavors to 
remove something from the organism or psyche;(2) additive treatment 
which removes symptoms by introducing something to the organism; (3) 
manipulative treatment which is set in motion by the physician or ther­
apist and effects an ameliorative change, Karl Menninger (p.24) says 
that "psychotherapy may be additive in the sense of giving a patient 
hope, dub tractive in the sense of removing a fear, or manipulative as 
in the case of redirecting a patient in regard to a goal." Although 
God's curative action in Jesus Christ provides a significantly different 
content to our hopes and goals and in removing sin rather than fear, 
the similarities are more than coincidental. That part of God's 
work in which he acts as the healer of souls, indeed, as the healer of
man's whole personality, may be described in the same modalities used 
by the medical and psychoanalytical professions.
Speaking in this way seems to ascribe priority to scientific 
psychotherapeutic categories in describing God's healing work and 
therefore we may appear to be forcibly adapting religious concepts to 
medical theories. This impression, if it exists for the reader, is 
mistaken and this paper is suggesting rather that the implications are 
already inherent in our theology but is, in many instances, more aptly 
and systematically described in medical thought-patterns. This is not 
to say that the ultimate quality, meaning, and purpose of God's healing 
work is to be transformed into and identified with the limited and 
conditional aims of the psychotherapeutic or medical arts in general. 
However, this paper is suggesting that for the sake of interpreting 
the Gospel and communicating it to the modern man Christian theologians 
must avail themselves of such modern categories which adequately repre­
sent the meaning and purpose already inherent in the Good News of 
Jesus as the Christ. The idea of Jesus as healer and physician is 
not foreign to either the Gospels or the New Testament world-view; 
therefore modern therapeutic principles which offer a purview of cer­
tain biblical principles should be employed where applicable, not 
with uncritical acceptance but rather with judicious consideration.
Some psychiatrists consider psychoanalysis and other forms of 
psychotherapy to be more a matter of re-education than of treatment;
this appears to he a residue from the liberal views of man popular in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and it is most clearly 
evident in the thought of John Dewey, the renowned educational theorist 
Such a view poses a serious problem for us. Such a view of man, his 
predicament, and his subsequent healing, psychological or otherwise, 
is shallow and does not take seriously the meaning of sin. Insofar 
as psychotherapy misapprehends this crucial fact and considers itself 
in theory and technique sufficient“for the total healing of man, it 
becomes unrealistic and, paradoxically enough, inadequate for its 
rightful task.
The final concern in this section on the contractual-covenantal 
paradigm is the payment or the question of money. Although "compli­
cations also arise if the patient pays more than he can afford, the 
analysis will not go well if the patient is paying less than he can 
reasonably afford to pay."(p*32, Menninger). This is analogous to the 
doctrine of the atonement and to the cost of discipleship. The price 
of God's healing work is, so to speak, beyond our means and Christ's 
death is God's sign that he is willing to absorb the so-called 
'expense* himself out of unconditional love for man. Any 'satisfaction 
regarding payment can only be undertaken by God himself; furthermore, 
the sacrificial aspect of the atonement is a foresign of what will be 
required of the 'patient' himself in the course of restoring him to 
wholeness. This unique act of God is unparalleled in the psychother­
apeutic relationship and it points to the ultimate or religious dimen—
sion which ia not inherent in the psychotherapeutic process itself.
Although God's act in Jesus as the Christ is unprecedented and 
unrepeatable in magnitude and kind, it would be wrong to assume that 
our relationship with God through which healing is effected is without 
personal expense or sacrifice. If the covenant depended on God assuming 
all responsibility, then man would assume a passively dependent, nar­
cissistic, infantile, help-seking attitude similar to a patient receiving 
psychotherapy at no personal sacrifice. The admonition in Scripture 
to become as little children is not encouraging the egocentric atti­
tude referred to above.
Menninger also declares that the analysis "should be a definite 
sacrifice for him (patient), for him and not for someone else."(p.32). 
This is where the paradox of faith and the cost of discipleship comes 
into effect. Man is required to recognize the attitude and completeness 
of God's act in Jesus Christ and he then becomes fully responsible for 
his predicament and for making a response of faith; or again, the 
paradox of healing, the price of which has already been paid, which 
costs a man his life. Therefore God's act of cosmic and personal 
healing is measured not only in terms of Christ's death but in terms 
of each individual's life; "he who would save his life must lose it 
for my sake."
God's healing, far from being undemanding of our personal commit­
ment, exacts from us the greatest price conceivable, namely our lives.
Becoming responsible for our own healing and return to functional 
wholeness is itself part of the healing and the very path which leads 
to greater integration and maturity# Such responsibility is fundamental 
to both the Christian faith and to the psychotherapeutic process#
In this connection Dr# Nils Haak ("Comments on the Analytic Situation" 
Internet# Jour. Of Psycho-Anal., 38:183-195i 1957) makes some penetra­
ting observations on the analyst-patient relation which are applicable 
to the God-man relation: (l) The patient regards the analyst not as an 
indulgent 'father-figure' but as a reliable, integrated person who 
dares to accept the aggressions which the patient releases against 
this strict system of payment. "The patient experiences the therapist 
as an honest, upright person and thus the analyst becomes a good object 
of identification." Therefore God's integrity is not compromised and 
our healing includes what Bonhoeffer calls a 'Christ-formation' in us.
(2) The patient experiences that he has entrusted himself to a 
strong person who will not be tempted or'castrated'* This attitude 
"becomes a good and realistic ego-ideal for the patient in contrast
to his own neurotic one." Whenever the Church has emasculated or has 
allowed the world to emasculate Christ, He has lost much of his effect­
iveness and authority as a healing and saving figure.
(3) "The analysis must involve sacrifice, otherwise it becomes a 
matter of indifference in the patients life. It is deeply rooted in 
the human mind that what is cheap is of little value and what is dear
is valuable." One only* needs to read Dietrich Bonhoeffer's comments 
about cheap and costly grace in his Cost of Discipleship to see the 
relevance of the psychological observation for our Christian paradigm 
of healing. Similarly, psychotherapists believe that the treatment 
must be considered by the patient as one of the most important things 
in his life. Without stopping here to point out the idolatrous pos­
sibilities of such a view, we can notice its similarity to the Til- 
lichian description of faith as ultimate concern, that it be both ul­
timate in content and the most important thing in our lives.
Having completed our survey of the contract-covenant paradigm, we 
must now consider some of the implications for practical theology.
In drawing useful conclussions from our foregoing discussion the pastor 
must remember two things in order to avoid difficulties; as facetious 
as it may sound, the pastor must remember that he is not God; secondly, 
he must remember that he is not a professional psychotherapist or 
psychoanalyst either by training or byfvocationf. More positively 
speaking, he must remember two other things; firstly, he does min­
ister in the name of Jesus Christ and secondly, he is trained to care 
for and counsel those people entrusted to him. The pastor's unique 
position gives rise to certain very challenging possibilities as well 
as to some very specific limitations.
As {Lescribedyabove God works in a healing way in history and he
acted most decisively in Jesus Christ. The pastor, as an ordained 
agent mediating the healing word of God, becomes at any given moment 
a focus of God's continuing healing and saving activity through the 
Holy Spirit* (I have chosen to neglect the fact that all Christians 
are priests one to another and therefore all of them are potential 
healing instruments of God; I shall concentrate primarily on the or­
dained professional clergy.) As such, he meets a counselee as a man 
but as a man open to the possibility that God may work in a healing 
way through him* In this capacity he will endeavor to mediate the 
unconditional acceptance of God to the counselee and refrain from 
premature judgemental or condemning attitudes* This corresponds to 
sound counseling technique which he ought to employ where possible*
The very fact that the counselee came to a pastor instead of a 
psychiatrist may indicate various things (someone to listen without 
charge, a religious crisis, etc.) but this is no excuse for introducing 
extraneous 'religious talk' that may interfere with good counseling 
technique*
Two other considerations are worthy of comment* Remembering that 
the healing process is continuous and frequently difficult, the pastor 
will need to practiv® the cardinal rule of counseling, namely self­
limitation* The pastor's training and technical skills may be un­
equal to the more serious personality disorders* A preliminary diag­
nosis may indicate the need to refer the counselee to a qualified,
professional psychotherapist (psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, psychiatric 
social worker, etc.).
Secondly, the pastor must limit himself according to the time re­
quired for counseling. If he undertakes a long-term treatment, he must 
make certain that it does not interfere with his other pastoral tasks 
to which he was contracted. Although he receives no direct remunera­
tion from a counselee but rather is salaried for his overall tasks, he 
must establish certain priorities for members of his own church and 
those from outside his congregation with whom his own congregation may 
or may not wish him to spend time. The fact that the counselee is not 
required to make payment may cause the counseling relationship to 'bog- 
down* so to speak. Since the pastor's counseling services do not make 
any monetary demands upon the counselee and the motivation provided by 
hired time is lacking, the pastor must be sure that the counselee is 
making an adequate sacrifice or payment in time and effort in the re­
lationship.
Because the scope of this paper is rather broad, it must be sug­
gestive rather than exhaustive. Therefore, further expansion of the 
topics already mentioned and their implications for the pastor may 
be found in several good books on pastoral counseling and theology.
A. Godin, The Pastor as Counselor
S. Hiltner, Pastoral Counseling
" M , Preface to Pastoral Theology
E. Thurneysen, Theology of Pastoral Care
D. D. Williams, The Minister and the Care of Souls
THEOLOGY AND EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS
Before proceeding further it is necessary to lay certain ground­
work preparatory to erecting our larger structure. Certain insights 
provided by Paul Tillich will lend certain theological perspective to 
our task and help out the values, weaknesses, and limitations of psycho­
therapy in general and existential psychoanalysis in particular. Tillich 
proposes a three-fold metaphysical scheme which is common to Christian 
tradition. The first fundamental concept is: "Esse qua esse bonum est. 
This...basic dogma of Christianity.•.means 'Being as being id good', 
or in the biblical mythological form: God saw everything that he had 
created, and behold, it was good. The second statement is the uni­
versal fall - fall meaning the transition from this essential goodness 
into existential estrangement from oneself, which happens in every 
living being and in every time. The third statement refers to the pos­
sibility of salvation. We should remember that salvation is derived 
from salvus or salus in Latin, which means 'healed' or 'whole', as 
opposed to disruptiveness. These three considerations of human nature 
are present in all genuine theological thinking: essential goodness, 
existential estrangement and the possibility of something, a 'third', 
beyond essence and existence, through which the cleavage is overcome 
and healed."(p.118,119, Tillich, Theology of Culture).
Depth psychology as such operates on the second level, that of
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describing man*a existential predicament. In typically existential 
categories Tillich suggests that depth psychology describes and analyses 
the experience of meaninglessness, loneliness find emptiness as a result 
of the human predicament in finitude, estrangement and loss of sub­
jectivity. The precinct of depth psychology concerns the attempted 
escape into neurosis and psychosis.
In contrast to depth psychology which merely describes and explains 
the escape, the term 'therapeutic psychology1 clearly implies that 
something must be healed. The question of healing add making whole, 
the movement from the existential toward the teleological and sal­
vation, raises several important and difficult problems. If psycho­
therapy and existential psychoanalysis are concerned with helping re­
store wholeness and effecting healing in man, then is it intrinsically 
interested in salvation either in a wider or narrower sense? Secondly, 
by initiating and aiding a healing process through interpersonal means 
does psychoanalysis support the larger Christian meaning and task of 
salvation or does it establish itself as a quasi-religious system of 
salvation in itself?
In answering these questions we must again turn to Tillich for 
insight. Within the area of healing "...we have the difference between 
the healing of an acute illness and the healing of the existential pre­
suppositions of every disease and of every healthy existence." Beyond 
the 'compulsive restrictions of men's potentialities1 which produce
psychosomatic irregularities and destruction and lead to neurosis and 
to psychosis there are the existential presuppositions. "Neither 
Freudianism nor any purely existentialist considerations can heal 
these fundamental presuppositions. Many psychoanalysts try to do it.
They try with their methods to overcame existential negativity, anxiety, 
estrangement, meaninglessness, or guilt. They deny that they are uni­
versal, that they are existential in this sense. They call all anxiety, 
all guilt, all emptiness, 1*Jii?osQ which can he overcome as any illness 
can he, and they try to remove them. But this is impossible. The exist­
ential structures cannot be healed by the most refined techniques.
They are the objects of salvation. The analyst can be an instrument 
of salvation as every friend, every parent, every child can be an instru­
ment of salvation. But as analyst he cannot bring salvation by means 
of his medical methods, for this requires the healing of the center 
of the personality."(p*123f Theology of Culture).
Although not an effective agent of salvation in the larger Christian- 
existential sense as such, depth psychology, psychopathology, and psycho­
analysis have led to a rediscovery of the meaning of the concept of 
'sin'. "Sin is separation, estrangement from one's essential being." 
(ibid.). Furthermore, the idea of unlimited freedom in man and the 
absolute authority of man's autonomous will over the rest of his person 
has been jettisoned with the discovery of the unconscious on the rel­
atively involuntary patterns and motives which determine to a greater
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or lesser extent even our apparently free, conscious decisions and 
actions*
In spite of these important contributions to theology the crucial 
and pivotal part in my proposed paradigmatic relationship between theo­
logical soteriology and healing through existential psychoanalysis is 
theology fs rediscovery of the meaning of grace from the interpersonal 
relationship which exists between patient and analyst. "It is important 
to know that theology had to learn from the psychoanalytic method the 
meaning of grace, the meaning of forgiveness as acceptance of those 
who are unacceptable and not of those who are the good people* On the 
contrary, the non-good people are those who are accepted, or in reli­
gious language, forgiven, justified, whatever you wish to call it*
The word grace, which had lost any meaning, has gained a new meaning 
by the way in which the analyst deals with his patient. He accepts him. 
He does not say, 'You are acceptable*, but he accepts him. And that 
is the way in which, according to religious symbolism, God deals with 
us; and it is the way every minister and every Christian should deal 
with the other person."(p.124, Theo. of Culture)♦
Furthermore, Tillich writes? "If the counsellor or confessor if 
somebody who knows the human situation, he can be a medium of grace 
for him who comes to him, a medium for the feeling of overcoming the 
cleavage between essence and existence."(p.125> Theo. Of Culture).
The above comments may help to determine the limitations as well as
the possibilities of psychoanalysis and pastoral counseling. If the 
analyst mediates certain healing effects by certain movements which 
emphasize the difference between sin and sickness, realistic respon­
sibility for changing direction (repentance in religious terminology), 
and mediates a form of grace and forgiveness by his acceptance, then 
in vhat way is he involved in salvation and what limitations does 
the lack of religious symbols impose on him?
Whereas Tillich sees the psychoanalytic interpretation of man's 
predicament as raising the question that is implied in man's very 
existence, the task of systematic theology for Tillich is to "•••show 
that the religious symbols are answers to this question." Therefore 
he believes that there is no theistic or non-theistic psychoanalysis. 
Freud himself agrees with this view and in one of his letters to 
Oskar Pfister he writes; "In itself psycho-analysis is neither reli­
gious nor non—religious, but an important tool which both priest and 
layman can use in the service of the sufferer. I am very much struck 
by the fact that it never occurred to me how extraordinarily helpful 
the psycho—analytic method might be in pastoral work."(P.17, Letters 
of Freud and Pfister). But Tillich helps clarify the relation and 
its limitations: "Whenever the analysts.•.give an answer, they do it 
not as existentialists. They do it from other traditions, whetherr 
it be Catholic, Protestant, Lutheran, humanist, or socialist. Tradi­
tions come from everywhere, but they do not come from the question.
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This means that the existentialist (psychoanalyst) raises the question 
and analyses the human situation to which the theologian can then give 
the answer, an answer given not from the question hut from somewhere 
else, and not from the human situation itself."(p.175> Theology of 
Culture)#
Tillich distinguishes between the universal existential conditions 
of human reality (e.g. existential anxiety over finitude and threat of 
non—being, existehtial loneliness,*and existential self-estrangement) 
and the acute illnesses and disease entities which are to a certain 
extent rooted in the existential conditions but which pass beyond 
them into the province of disintegration and disease. Later we will 
discuss the difference between existential and pathological anxiety.
For Tillich psychotherapy and existential psychoanalysis deals with 
the pathological forms of human existence and with a certain, limited 
type of healing while the universal existential condition of mankind 
is saved or healed in a wider sense by the use of Christian symbols; 
psychotherapy and analysis is not ultimately concerned with or able 
to heal the existential conditions and theology and pastoral care is 
not primarily concerned with healing the pathological state of men 
except as it accompanies the ultimate task of healing the general 
existential condition of mankind. In Tillich^ scheme theology and 
pastoral care is primarily concerned with healing the universal 
existential condition of man by evoking an authentic ultimate con—
cern by the mediation of Christian symbols. Psychotherapy is relegated 
to describing the existential predicament and healing men plagued by 
psychogenic diseases.
The above distinction is helpful and understandable but perhaps 
it is at the same time too categorical to fit the facts. Tillich has 
been asked to define the difference between existential and patholo­
gical anxiety, presumably to allow the healers involved to pursue their 
rightful tasks without confusion, but the problem is difficult and it 
has given rise to disagreement among theologians and psychologists alike. 
Many psychotherapists including Karen Horney believe that some anxiety 
is creative and motivates positively while other levels constitute des­
tructive and disintegrative forces. The study and definition of dis­
ease processessome of'which seem to be autonomous, self-regulating 
entities, is still imcomplete. Therefore, although the question of 
distinguishing existential from pathological anxierty is not moot, 
it at least begs an incomplete and tentative answer for the present.
A more important matter involves what might be called for lack 
of a better name the ‘ultimate movements1 of the analyst in his thera­
peutic relationship to the mentally ill patient. The analyst may med­
iate through his personhood the ultimate truths embodied in the Christian 
proclamation and its symbols. Therefore the analyst may unknowingly 
and implicitly mediate grace in a real and meaningful and immediate 
way to his patient by his acceptance of those who .are unacceptable.
The analyst may act 'grace-fully' toward his patient Because of the 
dictates of technique or because he was accepted by his own analyst 
during his training; in other words, these so-called ultimate move­
ments may not be self-consciously Christian or theologically motivated.
The patient, having meaningfully experienced the truth of grace 
through acceptance and the healing connected with it, may wrongfully 
attribute this truth and power in an ultimate sense to the analyst him­
self or to the psychoanalytic method and thereby make this source 
the object of his ultimate concern. Some analysts have proudJLy accepted 
this undeserved honor for themselves in a moment of unguarded countortrans­
ference, or, more modestly, they have encouraged this attitude on be­
half of their patient toward psychoanalysis as a quasi-religious, ideo­
logical reality. In this situation Tillich offers helpful insight; the 
acceptance of a patient by an analyst is, insofar as it has its origin 
by whatever motivation in the analyst himself, conditional and relative. 
This grace or acceptance may help effect healing of the illness in 
the patient but it does not provide the ultimate ground required for 
healing the deeper existential situation of the patient as man.
The healing dimension of psychotherapy is penultimate and con­
ditional. The ultimate healing of man in his existentiality is rel­
igious, unconditional, and absolute. Existential psychoanalysis is 
not properly concerned with the ultimate dimensions of healing or 
with developing an ultimate concern in its patients; furthermore, it
lacks the authority and symbols to mediate these 'religious' realities. 
Theology is primarily concerned with ultimates and it possesses the sym­
bols and authority by which to mediate these ultimates to men. There­
fore acceptance of the patient by the analyst and the subsequent self- 
acceptance by the patient is not synonymous with the religious exper­
ience of grace, forgiveness, and justification.
Nevertheless, the original thesis still stands; insofar as psycho­
analytic principles which operate in and through the analytical relation­
ship reflect certain ultimate principles and religious relationships 
(i.e. God's relationship to his creation and especially in and through 
Jesus as the Christ), there are ultimate dimensions to this particular 
healing process even though they remain unsymbolized or unverbalized.
The pastor as counselor, insofar as his time and training permit, may 
be involved in mental healing as well as ministering to the existential 
condition of man by using religious symbols to mediate the ultimate 
dimensions of grace, forgiveness, and reconciliation as revealed by 
the Ground of Being Itself. Therefore he bridges the Ti&lichian cate­
gories and mediaties healing in its narrower, conditional sense as 
well as in its wider, unconditional sense.
This is the crux of the thesis and the key to understanding the 
relationship which exists between theology and existential! psycho­
analysis and the value it has for the pastor as counselor. Within 
the structure of depth psychology and especially within the analytic
relationship between doctor and patient there are principles in effect 
and movements taking place that, in some analogous form, parallel and 
resemble those which Christian theology has represented with its reli­
gious symbols. This analogy or paradigm of relationship: has, positively 
speaking, not only led theology to rediscovery and new understanding 
of such traditional Christian concepts as 'sin', 'freedom*, and 'grace* 
but has also, negatively speaking, led certain analysts ito represent 
the psychoanalytic method as an ideology, as a way of ultimate salva­
tion in itself, thereby becoming an absolute truth over against the
Christian religion. Becoming enamored with the fruit of the tru&h,
themselves
some psychoanalysts claimed this partial truth for itee-fc# while ig­
noring its connection with the larger ground of truth from which it
nine! ring
grew. As a result or p4uk4»g, this newly rediscovered truth and separ­
ating it from the life-giving roots of the whole, the truth became 
spoilled and dangerous just as a rotton fruit may become poisonous.
At various times psychoanalysis has become perverted and idolatrous 
in the Tillichian sense that something relative is regarded as absolute. 
The tendency for psychoanalysis to become idolatrous has several 
sources. The first and most obvious reason is the apparent success 
of psychoanalysis in dealing with nervous disorders. Failures are fre- 
quentAiSiey are usually ascribed to faulty technique or^'the patient 
rather than to the psychoanalytic method itself. Secondly, psycho­
analytic training as well as its societies and professional associa—
as seen by
tions tend to be closed and almost cultic, especially the outsider*
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The clientel is select and few in number due to the expense and time 
involved which not only boosts social status but also the cultic, 
exclusive aspects* Thirdly, the movement is modern, systematic, and 
logical, these qualities being especially appealing to the modern 
mind in contrast to to the more mysterious and more traditional 
Christian religion. Lastly and most importantly, psychoanalysts in 
their typically self-conscious way have sensed, intuitively in some 
cases and more rationally in others, the deeper truth reflected in 
the principles embodied in their professional methods and personal . 
encounters* Psychoanalysis has recovered a more realistic view of 
human personality especially in its irrational aspects; it has helped 
describe profoundly what Tillich calls the existential predicament 
of man. Psychoanalysis provides a deeper understanding of psycho­
pathology and psychotherapy* It has helped theology to rediscover 
the meaning of old religious symbols, and it has acted in a 'grace­
ful* manner toward men in the interest of their healing*
With such phenomenal powers invested in this movement it is at 
least understandable, though no less unacceptable, that it should 
become an absolute for many men, an irresistible alternative to the 
Christian God and traditional religion. Psychoanalysis has been rep­
resented as a system of truth worthy of men’s ultimate concern, as a 
religion without God, fashioned in the minds of men for the enlighten-
ment and betterment of human life. As an object of idolatry psycho­
analysis is a formidable challenge to the genuine ultimates.
By way of illustration let us now consider some doctrines common 
to both psychoanalysis and theology. The first example is Freud's 
doctrine of man: "Man according to him, as infinite libido which never 
can be satisfied and which therefore produces the desire to get rid of 
oneself, the desire he has called the death’instinct. His dismay.about 
culture shows that he is very consistent in his negative judgements 
about man as existentially distorted,"(p,119» Tillich, Theo, of Culture). 
Freud's pessimistic view of mankind captured the reality and depth of 
man's existential predicament; but Freud could not escape the exist­
ential condition he had perceived nor could he distinguish an essential 
nature. Despair should have been the logical outcome of his thought, 
"Now, fortunately, Freud, like most great men, was not consistent.
With respect to the healing process, he knew something about the healed 
man, man in the third form, teleological man,"(p,120,Ibid,). Freud's 
existential pessimism was ameliorated by his guarded optimism o^er the 
teleological possibilities of healing; this healing was purely human­
istic and predominantly psychoanalytic,
Freud's doctrine or idea of God "•..turns out to be at bottom a 
magnified version of the human father. The transformation of the 
father into God takes place both in the history of the race,,, and in 
the histpry of individuals who, in adult life, project upon the world
the infantile memory of the father, and raise this image to the rank 
of a Father God, The father who gave them life, protected them, and 
demanded their obedience, becomes the God who is similarly creator, 
preserver, and lawgiver. The main point that he wishes to make.,,is 
that a religious belief id determined by the psychological history of 
the person who holds it, and that such a belief is essentially infantile 
and neurotic. It is a projection of the nursury upon the world, and 
is thus a flight from reality. For Freud...the real world is the 
rigidly determined atheistic cosmos of nineteenth-century naturalism.
No Father God reigns over it, but - as he expressed it - 'dark, unfeeling 
and unloving powers determine human destiny',"(p.109> Macquarrie, 
Twentieth-Century Religious Thought).
However, in spite of his frequent invectives against God, he took 
a pragmatic attitude toward religion. Because the permanent success 
of psychoanalysis largely depends on sublimating the instinctual drives, 
religion is a possible option. In a letter to Oskar Pfister, a long­
time friend of Freud and a pastor—psychoanalyst, Freud wrote: "In 
your case,••young persons,..are personally drawn towards you and are 
ready for sublimation, and to sublimation in its most comfortable form, 
namely the religious. But you are in the fortunate position of being 
able to lead them to God and bringing about what in this one respect 
was the happy state of earlier times when religious faith stifled
the neurosis," Freud himself was not religious, though, and his patients 
had to find in humanity what he was unable to promise them from above 
and was unable to supply them with himself, (p,l6, Letters of Freud and 
Pfister).
Three comments are necessary. First, not only is Freud gloriously 
inconsistent'regarding religion but he is no theologian; even in sub­
limation true religion is not necessarily comfortable nor does it 
guarantee some Eden-like state of happiness, Karl Barth has most 
pointedly demolished the idea of comfortable religion and denied the 
authenticity of happiness as a criterion of faith. Secondly, and we 
shall discuss this question in the section on'transference', Freud 
raises the crucial question regarding the importance of the quality 
and kind of ultimate concern held by the analyst or pastor and its 
influence on the patient or counselee. Thirdly, Freud, being unable 
to promise his patients anything from above or from his own personal 
ultimate concern, cannot see or understand the deepest religious di­
mensions which underlie his whole method and work. Because the ulti­
mate roots of the truths contained in his theories were hidden from 
his eyes, Freud had to abandon his own patients to 'humanity1 to find 
the value and meaning of their lives; in the end of the matter he was 
unable to deal with the existential problem of estrangement as des­
cribed elsewhere by Tillich.
Neo-Freudians and Adlerians have abandoned many of Freud's in—
sights and consequently they have lost contact with the seriousness 
of the human predicament* "Other psychoanalysts have described the 
human situation as correctible and amendable, as a weakness only." 
Under such a doctrine healing consists merely of removing pathologi­
cal anxiety and offensive behavior primarily by re-education through 
personal insight gained from analysis* Obviously such a position 
leaves mein's healing or 'salvation' in the hands of medical and 
psychological specialists and the question of God is ignored or out- 
rightly denied. "But we can ask: is mem essentially healthy? If he 
is, only his basic anxiety has to be taken away; for example, if you 
save him from the evil influences of society, of competition and things 
like that, everything will be all right. Men like Fromm speak of the 
possibility of becoming an autonomous, non-authoritarian personality 
who develops himself according to reason."(p.122, Tillich, Theo. of 
Culture).
Carl Jung, an early and devoted Freudian who broke away from the 
master to found his own school, has probably contributed more to the 
psychology of religion and its place and function in the human psyche 
than any other leading depth psychologist. The rift between Freud and 
Jung is most obvious on the topic of religion. They have two radically 
different opinions on this subject; in the first instance, Jung id not 
a dogmatic atheist. Secondly, "Whereas Ereud thought of religion as 
essentially neurotic, as a failure on the part of the religious person 
to resolve his problems, Jung attributes a positive value to all re—
ligions. For Freud, religion is pathological hut for Jung, it is and 
ou^ht to be health-giving."(p.109, Macquarrie). Whereas Freud saw re­
ligion as an optional and easy sublimation of the basic drives, Jung 
feels that adoption of a religious attitude is a prerequisite to healing 
people, especially people in the second half of their lives. Jung 
writes: 11'Among all my patients in the second half of life - that is 
to say, over thirty-five — there has not been one whose problem in the 
last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life. It 
is safe to say that every one of them fell ill because he had lost 
that which the living religions of every age have given to their fol­
lowers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain 
his religious outlook.'"(p.109,Ibid.).
This attitude is extremely important to the pastor in his role 
as therapist and/or religious counselor. Whereas an analyst is theo­
retically required to be neutral in his relationship with the patient, 
in practice he probably will betray his religious attitude or ultimate 
concern. This is or should be accidental and it may even be harmful 
if it remains part of an unanalysed transference neurosis. However 
as Jung points out, the adoption of a genuine religious attitude, re­
gardless of content, may ultimately be helpful in the healing process.
The pastor as counselor has a special advantage and responsibility 
insofar as his religious affiliation and commitment is obvious and in­
separable from his role as a pastor—counselor. Unlike the analyst he
may exorcise his wider responsibility ox helping his counselee to find 
a religious viewpoint, although he must be cautious that this does not 
become part of a transference neurosis. Technically speaking, the 
pastor in his role as therapist is bound by the same rules of neutrality 
that bind the professional analyst* Practically speaking, though, when 
both pathological and existential healing are combined in the same 
person, the emergence of religious faith or ultimate concern may 
properly take place in conjunction with the psychotherapeutic part of 
the relationship* The ultimate truths which underlie and underwrite 
much of psychoanalytic theory, technique, and relationship may be 
experienced and lead to recognition of these ultimate dimensions and 
from there to a living Christian faith* Tillich rightly points out 
that although the priestly and medical function may be united in one 
man, the separate functions must be distinguished and neither confused 
with the other nor may one be eliminated by the other* The psycho­
therapeutic process and the truths contained therein may, via its 
paradigmatic relationship to God's healing movements, lead to an ul­
timate concern in the reality of Jesus as the Christ.
Jungian psychology is generally thought to be more helpful to 
pastors in their counseling than any other school of psychological 
thought; Jung offers a deep insight into religious symbolism. Jung 
takes religion seriously as a part of man's psychic life and is phe—
nominological in method, being based on experience of the numinous.
It might aptly be described as a metaphysical mysticism, "Through 
Jung's spiritual works there runs a peculiar, closely knit religious 
dialectic, an almost inaudible communing with the Unknown*' If religion 
as generally understood Crests on one’s capacity to let oneself be pro­
foundly affected by powers that transcend consciousness, then the first 
and essential thing about it is this influence and not the intellectual 
formulation of such experiences; the reality of these seizures is prior 
to the truth of their conscious formulation, Jung has once more made 
room for this reality in psychology,"(p,7-8, Schaer, Religion and Cure 
of Souls in Jung's Psychology)•
Jung's view of man misses much of the seriousness attributed to 
it by Breud and Christian anthropology. Consequently his attitude 
toward tho healing of man is rather optimistically based on the patient 
contacting, understanding and integrating the various paits and dynamisms 
of the unconscious into a synthetic and higher self. From a theological 
point of v&ew certain criticisms are in order. All of the schools of 
depth psychology with the possible exception of Freud's miss the ser­
iousness of man's existential predicament and estrangement. In all 
these representatives of contemporary depth psychology we miss the 
depths of Freud, "We miss the feeling for the irrational element 
that we have in Freud and in much of the existentialist literature,"
(p.122, Theo. of Culture), The doctrine of God exists only as a rather
naive denial in Freud and most of the other schools ignore the sub­
ject altogether, Jung's concept of God and religion in general is 
mystical and consequently vague and poorly defined.
Having dealt with the doctrine of man and the doctrine of God as 
it appears in several areas of depth psychology, let us now consider 
the important doctrine of psychological healing and its relation to 
theological healing or soteriology, "It is,,,possible to relate the 
different ways of healing to the reality of the New Being and its sign­
ificance for healing. The basic statement,,,is that the integration 
of the personal center is possible only by its elevation to what can 
be called symbollically the divine center and that this is possible 
only through the impact of the divine power, the Spiritual Presence,
At this point health and salvation are identical, both being the ele­
vation of man to the transcendent unity of the divine life. Health 
in the ultimate sense of the word, health as identical with salvation, 
is life in faith and &ove« In so far as it is created by the Spirit­
ual Presence, the health of unambiguous life is reached; and although 
unambiguous, it is not total but fragmentary, and it is open to re­
lapses into the ambiguities of life in all its dimensions,
"The question now is how this unambiguous though fragmentary 
health, created by the Spirit, is related to the healing activities 
under the different dimensions. The first answer is negative from 
both sides: The healing impact of the Spiritual Presence doers not re—
place the ways of healing under the different dimensions of life. And, 
conversely, these ways of healing cannot replace the healing impact of 
the Spiritual Presence. With the development of psychotherapy as an 
independent way of healing, problems arose in the directions both of 
medicine and religion. Today psychotherapy (including all schools of 
psychological healing) often tries to elimate both medical healing and 
the healing function of the Spiritual Presence. The first is usually 
a matter of practice rather than of theory, the second mostly a matter 
of principle. The psychoanalyst, for example, claims that he can over­
come the negativities of man's existential situation - anxiety, guilt, 
despair, emptiness, and so on. But in order to support his claim the 
analyst must deny both the existential estrangement of man from him­
self and the possibility of his transcendant reunion with himself; 
that is, he must deny the vertical line in man's encounter with 
reality. If he is not ■willing to deny the vertical line, because he 
is aware of an unconditional concern in himself, he must accept the 
question of an existential estrangement. He must, for example, be willing 
to distinguish between existential anxiety to be conquered by a cour­
age created by the Spiritual Presence and a neurotic anxiety to be 
conquered by analysis."(p.299—300, Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol,3)* 
Tillich's comments are surprisingly accurate when applied to our 
foregoing study. Freud, who came closest to grasping the seriousness 
of man's existential predicament, was realistic and moderately opti—
mistic about dealing with psychopathology but was led to despair about 
ultimate healing. Existential estrangement was hopeless to Freud who 
denied the reality of Spiritual Presence and all other symbolic reli­
gious truths.
On the other hand, other schools of depth psychology and psycho­
therapy lack Freud's profound insight into man's existentiality and 
therefore are able to offer relatively easy solutions and total healing 
to men and society as a whole, or so they suppose. Their systems are 
highly optimistic and yet they smack of superficiality and reflect 
a t%/o-dimensional image of reality which lacks the substantiality and 
depth of the Christian or even Freudian world. They offer lightweight 
solutions to an equally lightweight but partial world.
The different schools of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis either 
give the existential predicament of man its proper gravity and serious­
ness and therefore are unable to transcend it for its weight, or they 
heal the symptoms leaving the nuclear conflict and existential rift 
untouched. Therefore psychotherapy cannot replace the healing impact 
of the Spiritual Presence. There is a modern reaction to the above 
trend; some churchmen and even a few psychologists, notably 0. Hobart 
Mowrer of Illinois University (USA), have claimed certain healing 
prerogatives in both its pathological and ultimate forms for the 
church.
He (Mowrer) "...is demanding that the catagories of sin, real
guilt and what he describes as the repression of true conscience be 
reinstated as the causes of neurosis and mental illness. We are thus 
in the presence of one who is not a priest or minister but who insists 
that sick people be packed off to confession and a change of conduct, 
with the help, it must be added, of a doctor and a therapeutic group.
It is, Dr. Mowrer declares, the kind of ideas the church has, not 
that psychoanalysis has that can heal."(p. 124, Lynch, RedbooB). (Also 
see Mowrer's books The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion and The New 
Group Therapy). Although Mower correctly sees n w  possibilities for 
both psychotherapy and religious healing in the church, he oversimpli­
fies the problem and naively reduces all mental illness to existential- 
religious factors. There may be a relationship between sin, real guilt 
and repressed conscience, but it is not always direct nor does it 
account for all psychopathology or even just the neuroses.
The healing impact of the Spiritual Presence does not, therefore, 
negate psychotherapy as a healing art in its own right. "The ways of 
healing do not need to impede each other, as the dimensions of life do 
not conflict with each other. The correlate of the multidimensional 
unity of life is the multidimensional unity of healing. No individual 
can exercise all the ways of healing with authority, although more 
than one way may be used by some individuals. But even if there is 
a union of different functions, for example, of the priestly and medi­
cal function in one man, the functions must be distinguished and neither
confused with the other, nor mny one he eliminated by the other.
Finally, healing in its separate forms has an eschatological char­
acter. For instance, a neurosis may be relatively cured, the main con­
flicts resolved, symptoms relieved, and re-education of behavior accom­
plished; but this is an ongoing task and process rather than a once— 
and-for—all event. In this sense it is never complete or final. An 
analysis may be terminated but the healing process must be sustained 
from day to day. If this condition obtains in psychotherapy, so much 
more is it valid for ultimate or religious healing and the pastor's 
part in it. "Healing is fragmentary in all its forms. Under the con­
dition of existence it remains fragmentary and stands under the 'in 
spite of' of which the Cross of the Christ is the symbol. No healing, 
not even healing under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, can liber­
ate the individual from the necessity of death. Therefore the question 
of healing, and this means the question of salvation, goes beyond the 
healing of the individual to the healing through history and beyond 
history; it leads us to the question of the Eternal Life as symbol­
ized by the Kingdom of God. Only universal healing is total healing — 
salvation beyond ambiguities and fragments."(p.300, Tillich, Syst. Theo.
Psychoanalysis: Orthodox and Existential
Although our study is primarily concerned with existential psycho­
analysis, this type of analysis, though differing significantly from 
orthodox psychoanalysis on crucial issues, is largely based upon and 
derived from the theory and principles of the Freudians. The relation­
ship of existential analysis to orthodox psychoanalysis might be likened 
to the grafting of a young branch ’onto a still young but rapidly de­
veloping tree. Orthodox: psychoanalysis is still rapidly developing but 
has attained a certain stability and maturity of its own; existential 
psychoanalysis is, even when compared to the young field of psychoanal­
ysis, a relatively new development and largely untried on any wide scale. 
The use of this particular simile, fraught with dangers and misunder­
standings as it may be, seems somehow appropriate in its limited way.
As the name indicates, existential psychoanalysis is still a form 
of psychoanalysis, the origin and foremit developer of which is Sig­
mund Freud and his successors. His theories and techniques, modified 
as they are by new developments and by other schools within the gen­
eral psychoanalytic movement, form the fundamental matrix (or trunk, 
if you will) in which they grow and in terms of which deviations are 
defined. Understanding existential psychoanalysis without understand­
ing its 'parent*, orthodox psychoanalysis, is impossible. Existential 
analysts adopt and practice orthodox methods and theory diverging only 
where necessary.
On the other hand, the analogy of ’grafting* seemed appropriate 
because, although still a psychoanalytic discipline, existential psycho­
analysis incorporates an explicit philosophical approach which makes 
it somehow different from and alien to the more scientific analytic 
body to which it attaches itself. For all its similarity to and con­
nections with orthodoxy, existential psychoanalysis is not indigenous 
to the larger body. Furthermore, in any graft there is mutual influence 
between the parts involved. The influence of orthodox analysis on the 
existential branch is obvious and proportionately greater than the re­
ciprocal influence. However, existential psychoanalysis has already 
led to the adaptation and in some cases the replacement of certain 
parts of the larger genre of psychoanalytic knowledge. In any case, 
only time will tell the future of existential analysis.
If the larger body of psychoanalysis dies or wanes in influence 
and truth-value, existential analysis will die or wane with it. Simi­
larly, since it depends so heavily on the insights of existential philo­
sophy, the future of existential analysis depends in part on the influ­
ence and truth—value of its philosophical parent. Or again, perhaps 
the synthesis will prove unviable and existential analysis will only 
flourish momentarily before withering away, leaving little mark on 
psychoanalysis in general. The final possibility and* to the writer's 
mind, the best probability is that the existential-analytic branch will 
become the most useful and valuable part of the larger movement, com—
bining the* best of two modern movements.
Speculatively speaking, I believe that the graft or union will 
work to the benefit of both the psychoanalytic field in general and 
existential analysis in particular. This will probably occur because, 
as Tillich puts it, "psychoanalysis belongs fundamentally to the whole 
existentialist movement of the twentieth century; it is a fact that 
psychoanalysis and existentialism have been connected with each other 
from the very beginning."(p.lip, Theo. of Culture). The success of 
their synthesis in existential analysis, if it in fact occurs, will 
be due to their respective profound insights into man's existential 
predicament. "The basic point is that both existentialism and depth 
psychology (and including psychoanalysis as the therapeutic form of 
depth psychology) die interested in the description of man's exist­
ential predicament — in time and space, in finitude and estrangement.1 
(p.117* Theology of Cul.).
Combined in the one discipline of existential analysis these 
two analysers of man's predicament should strengthen and reinforce 
their fundamental insights while aiding theology in its task and 
especially aiding the paslsor as counselor who is met by the existential 
and yet meets it from a teleological perspective. "Theology has re­
ceived tremendous gifts from existentialism and psychoanalysis; exist­
entialists and analysts themselves do not need to know that they have 
given to theology these great things. But the theologians should
Having made certain theological qualifications regarding exist­
ential analysis, it may become immeasurably helpful to the pastor.
The pastor in his counseling role meets men and women caught up in the 
distress of their existential situations; knowledge of existential 
analysis will aid him to grasp their problems and understand them as 
his own, and it also should allow him to draw together these pieces 
of broken, existential humanity and.relate them to their essential 
humanity via the religious symbols at his disposal. With this ulti­
mate goal in mind let us briefly outline psychoanalysis and then out­
line its recent offspring, existential psychoanalysis.
Orthodox Psychoanalysis —
The word 'psychoanalysis' has three general meanings: "It is a 
research procedure to investigate human thinking processes, emotions 
and behavior. It is a psychological theory of personality structure 
and function. Finally, it is a treatment technique."(p.144, Menninger, 
You and Psychiatry). Since psychoanalysis as a research procedure is 
so intertwined with its personality theory and its psychotherapeutic 
technique, let us begin with the psychoanalytic theory of personality.
Freud himself is generally associated with the discovery and es­
pecially the development of theory concerning the unconscious mind.
Mind for Freud consisted of the unconscious, preconscious, and con­
scious sectors. Within this tripartite framework exist the three
major systems or provinces, namely the id, the ego, and the superego, 
all functioning in dynamic interaction, "Although each of these pro­
vinces of the total personality has its own functions, properties, com­
ponents, operating principles, dynamisms, and mechanisms, they interact 
so closely with one another that it is difficult if not impossible to 
disentangle their effects and weigh their relative contribution to man's 
behavior. Behavior is nearly always the product of an interaction 
among these three systems; rarely does one system operate to the ex­
clusion of the other tvo,"(p.32, Hall and Lindsey, Theories' of Person­
ality),
Although the newer ego-psychology hypothesizes the co-origin and 
development of id and ego, Freudian analysts believe the id to be the 
original and largest system of the personality, the one grom which the 
ego and superego subsequently become differentiated • Although ser­
iously questioned since Freud's time, we shall confine our discussion 
of the id to the two basic instincts described by Freud, namely Eros 
(the love instinat) and Thanatos (the destructive instinct), both acting 
according to the pleasure principle. Contrary to popular conceptions, 
Eros represented the synthetic-constructive forces and those which 
tend to bind together; these forces serve the purpose of individual 
survival and racial propagation, Thanatos acts in dialectical opposi­
tion to Eros and represents those forces which undo connections, dis­
integrate and reduce the more comples to the less complex.
"The ego comes into existence because the needs of the organism 
require appropriate transactions with the objective world of reality.
The basic distinction between the id and the ego is that the former
, . , . , . latter
knows only tne subjective reality of the mind whereas the letter dis­
tinguishes between things in the mind and things in the external world." 
(p.33-34, Ibid.). This principle of operation found in the ego is known 
as the reality principle and it is responsible for reality testing, or 
distinguishing what is real and what is merely hallucination, memory 
traces, etc.. The ego is primarily conscious and controls the 
cognitive-intellectual functions and the higher mental processes.
Furthermore and most importantly, "The ego is said to be the ex­
ecutive of the personality because it controls the gateways to action, 
selects the features of the environment to which it will respond, and
decides what instincts will be satisfied and in what manner. In per- 
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formingjthese highly important executive functions, the ego has to try 
to integrate the often conflicting demands of the id, the superego, 
and the external world. This is not an easy task a#d often places a 
great strain upon the ego." The integrative capacity of the ego is 
the primary factor in determining health or mental illness, especially 
neurosis. Alexander considers neurosis to be the failure of the in­
tegrative functions of the ego; what "...the ego cannot integrate 
harmoniously in its own system becomes repressed and therefore remains 
excluded from the learning process and later adjustment."(p.29, Psycho­
analysis and Psychotherapy).
'The superego is generally thought to he "...the internal repre- 
sentitive of the traditional values and ideals of society as inter­
preted to the child by his parents, and enforced by means of a system 
of rewards and punishments imposed on the child. The superego is the 
moral arm of the personality; it represents the ideal rather than the 
real and it strives for perfection rather than pleasure. Its main 
concern is to decide whether something is right or wrong so that it 
can act in accordance with the moral standards authorized by the agents 
of society."(p.35, Hall and Lindzey),
framework
Having described the basis structural let us briefly
consider the developmental or dynamic aspects of personality. Funda­
mental to our understanding of existential analysis and also to the 
discussion in the second section of this paper is Freud's theory of 
anxiety. Anxiety is a state of tension which functions as a warning 
of impending danger. According, to Freud anxiety has three forms; 
reality, neurotic, and moral anxiety. "The basic type is reality anx­
iety or fear of real dangers in the external world; from it are derived 
the other two types. Neurotic anxiety is the fear that tke instincts 
will get out of control and cause the person to do something for which 
he will be punished. Moral anxiety is fear of the conscience."(p..45, 
Hall and Lindzey). Existential analysts and theologians differ with 
Freud on this point. They recognize an existential anxiety based on 
the threat of non-existence (being overcome by non-being) which exists
universally in mankind. Another issue is raised concerning guilt- 
feelings which, for Freud, may be either neurotic or based on reality; 
the existentialists posit an existential guilt again grounded in onto­
logy. These are both key questions but we will reserve comment on 
them until the second section of the paper.
Freud discovered that the early years of infancy and childhood 
are decisive for the character structure of the person. "Indeed,
Freud felt that personality was pretty well formed by the end of the 
fifth year, and that subsequent growth consisted for the most part of 
elaborating this basic structure, Freud believed that the child is 
father of the man".(p.46, Hall and Lindzey). This orthodox doctrine 
is radically altered even to the point of rejection by the existential 
school of analysis. The existential concept of time and its emphasis 
on the present moment and the importance of decisions made therein 
obviates much of Freud's developmental determinism.
This attitude leaves three alternatives to the existi&lial analysts 
(l) They must ascribe an ego to the infant (as in modern ego-psychology) 
and subsequently attribute proportionate responsibility for decisions 
to the child from birth. This would be difficult if not impossible 
to substantiate scientifically; in fact, science tends to disprove 
such ideas. Secondly, they might subscribe to a modified Freudian view 
which admits that certain character structures and tendencies are more 
or less developed during infancy and childhood which condition and
limit, not determine, developments and decisions made subsequent to the 
age of discretion.
Thirdly, they might postulate an absolute freedom which makes all
things possible at any point in the life of a person; such a view of
S o r + r e * s
human reality would approximate concept of human freedom
which identifies authentic humanity with human freedom which is es­
sentially lack. Because man is his freedom, he, when fulfilling him­
self authentically, takes total responsibility in the 'eternal now1 
for his past, present, and future; i.e. in the words of hartre himself, 
"Freedom is existence, and in it existence precedes essence." Under 
these conditions, "The central principle of existential psychoanalysis," 
according to Hollo May, "will not be libido or will to power, but the 
individual's choice of being."(p.13, Sartre, Existential Psychoanalysis) 
Furthermore, Sartre points out that "The goal of existential psycho­
analysis is to rediscover through these empirical, concrete projects 
the original mode in which each mem has chosen his being."(p. 115, Ibid.) 
However, when existential analysts deal with 'absolute' freedom, they 
must be careful to explain themselves carefully so as not to forget 
the 'given-ness' of our 'throwness-of-existence* or tread needlessly 
on the toes of theologians; otherwise existential analysis will be­
come absurd and fall into disrepute as a healing art.
In the developmental process man implements two methods to aid 
in maturation: displacement and identification. Displacement is the 
process of substituting an object when the original object—choice is
inaccessible. "A displacement which produces a higher cultural achieve­
ment is called a sublimation."(p.48, Hall and Lindzey),
The process of identification is of great interest to theology 
and the psychology of religion because it raises important questions 
concerning 'Pauline mysticism'. Speaking in strictly psychological 
terms, "Identification may be defined as the method by which a person 
takes over the features of another person and makes them a corporate 
part of his own personality. He -learns to reduce tension by modeling 
his behavior after that of someone else. We choose as models those 
who seem to be more successful in gratifying their needs than we are." 
Identification, as opposed to imitation signifies a rather permanent 
acquisition to personality. Secondly, "Identification is also a met­
hod by which one may regain an object that has been lost. By identi­
fying with a loved person who has died or from whom one has been sep­
arated, the lost person becomes reincarnated as an incorporated feature 
of one 's personality.1 (p.46-47, Hall and Lindzey).
Although this psychological process of identification may help 
to explain certain superficial 'imitations of Christ' and other reli­
gious phenomenon (especially neurotic conversion symtoms such as sti- 
mata, etc.), it cannot plumb the ultimate depths of the religious 
realities or what Bonhoeffer describes as 'Christ—formation' in the 
believer. Psychological identification as described above and as re­
lated to these religious subjects may be criticised at several levels.
First of all, Christ as a model of identification is unsatisfactory 
because he was not successful in gratifying many of the need3 of which 
Freud speaks. In fact, with Christ ’in us* life mny become more dif­
ficult and create more intense conflicts and tensions than without him. 
Secondly, we do not choose Christ as model but we are chosen of Christ 
and any reality of Christ in us is given and we are recipients and not 
the appropriators. Thirdly, psychological identification lacks the 
reciprocity that exists in our relationship with Christ. Not only is 
He 'in us* (ll Cor.13:5, Horn.8:10) but believers are 'in Christ' (i Cor 
1:30, II Cor.5:17, Gal.3:28). Identification as a means of regaining 
a lost object or reincarnating a dead person into one's own personality 
is not useful in explaining the Christian's relationship to his Cruci­
fied Lord. First of all, this kind of identification is unhealthy 
and neurotic and reveals an inability to come to grips with the finalijr 
and reality of death; secondly, it loses sight of the Resurrection 
and the reality of the Living Christ as mediated by the Holy Spirit 
to the believer.
Identification as a psychological phenomenon is more relevant 
to the pastor in his general relationships and especially in his 
counseling relationships. Many young people in the church use the 
minister as a model for identification, especially if he is young 
and has a successful or popular personality. Similarly, as an author­
ity figure and counselor he is the object of valid identifications as
well as neurotic transferences which should be resolved if possible; 
the former is helpful and may consummate the paradigmatic relationship 
described earlier by allowing the counseloe to pass via his relation­
ship with the pastor-iherapist from the conditional, penultimate con­
cerns of mental healing to recognition and appropriation for himself 
of the unconditional, ultimate concerns which underwrites the former 
and is explicit in the latter.
As a common figure of identification, the pastor should be con­
cerned about and aware of the 'image' which he projects and its authen­
ticity. Furthermore, pastors frequently become the object of unreal­
istic projections (e.g. omniscient, holy, omnipotent, etc.) which these 
people then identify with or toward which they develop mild transference 
neuroses. If the pastor accepts and tries to fulfill these unrealistic 
roles and images, he endangers himself as well as his counselees and 
parishioners. Pastors, especially while they are involved in counseling, 
should pray and live the words spoken by Carl Jung: "God forbid that I 
should become as good or as ’wise as my patients (or parishioners) think 
I am. "
The ego's use of defense mechanisms to allay excessive anxiety 
is of interest to all analysts and counselors regardless of school 
or theoretical commitment. These defensive measures of the ego make 
frequent appearances in any analysis or counseling and, though usually
used by the patient or counselee, the counselor or analyst is in con­
stant danger of introducing his own defensive mechanisms. Even if not 
analysed as such, they should be recognized and dealt with implicitly 
by the analyst. "The principal defenses are repression, projection, 
reaction formation, fixation, and regression. (Anna Freud, 1946).
All defense mechanisms have two characteristics in common: they deny, 
falsify, or distort reality, and they operate unconsciously so that 
the person is not aware of what is taking place." (p.49, Hall and Lind.).
Repression is probably the most basic and earliest defense mechan­
ism; it is a process whereby unpleasant experiences once predent to 
the consciousness are pushed back into the unconscious. If this re­
pressed material does not find suitable symbolic displacement or sub­
limation, it may manifest itself as a neurosis. Although repression 
is active in adults, it develops early in childhood. "The original 
repressions take place, in childhood to a large degree at least, under 
parental influences. Those impulses which find disapproval, punish­
ment, loss of parental love are the ones which the child represses.
The main factor is that the child's ego is weak and has no other 
means of defending itself against the onslaught of his own impulses 
than to exclude them from consciousness. Repression is, if not the 
only, the most important defense mechanism of the child. This whole 
process of repression can be reversed in the emotional atmosphere 
prevailing between patient and physician using the method of free
association. The physician reacts differently from the way the parents 
did - he does not evaluate and judge."(p.38, Alexander, Psychoanalysis 
and Psychotherapy).
Reaction formation concerns the replacement of a disturbing im­
pulse or feeling with its opposite and more acceptable feeling or im­
pulse.
"Rationalization is the device which we use to defend certain 
feelings, ideas or behavior by explaining very convincingly and appar­
ently logically that they are the result of something other than the 
demands of our irrational Ids."(p.117, Menninger, You and Psychiatry).
Projection externalizes disturbing, unacceptable, and threatening 
internal impulses ani feelings; it converts neurotic and moral anxiety 
to objective or reality anxiety. The person attributes his own un­
acceptable desires and.impulses to objects or other persons.
Personality Development: In the course of normal development the
personality passes through a series of rather distinct stages which 
Freud called the psychosexual stages of development. This particularly 
applies during the first six years and focuses on a specific gone of 
the body during each stage • These are the oral stage, the anal stage, 
the phallic stage and the genital stage.
During the oral stage (first year) the dominant modes of activity 
are incorporation and biting which help determine certain character 
traits. During this stage abundant love an4 protection, best expressed
in fondling and physical proximity, are absolutely essential to con­
tinued normal development in subsequent stages.
During the anal stage (second anO third years) feelings of discom­
fort as well as pleasurable sensations focus on the anal sphincters. 
Toilet training introduces self-discipline and rhythmic regulation of 
the instinctual impulse. For reasons we won't explain here, this 
stage can be the basis for creativity and productivity if successfully 
resolved.
During the phallic stage (third to sixth year approximately) cer­
tain difficulties arise. Sexual curiousty leads to, among other things, 
autoerotic activity (infantile masturbation) which is usually followed 
by the parent's censure of the child. This is associated with a lar­
ger and, for Freud at least, the most crucial conflict of life, the 
Oedipus conflict, which is named after the Greek tragic who murdered 
his father and married his mother. During the first two stages the 
child developed dependency-feelings and sexual feelings toward his 
mother, the source of all pleasure. The boy develops a deep resent­
ment of his father, his rival for the mother's time and attention 
and love. The child fears retaliation from his father for his love 
of the mother and hostility toward the father; as a result he develops 
castration anxiety.
The resolution of this primary conflict will largely determine 
his attitudes and responsive— tendencies towards authority for the
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remainder of his life; hence his relationship to God will be healthy 
or rigid and fixated according to his relationship to his father at 
this stage* "If a father is a 'good* father and expresses his love 
and affection for him, the child is aware of it,"(p.34, Menninger,
You and Psychiatry), The resolution of the Oedipal conflict will 
substantially determine whether the person responds realistically to 
analysts or pastors as authority figures. This distortion in relation­
ships and its dangers and implications for the pastor, himself in a 
position of authority, will be discussed under the subject of trans­
ference.
During the genital stage many narcissistic tendencies (self-love) 
are normally transformed into socialized, altruistic ones, “The per­
son becomes transformed from a pleasure-seeking, narcissistic infant 
into a reality-oriented, socialized adult. The principal biological 
function of the genital stage is that of reproduction,"(p.55» Hall 
and Lindzey), Most of the people coming to the pastor for counseling 
or therapy will fall within this stage. The pastor will need to 
familiarize himself not only with the earlier and largely formative 
psychosexual stages but also with the various existential problems 
presented by the different age groups within the genital stage of 
psychosexual maturity. This includes knowledge of adolescent psych­
ology and their existential conflicts over social relations, marriage, 
vocation, and so forth. Existential situations, if difficult and 
anxiety—producing, may cause regression to inappropriate, inauthentic,
non-existentiai behavior and emotional responses from an earlier psycho­
sexual stage. An excellent introduction to the existential conflicts 
faced at various stages in life, particularly in adolescence, middle- 
age, and old age, can be found in Erik Erikson’s Childhood and Society.
Before examining the theological and therapeutic advantages and 
limitations of existential psychotherapy especially as used by the 
pastor, let us briefly examine psychopathology and some principles 
of orthodox psychoanalytic therapy in outline.
Neurosis: "...an attempt to relieve anxiety created by conflicts 
which repeat earlier conflicts and are reactivated by regressive desires. 
The anxiety is a reaction to repressed impulses which threaten to emerge 
into consciousness. The different forms of neurosis correspond to 
the different methods of defense employed by the ego."(p.208,214, Alex­
ander The various forms of neurosis include:
(page number refers to pages in Alexander's Fundamentals of Psychoanal­
ysis in which fuller description is available):
Anxiety neurosis (214)
Phobias (215)
Obsessive-compulsive state (218)
Depressions (222)
Manic-depressive reaction (225)
Hypochondriac syndrome (252)
Psychopathic personality (neurotic character) (254)
Addiction - alcohol and drug (240)
Traumatic neurosis (24l)
Conversion neurosis 
Perversions (260)
Psychosis: The second category of psychopathology is psychosis:
"In a psychosis there is a 'degree of personality disintegration and 
failure to test and evaluate correctly external reality in various 
spheres'."(p.1193* Frank Lake, Clinical Theology), These include:
Paranoid schizophrenia
Dementias
Schizophrenia: " 'A group of psychotic reactions characterized
by fundamental disturbances in reality relation­
ships, by a conceptual world determined exces­
sively bj^  feeling, and by marked affective, 
intellectual, and overt behavioral disturbances. 
In many cases there is a progressive deteriora­
tion, ' Thought and behavior are characteris­
tically bizarre. Delusions and hallucinations 
are common."(p.1195, Lake, Clinical Theology),
Psychoanalytic therapy: Psychoanalytic therapy attempts to increase
the ego's integrative power, the lack of which becomes evident in neuroses. 
Perhaps Franz Alexander can better summarize the process and its goals: 
"Psychoanalysis aims at improving the Ego's capacity to deal with in­
ternal and external conflicts. Psychoanalysis achieves this by re- 
exposing the patient's ego to the conflicts it earlier repressed. It 
does this not merely by intellectual reconstruction but by making the 
patient experience emotionally the unsolved conflict under more favor­
able conditions. This re—experiencing takes place both in the trans­
ference and in the patient's other relationships. The latter, however, 
is now also under the control and guidance of the therapist. The core 
of the treatment lies in the transference situation. The most important 
therapeutic factor is that the therapist's response to the patient's 
neurotic reactions is different from that of the persons with whom the
conflicts were originally connected. The objective, understanding 
attitude of the therapist is for the patient a novel response. No re­
lations in actual life are quite as objective and understanding or ex­
clusively concerned with helping another. The corrective experience 
can be made even more effective if the therapist assumes an attitude 
opposite to that of the parents, which caused the neurotic development." 
(p.298—299f Alexander, Funda. of Psvchoanal.).
Or again: "Psychoanalysis attempts to restore mental healtjx by 
affording the patient an insight into the nature of his difficulties 
accompanied and made meaningful by a highly controlled type of emotional 
experience. This experience enables him to extend the integrative faculty 
of his ego over impulses which he excluded from his consciousness be­
cause he was unable to bring them into harmony with the rest of his 
personality. It is an extension of insight and control over one's self 
obtained through re-experiencing in the transference situation conflict— 
ful situations of the past. In this highly methodical procedure it is 
the therapist's role to serve as a target for the patient's preformed 
emotional reactions and to help the patient to understand these reactions 
in the light of his past experiences."(p.6, Alexander, Psychoanal. and 
Psychotherapy).
As we shall soon see, existential analysis criticizes this heavy 
emphasis by orthodox analysts on recovering past experiences and work­
ing through past traumas as"prerequisites for healing. This almost
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exclusive reliance on the past diminishes the importance of the pre­
sent and totally ignores the future according to existential-analytical 
doctrine. Although some existential analysts have completely ignored 
the past of the patient in reaction to and as a corrective of the 
orthodox psychoanalytic method, most have balanced their appreciation 
of the past with a greater interest in the future-time and especially 
the present moment in true existential style.
In conclussion Alexander points out that 11 ••.psychoanalytic treat­
ment aims to replace the individual's automatic, traditional internal­
ized patterns with the ability to find his own formula of life based 
upon a fuller understanding of himself."(p.19, Ibid.)* Existential 
analysis has the same aim but attempts to bring the patient to a 'fuller 
understanding via the truths and insights peculiar to certain parts of 
existential philosophy and psychology. To the extent that it touches 
dimensions of reality overlooked by the more clinical—scientific, orth­
odox approach, existential psychotherapy is a valuable aid to analysts, 
pasidrs and anyone else involved in healing of the mind and/or spirit* 
(For a more complete discussion of personality theory and the develop­
ment of psychoanalytic theory and technique see the bibliographies 
in Hall and Lindzey's Theories of Personality (p.73-75) and in Franz 
Alexander's Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis (p.300-302))•
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Existential Psychoanalysis -
Before its emergence as an independent social science psychology 
was for thousands of years a branch of formal philosophy especially 
as it pertained to the stjidy of man. Subsumed as it was under philp— 
sophy, it was explictily influenced by the presuppositions of the var­
ious systems under which it was developed. Beginning in the nineteenth 
century psychology emerged as a scientific discipline relying upon a 
more methodological-scientific foundation but nevertheless still in­
fluenced by the implicit and sometimes deliberately obscured presuppo­
sitions of science itself.
Science in a general sense is based on certain philosophical pre­
suppositions, but scientists in every age are liable - No - are bound 
to introduce some elements of their own personal first principles or 
the prevailing philosophy of the period into their work as scientists 
and thereby influence their methodology and conclussions. An obvious 
example of this tendency is Sigmund Freud and his predominantly logi­
cal-naturalistic approach to psychology. The biggest danger to the 
integrity of the truth,and in this case, scientific truth, is two­
fold: (l) that one may deny the existence of scientific presuppositions 
or, on the other hand, absolutize these presuppositions making them 
immutable and eternal; (2 ) that one may fail to acknowledge the tenta­
tive and hypothetical nature of certain concepts (e.g. Freud's postu­
lation of the unconscious) no matter huw probable they seem.
7)
With the development of existential psychology and psychoanalysis 
based on a phenomenological methodology and existential philosophy, we 
find a movement freely acknowledging its presuppositions yet proceeding 
with its task. Paul Tillich has remarked about this attitude of exist­
ential psychoanalysis and its ultimate possibilities: "This.•.opens
up a new dimension for psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. It is the di­
mension of the ultimate question, the question of man’s nature and 
his place within the whole of reality. Since an answer to this ques­
tion underlies every method of healing, it is important that psychology 
now starts to bring its own presuppositions into the open."
Similarly, Iloilo May, himself a forerunner of existential analysis 
on the American scene, has commented: Existential analysts "...are those 
who approach it (contemporary psychotherapy) with an ’ontological hun­
ger1, those who ask the ultimate questions about man, neurosis, health, 
and fulfillment."(p.3^5, Friedman, The Worlds of Existentialism). 
Furthermore, "...the confluence of these two disciplines (philosophy 
and psychology) indicates another aspect of the existential approach: 
it deals with psychological categories — ’experienceJ, ’anxiety', and 
so forth - but it is concerned with understanding these aspects of 
man's life on a deeper level which Tillich calls ontological reality.
It would be an error to think of existential psychology as a resurrec­
tion of the old 'philosophical psychology' of the nineteenth centnr^.
The existential approach is not a movement back to the armchair of
speculation, but an endeavor to understand man's behavior and experience 
in terras of the presuppositions that underlie them - presuppositions 
that underlie our science and our images of man. It is the endeavor 
to understand the nature of this man who does the experiencing and to 
whom the experiences happen."(p.14, May, Existential Psychology).
The question of man, his nature and predicament, is fundamental 
to our study of existential psychoanalysis. The scientific—theoretical 
approach to the nature of man called on the great modern human sciences 
of biology, sociology, psychology, and anthropology to tackle this 
problem. Their method is analytical and reduces a complex whole to the 
sum of its component parts. But because the problem and sheer reality 
which is mem becomes most concretized and illumined in the psychothera­
peutic arena, the inadequacy of theoretical formulae per se soon became 
evident, Rollo May points out that "...the crucial question is always 
the bridge between the system and the patient — how can we be certain 
that our system, admirable and beautifully wrought as it may be in prin­
ciple, has anything whatever to do with this specific Mr. Jones, a 
living, immediate reality sitting opposite us in the consulting room?"
(p.3, Existence). The existential approach takes greater cognizance 
of the consciousness and imagination of man and thereby renders valua­
ble insight into the ultimate problem of human nature. However, theology 
must be vigilant for tendencies to finalize or absolutize these new exist­
ential breakthroughs. Although these various disciplines aid in clari—
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Tying the ultimate question of man, it remains for theology to develop, 
correlate, and proclaim the ultimate answer to their question. The 
theological task of correlating ultimate questions and answers falls 
most heavily and practically on the pastor in his therapeutic-counseling 
functions.
Having considered the nature of man, let us turn to the problem 
of man's modern existential predicament. The problem has a least two 
main roots, the first originating in the philosophical revolution and 
the subsequent erosion of traditional, heteronomous values. With the 
disintegration of the medieval world-view and its attendant philosophical- 
theological system of metaphysics the process of fragmentation began.
(As we shall see later, Ileideggerian ontology, which is fundamental to 
existential psychoanalysis, is a radically new venture and does not 
represent a revival of traditional metaphysics). As a result of this 
abandonment of ’religious' values, man in his search for values became 
more autonomous, hence lonely, and finally idolatrous; he replaced abso­
lute values with relative ones according to Igor Caruso. This is a 
.two—fold process of relative values becoming absolute and, in dir­
ect consequence, of absolute values becoming relative ones. It was not 
only man who, in loosening or breaking the ties of his metaphysical 
relationships, became free and autonomous; the absolutized values of 
freedom and science themselves became independent of man."(p.X, Exist­
ential Psychology). The result is totalitarianism and nihilism*
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This idea is Tillichian and refers to the replacement of ultimate 
concerns with relative ones, or in other words, idolatry. There are 
two dangers in Caruso's analysis of the problem; first, he portrays 
the medieval period as the locus of truly absolute values there}jy ig­
noring the more bubtle but nonetheless idolatrous action of attributing 
absoluteness to certain values and systems, in this case Roman Catholic 
systems and values. This is a deadly presumption which is unaware of 
its idolatty because it is predicated on 'religious' principles, Car­
uso's observation is therefore a half-truth which should be acknowledged 
as such. Undeniably the replacement of ultimate concerns and values 
by conditional ones is the source of man's existential 'sickness', but 
this is true for all ages and not only for the modern man. Caruso 
rightly makes the existential condition of man an ethical question, 
but when it comes to psychopathology and neurosis, he fails to see
any distinction and makes it primarily a moral issue as well. This
discover
is true only in a limited sense as we shall^later in the paper. The
existential
pastor must clearly make this distinction between the cxi/tenti-al and 
the neurotic condition of men as they become his responsibility. Al­
though there is a relation between the two, they do differ one from the 
other and call for a different approach by the pastor; the former re­
quires a religious ministration aimed at ultimate healing and the 
latter requires a psychotherapeutic approach aimed at limited healing.
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The second source of man's existential predicament is the result 
of modern technology. It is best expressed in the following quote: 
"Existential psychology tells us that Western man, in freeing himself 
from the drive-pressures of hunger, disease, and fatigue, has n m  head­
long into a vacuum where boredom and meaninglessness usurp his being. 
Only by transcending this existential vacuum can he fill his life with 
significance and motive. Alienation is a fact; the capacity for self- 
transcendence is a fact; man’s potentiality to achieve a responsible 
world-design is a fact." Not only are these the facts with which 
existential psychoanalysis and theology must deal, but these are the 
living issues (ultimate questions) which the pastor must face personally 
and professionally as a counselor and to which he must speak; perhaps 
speaking first as a psychotherapist but always as one who ministers in 
the name of Christ, the source and ground of all healing. To that end 
we seek further understanding.
In contrast to Freud's discovery,the existential approach to psycho­
analysis originated in various parts of Europe from various researchers 
and creative thinkers at about the some time. "There were Eugene Min­
kowski in Paris, Erwin Straus in Germany..., V. E, von Gebsattel in 
Germany, who represent chiefly the first, or phenomenological, stage 
of the movement. There were Ludwig Binswanger, a. Storch, M. Boss,
G. Bally, Roland Kuhn in Switzerland, J. H. Van Den Berg and F. J. Buy— 
tendijk in Holland, and so on, representing more specifically the second,
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or existential, stage."(p*4, May, Existence). Most of these men are 
Freudian analysts and a fev others represent the Jungian school. Con­
sequently, though grouped under the general rubric of existential psycho­
therapists and sharing certain common presuppositions and concerns, 
these men represent divergent schools of thought and exhibit only the 
broadest theoretical •unity. The basis for the unity they do share is 
to be found in existential philosophy and phenomenology.
Phenomenology -
Phenomenology is a very complex philosophical trend fathered by 
Edmund Husserl; ve shall only briefly summarize its main tenets and its 
relation to existential analysis here. The movement is basically method­
ological and has permitted psychoanalytic researchers to abandon older, 
classical methods and adopt its new approach to psychiatric investi­
gation. In a concerted attempt to minimize the influence of presup— 
postions, theories and dogmas, the phenomenologist endeavors to observe 
phenomena as thejjpresent themselves.
Such openness to phenomena is permitted by an operation of the 
mind which Husserl called the psychological—phenomenological reduction* 
whereby "the observer...excludes from his mind not only any judgement 
of value about the phenomena but also any affirmation whatever con­
cerning their cause and background; he even strives to exclude the 
distinction of subject and object and any affirmation about the exist­
ence of the object and of the observing subject. With this method, ob—
77
servation is greatly enhanced: the less apparent elements of phenomena 
manifest themselves with increasing richness and variety, with finer 
gradations of clarity and obscurity, and eventually previously unnoticed 
structures of phenomena may become apparent."(p.96, May, Existence).
The relation of phenomenology to existential philosophy and es­
pecially to Kierkegaard is evident here; Husserl's phenomenology shifts 
emphasis from existent objects to the mind that makes them its objects. 
Such a discipline of mind and attitude helps the pastor or analyst to 
'get into* or assume the counselee's or patient's internal frame of 
reference or in other words, to investigate and appreciate the patient's 
subjective state of consciousness. This is of first importance because 
it allows the pastor to "...catch what the patient is communicating on 
many different levels; these include not only the words he utters but 
his facial expressions, his gestures, the distance from us at which 
he sits, various feelings which he will hatfe and communicate bubtly to 
the therapist and will serve as messages even though he cannot verbal­
ize them directly, ad infinitum. And there is always a great deal of 
subliminal communication on levels below what either the patient or 
therapist may be conscious of at the moment."(p.26, May, Existential 
Psychology). This process and its importance for healing will become 
more evident in our discussion of the analyst—patient relationship 
later in this paper. Binswanger even refers to this reality of 'being— 
there* with the patient and 'being—for* the patient as presence. The 
urge to draw the parallel between the above and Christ's healing pre—
aence with and for mankind (incarnation) in terms of the paradigm set 
forth earlier in this paper is irresistable. Needless to say, this 
does not exhaust the meaning of the work and person of Jesus as the 
Christ, but it does, in the author's mind, contain truths which contribute 
theological insight toward understanding the interpersonal relationships 
of healing as found in existential psychoanalysis and pastoral counseling#
Contact with the patient as described above is aided by categorical 
phenomenology which also touches upon several fundamental existential 
topics. In the categorical phase..."the phenomenologidt attempts to 
reconstruct the inner world of his patients through an analysis of their 
manner of experiencing time, space, causality, materiality, and other 
'categories1 (in the philosophical sense of the word."(p.101, May, 
Existence). One of the most important and basic coordinates of human 
life dealt with by phenomenology and existentialism is that of tempor- 
ality. Though terribly overemphasized, this is properly seen as 'lived 
time' or immediately experienced time over against dialectical time— 
lessness and infinite, quantitative, measured time. Disturbance in the 
balance and relation between past, present, and future time is closely 
associated with all mental illness and especially schizophrenia. One's 
subjective feeling of experienced time is closely tied to one's 
world-view and life-meaning.
Time is also an important subject fdr existential philosophy and 
theology. Whereas Nietzsche perceived time as sternal recurrance, 
Kierkegaard, the Danish philosopher with such brilliant psychological
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insight, conceived existential time not as measured and objective but 
in terms of pregnant moments, moments in which the eternal forces its 
way into the temporal, when the vertical intersects the horizontal and 
man realizes the presence of God,
Paul Tillich in his typically systematic and thorough manner has 
developed the concept of ’kairos* as ’fulfilled time' - the right moment 
to act in a given situation* The 'kairoi' appear in the course of ill­
ness as critical moments or crises when treatment may be determinative. 
As such, each kairos makes its own intrinsic demand on the situation.
In contrast to these relative kairoi there is the unconditional or rel­
igious Kairos, or the Kierkegaardian moment, when time is invaded by 
eternity. In the Kairos situation the healing and transforming power 
of Being Itself is present. Although Tillich applies this concept to 
ethics, politics and history, we are primarily interested in it on 
the individual scale as related to psychotherapy and pastoral counsel­
ing.
The essence of Christian existientialism is that a person, whether 
involved in analysis or in everyday life, recognize and respond respon­
sibly to the kairoi as they present themselves and to the Kairos as it 
is presented, especially in &hd through Jesus as the Christ. Similarly, 
in the course of analysis and pastoral counseling there occur critical 
moments or kairoi which require recognition and responsible action by 
both parties involved in the relationship. For the analyst this
readiness is required in estimating the safe depth of interpretation, 
the timing of interpretation, and conversely, in determining the per­
iod for listening, and especially for the pastor, the timing of reli­
gious interjections at the point of maximum impact and effectiveness.
In a similar manner the patient must determine what he will reveal <f 
himself, what he will accept from the analyst's interpretation, and 
most importantly, whether he is willing to accept responsibility for 
himself. With the help of psychoanalytic theory and technique these 
relative kairoi may be somewhat controlled and anticipated by the ana­
lyst or pastor, but the divine Kairos cannot be regulated, controlled 
or scheduled even by the pastor with his arsenal of religious symbols, 
rituals and church history. The Kairos, or intrusion of the eternal 
into time, may occur in the office of a non—Christian analyst and not 
in the pastor's counseling room or vice versa, or it may not occur at 
all. The coming of God in Jesus as the Christ to any man in his existent*-' 
iality is grace—ful, given, and unexpected. However, due to the struct** 
ure and quality of the analyst—patient (or pastor—counselee) relation­
ship and its paradigmatic relation to God's healing work in Jesus as 
the Christ, the writer feels that the pastoral counseling situation 
is particularly suited not only to a certain amount of psychotherapy 
but also provides the type of context in which it might please God to 
move and express his purpose of healing in both its ultimate and pen­
ultimate formso
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The second categorical coordinant on the phenomenological time-space 
index is speciality. Again we find that mental illness is closely asso­
ciated with a distorted subjective experience of space; this is most ob­
vious in agoraphobia (fear of large, open spaces) and claustrophobia (fear 
of constricted, closed spaces) but it applies to most of the neuroses 
and psychoses.
Phenomenological studies of spaciality have established several 
existential-subjective characteristi-cs or types of space such as oriented 
space, attuned space, clear space, dark space, luminous space, and so on. 
The idea of luminous space H...seems to underlie a number of mystical 
and ecstatic experiences, and there is a considerable literature devoted 
to Pmy^tic&l space1. Experiences of a 'mystic space* have been reported 
by an impressive number of seers in many countries and centuries. Guido 
Huber collected a number of relevant texts and tried to ddfine the com­
mon characteristics ascribed to mystic space: the fusion of the subject 
and the object in a 'cosmic consciousness'; the experience of a radically 
different space in which distance and size are transcended, where im­
mense spaces are contained in small ones, where the universe is at the 
same time empty and filled with blinding light, etc.* The experience 
which Freud called 'oceanic feeling* seems to be a subtype of this exp­
erience of mystic space."(p.112, May, Existence). This spacial pheno­
menology opens up many possibilities for staying the mystical experi­
ences and parts of mystical metaphors dealing with space* Such subjective 
experiences of space are directly related to the man's existential exper—
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ience of .Ffiniiu.de * and 'loneliness' which leads to estranged space or
r
alienated space.
Before leaving the phenomenological part of existential psychology 
and psychoanalysis, let us consider a few more component elements of 
space which will aid our understanding of Binswanger in the section to 
follow. The ideational representation of a 'vortical axis' has long 
been used to help understand religious concepts of transcendence and God- 
man relationships (e.g. the Fall, the Incarnation, Bedemption, etc.).
"The vertical axis, according to Binswanger and to Bachelard, is the 
basic axis of human existence to which our most vital experiences are 
related. Life is felt as a constant movement upward or downward. The 
movement upward is expressed metaphorically as becoming lighter, being 
'elevated', 'uplifted' to a realm of peace and light; the movement down­
wards is expressed in being 'abased', 'falling', 'becoming heavier', 'de­
jected', 'downcast'.
"Distance also has many phenomenological implications. Alfred 
Adler described the various ways in which a neurotic puts 'distance'
is fellow men."
(p.113,114, May, Existence). This is another way of describing 'estrange­
ment* or Alienation from the world, from the rest of htimanity, and 
from oneself which is ultimately rooted in estrangement from God or 
Being Itself as Tillich would describe it. The implications for psycho­
therapy are obvious; for instance, it helps the therapist and pastor to
between himself and his life goal, the world, andjh
understand the requirements of psychological distance in his relation­
ship with the patient. Hence, in dealing with the patient he is aware 
of both his own feelings and the emotional distance required to provoke 
the 'flight1 response (withdrawal) and the 'fight' response (aggressive).
In attempting to overcome the emotional distance and estrangement of his 
patient, the pastor—therapist should be aware of the 'space-binding' 
quality of love; "The lover feels himself close to the beloved in spite 
of the distance because in the spacial modality of love distance is 
transcended." Obviously love is not a technical tool that can be dragged 
in or turned on by the pastor or therapist; neither can it be forced 
by the healer either in himself or in the patient. But insofar as it 
appears and plays a part in the relationship and healing process, its 
value and neurotic forms (i.e. transference of childish, dependent love 
by the patient to the therapist and/or the countertransference of domineer­
ing, smothering love by the pastor—therapist to the patient) should be
recognized. The importance of love for therapy will he discussed in 
another section.
Whereas the importance of phenomenological distance is more obvious
its of
for therapy and^understanding^human beings and their relationships to 
others, the implications for religion and theology are less apparent but 
just as important. If the paradigmatic relationship between 'heilsges- 
chichte' (salvation history or God's saving acts in history) and the 
psychotherapeutic process is valid, then we should find in God's move­
ments and the pattern of his healing activity in relation to mankind, 
especially through Christ, the paradigm for healing interpersonal rela­
tionships on every level, whether neurotic or more generally existential 
in the Tillichian sense. In other words, God's dealings with men estab­
lishes an ultimate model or paradigm for healing insofar is healing is 
part of the wider religious concept of 'salvation'.
Any theological study of God's healing and salvation in terms of 
phenomenological—psychologicil distance would mean studying the 'felt* 
presence and immediacy of God and his perceived attitude (love or wrath, 
etc.) as well as the 'felt' remoteness and distance of Him by different 
persons and peoples of all ages, not neglecting helpful accounts in 
Scripture. For instance, the Psalmists sometimes perceived or felt God 
to be remote and indifferent to their predicament and anguish; this is 
reflected by Christ on the Cross when God seems distant and like a 
father who has abandoned his son. Elsewhere God seems close at hand
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and full of good will and consolation, while at other times he again 
seems angry? and threatening. It might also be helpful to study the 
neurotic, defensive responses and transference reactions ma$e to God by 
his sick and sinful people and his therapeutic, saving counter—responses 
and revelations on their hehalf. For instance, one might study the way 
God deals with such inauthentic, neurotic responses as legalism and 
idolatry and tries to bring his elect to an authentic, mature relation­
ship with Himself and each other.
By suggesting this type of study I do not propose to confine God's 
relation to man within a psychoanalytic model; nor is it ihy intention 
to encompass God within any pattern or plan and thereby restrict His 
absolute freedom and sovereign Will. However, I am suggesting that 
since God has already graciously chosen to reveal himself to man in a 
saving (healing) way, we might learn from it using principles and know­
ledge now available but already inherent in God's act at the time of 
performance. This in no way limits or circumscribes the way in which 
God is now relating to and may relate himself to man in the future.
Rather, in this way revelation completed once and for all in the 
past continues to disclose itself to us as we look back with knowledge 
only recently attained. Having made such qualification and admonishing’ 
any such ambitious researcher who might undertake this task to keep his 
work in the perspective of God's total relationship to his created or­
der as witnessed to especially in the Cross of H^s Son, I hope that
theology will acknowledge the true value^such existential-phenomenological 
studies for its understanding of man and God without losing its integrity 
or abdicating its special responsibility to God and his Church.
Hence we see the importance of phenomenology for analyst, pastor, 
and theologian. Though limited in special ways, phenomenological anal­
ysis helps the pastor-therapist reconstruct the patient's inner-world 
of experience. Whether this permits the therapist to intellectually • 
understand the patient's existential situation or more directly aids in 
the establishment of an empathetic relationship and rapport, the method 
is basic and essential to the healing process.
For a more complete discussion of phenomenology and its application 
to psychotherapy see; The Foundation of Phenomenology by Marvin Farber 
and the relevant chapters in Existence, A New Dimension in Psychiatry 
and Psychology edited by Hollo May et. al..
Let us now discuss the second component of existential psychoanalysis, 
namely existential philosophy and metaphysics. Perhaps it is redundant 
to point out that existentialism is not confined to the Left Bank and 
Sartre, the man who boosted it to modern popularity. Rollo May writes; 
"Existentialism...is an expression of profound dimensions of the modern 
emotional and spiritual temper and is shown in almost all aspects of 
our culture. It is found not only in psychology and philosophy but 
in art, vide Van Gogh, Cezanne, and Picasso — and in literature, vide 
Dostoevski, Baudelaire, Kafka and Rilke. Indeed, in many ways it is
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the unique and specific portrayal of the psychological predicament of 
contemporary Western man* This cultural movement*•*has its roots in 
the same historical situation and the same psychological crises which 
called forth psychoanalysis and other forms of psychotherapy. Existent­
ialism* in short* is the endeavor to understand man by cutting below 
the cleavage between subject and object which has bedeviled ^Western 
thought and science since shortly after the Renaissance* This cleavage 
Binswanger calls 'the cancer of all psychology up to now. ..the cancer 
of the doctrine of subject—object cleavage of the world1*n(p.11, Exist­
ence).
Kierkegaard is considered the ‘father of existentialism' and his 
penetrating psychological insights derived from his own self-examination 
provided an early link between existentialism and psychology. Kierke­
gaard's The Concept of Dread and The Sickness Unto Death are classics 
of their kind.
The Kierkegaardian critique of man and his predicament is the cor­
nerstone for modern anthropologies in science* philosophy and theology#
He observes: “Man is not a ready-made being; man will become what he : T 
makes of himself and nothing more* Man constructs himself through his 
choices* because he has the freedom to make vital choices, above all 
the freedom to choose between an inauthentic and an authentic modality 
of existence# Inauthentic existence is the modality of the man who 
lives under the tyranny of the plebs (the crowd, i*e#, the anonymous 
collectivity)# Authentic existence is the modality in which a man as—
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sumes the responsibility of his own existence. In order to pass from 
inauthentic to authentic existence, a man has to suffer the ordeal of 
despair and'existential anxiety1, i,e,, the anxiety of a man seeing 
the limits of his existence with its fullest implications: death, noth­
ingness, This is what Kierkegaard calls the 'sickness unto death*,"
(p.1X8, May, Existence),
In spite of these enervating possibilities, Kierkegaard believed 
that man must responsibly face reality and embrace existence in the 
face of eternity in a passionate commitment, Kierkegaard conceived of 
truth as radically relational whereby man only confronts truth and reality’ 
where he 'acknowledges it, participates in it, and relates himself to 
it?. This is the key to understanding this thesis in general and the 
section on the analyst-patient relationship in particular. Whereas the 
early Freudian analysts insisted that minimal interpersonal involvement 
was essential to the psychoanalytic process, Kierkegaard opened the 
therapeutic door to more effective healing through personality and 
more direct involvement by the therapist, Kierkegaard was, as May so 
concisely puts it, ",.,the forerunner of concepts of 'participant 
observation' of Sullivan and the other emphasis upon the significance 
of the therapist in the relationship with the patient. The fact that 
the therapist participates in a real way in the relationship and is 
an inseparable part of the 'field' does not, thus, impair the sound­
ness of his scientific observations," The result is ",,,that we are 
freed from the traditional doctrine, so limiting, self—contradictory,
so
and indeed so destructive in psychology, that the less we are involved 
in a given situation, the more clearly we can Observe the truth. The 
implication of that doctrine was, obviously enough, that there is an in­
verse relation between involvement and our capacity to observe without 
bias/'(p*27, Existence).
The corollary of this concern with the therapist and his role in 
the analysis is the question of the role and responsibility of the pat­
ient in the relationship. This leads us to two observations; first, 
Kierkegaard's doctrine of indirect communication nullifies any merely 
objective, abstract approach to therapy. In spite of the interpretations 
given by the analyst-pastdr, analysis is not merely a didactic process 
and the relationship is not one of teacher to pupil. May again comes 
to our aid; "It is well known to every therapist that patients can talk 
theoretically and academically from now till doomsday about their problems 
and not really be affected; indeed, particularly in cases of intellectual 
and professional patients, this very talking, though it ma# masquerade 
under the cloak of unbiased and unprejudiced inquiry into what is going 
on, is often the defense against seeing the truth and against committing 
one's self, a defense indeed against one's own vitality. The patient's 
talking will not help him to get to the reality until he can experience 
something or some issue in which he has an immediate and absolute stake," 
(p.28, Existence).
The second observation concerning the patient's role in therapy 
deals with his passionate acceptance of and commitment to his being—in—
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the-world. Knowledge about the analytic process and techniques and in­
tellectual discovery about repressed material and the nuclear conflicts 
causing the neurosis is of little or no value unless it is accepted as 
one's own with one's whole being, emotions, intellect and all. forking 
through* the problem (see section dealing with the ’corrective emotional 
experience’) requires a total participation of the person and not par­
tial intellectualization; it means 'talcing it to heart' and coming to 
grips with reality about oneself and one's place in the world. The 
truth involved must become so through personal experience. It must 
become, as Nietzsche described it, 'a bloody truth for me'*
Furthermore, these two observations concerning the therapist and 
patient require a comment about the quality of this 'truth as relation­
ship' of which Kierkegaard speaks and in which pastor and therapist 
find themselves during counseling and analysis. Feuerbach provides 
the answer: "Love is passion and only passion is the mark of Existence." 
(p*54, Tillich, Article on "Existential Philosophy"). Hence our con- 
clussion that love is the passion that ultimately binds the healing 
relationship between therapist and client and pastor and counselee.
This is a finite and limited human love to which we refer 
and it is not intended to give comfort and support to the rank humanists 
who praise and glorify human goodness and possibilities per se* Though 
it may help to heal the neurotic fissures in the human personality, it 
cannot ultimately overcome the existential and universal plight of man­
kind; man's 'natural* love is based on a fractured 'imago dei* and is
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only a tortured facsimile of God's unconditional and perfect love upon 
■which man's love is ultimately predicated.
Again we may make certain observations relating to the paradigm 
which undergirds this thesis. Kierkegaard's debunking of disinterested 
objectivity and his stress on passionate commitment effects the pastor 
in two ways, both as therapist and as religious counselor. As healer, 
the pastor knows that the patient must embrace the nuclear difficulties 
with his mind, heart and spirit and take responsibility for it before 
healing will be effective. Furthermore, having helped the patient move 
from the neurotic level to the universal-existential level and having 
begun to speak of God's healing of this latter level of existence, the 
pastor knows from Kierkegaard that these healing religious truths must 
also be appropriated inwardly and in a total way to be fully realized. 
Kierkegaard himself criticized those persons who only gave intellectual 
assent to religious truths. The commitment to truths discovered in 
therapy and upon which healing is contingent on this plane is equally 
applicable to the healing which comes through wholistic commitment to 
God's truths.
Another paradigmatic parallel: whereas the neurotic must come to • 
ternns with the repulsive, repressed side of his personality, so also 
must the existential man confront honestly his predicament of radical 
estrangement best expressed in the religious symbol of 'sin1. Just as 
the neurotic patient must feel he has an 'immediate and absolute stake'
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in the analysis, so also must the existential man discern an :ultimate 
claim upon his life to which he responds with an ultimate concern. Or 
again, the pastor who deals therapeutically with neurotics soon realizes 
that a will to recover and care about one’s own existence in the world 
(Heidegger’s sorge) is essential to healing; the emergence of this care 
in the neurotic is in some way gratuitous and given. It is not infre­
quently evoked by antecedent concern and care for the patient by the 
pastor-therapist. The dynamics may again be likened to the unsolicited 
and faith-evoking, loving acts of God which awakens a will to cooperate 
in alienated and broken mankind.
I must remind the reader that in developing the paradigmatic re­
lationship between God’s saving acts and the psychotherapeutic process 
I am not trying to make analysis a revelatory event in which God him­
self is disclosed to man because religious revelation is not based on 
eternal principles but on an existential and personal confrontation with 
God in Christ. Neither am I suggesting that psychotherapy or psycho­
analysis be sanctified and made a sacrament or liturgical act. However, 
I am pointing to an analogy of truth which I believe exists between 
Heilsgeschichte and psychotherapy. Psychotherapy is still psychotherapy 
and revelation is still revelation and confusion of the two is to be 
avoided.
But psychoanalysis, and expecially existential analysis, corres­
ponds in many ways to truths we find in the Gospel (taken as the Old 
and New Testaments) in the intent, pattern, spirit, and quality of re­
lationship; Psychotherapy, though penultimate itself, taps a deeper, 
ultimate dimension and meaning* Therefore when psychotherapy is done 
by a secular analyst or especially by a pastor in the name of Christ, 
it becomes a powerful aid to understanding the wort of God on a uni­
versal as veil as personal scale. Psychotherapy is neither intrinsi­
cally religious nor is it 'saving' in the wider, ultimate sense of the 
word. My hope is that it will be seen for nothing more or less than it 
is, but within that context pastors-and theologians will appreciate its 
full meaning, value, and many possibilities.
I believe my thesis to be delicately balanced between two extremes 
and slipping into one or the other leads to obvious error and justified 
criticism. Hence the frequent qualification and clarification is neces­
sary lest the reader assume my position to be something other than it 
is. I concede the difficulty of following the chosen line of thought, 
but since truth is rarely simple or easy, I hope that perseverence will 
eventually be rewarded.
In our brief survey of existential philosophy as the second com­
ponent in existential analysis we have confined our discussion primarily 
to Kierkegaard. Nietzsche also did some writing directly applying 
existential principles to psychology, but most existential philosophers 
contribute only indirectly to a deeper understanding of psychology and 
psychoanalysis. Even a cursory treatment of this subject would entail 
studying the thought of some of the most illustrious minds in history; 
e.g. Feuerbach, Marx, Schopenhauer, Bergson, William James, Schelling,
94
Sartre, et. al.. Discussion of each of "these men and his particular con­
tribution is not feasible, but we shall now consider a man with a foot 
in both psychotherapy and existential philosophy.
Karl Jaspers along with Ludwig Binswanger and V. E. Gebsattel are 
all psychotherapists and at the same time existential philosophers. 
Jaspers was the first to bridge the two fields; Jaspers' pivotal work 
is essential to our historical discussion. He was one of the first pio­
neers to formulate the questions and draw the preliminary conclussions 
made incumbant upon psychotherapy by existentialism. His work was pri­
marily along three lines: (l) examination of the philosophical presup­
positions of every science of man; (2) criticism of depth psychology and 
psychoanalysis; (3 ) development of his own philosophical anthropology 
and its implications for psychotherapy.
(l) Jaspers argues in his General Psychopathology that every science 
studies man with specific questions and specific methods and therefore 
it cannot produve a comprehensive view of man. Hence any reductionist, 
synthetic, or additive approach fails to produce an authentic picture 
of man as a whole. Jaspers realizes that existential psychoanalysis 
brings its own presupposed philosophical anthropology to the study of 
man, but he, like Rudolf Bultmann in the Biblical field, believes that 
existentialism is more comprehensive, less dogmatic, more self—corrective, 
and relatively more open to all aspects of human being than any other 
system. Since we have already dealt with these considerations above, 
we shall not tarry longer on the subject.
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(2) Jaspers' criticism of Freud and his psychoanalysis was three­
fold. (a) Jaspers attacked Freud for trying to pass off his world-view 
for scientific knowledge, for confusing interpretive psychology with 
natural science. This is merely an elaboration of item (l) above.
(b) Jaspers censured Freud for allowing his theories to become 
movements of faith and his school of psychoanalyses a quasi-religious 
sect based on absolute, 'scientific' knowledge. "Socially the effect 
of Freud's work seems to have been ^he founding of a sect, brought about 
by his organization of an association and his expulsion of renegade pupils. 
Freudianism has become a movement of faith within the guise of science. 
There can be no discussion of faith, but one can sometimes learn from 
people with whom one cannot discuss. Freudianism as a whole is an existing 
fact which has made it universally clear that psychotherapeutic sects 
as such must be something like substitute-religions. Their teaching be­
comes a dogma of salvation and their therapy a redemption. They tend 
to nihilism, a callous fanaticism and an arbitrary scepticism. In the 
end they always work to existential ruin."(p.774, Jaspers, General Psycho­
pathology).
The quasi—religious dogmatism connected with psychoanalysis seems 
to have pervaded the personality of its founder as well. "Kunz also 
differentiates Freud from the rest of the analysts who are his orthodox 
pupils. 'Is it chance thdt it is always the 'unahalyzed' Freud who time 
and again breaks through the psychoanalytic horizons and never his anal­
ysed followers?.•. Why are pupils with a viewpoint of their own perse—
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cuted vith such hitter antagonism? The necessities of the Eminent and
foreground facts cannot wholly cover the pover-tendencies taking hidden
effect in the analysis 1•"(p#775, Jaspers, General Psychopath,). It
rootpd
appears that the god-like tendencies in Freud are in his unahalyzed
personality. Freud performed a monumental self-analysis but he never 
went through an orthodox analysis himself. Since the essence of an anal­
ysis is interpersonal, Freud’s attitude is like that of a minister re­
commending or expounding the great Christian truths without a commitment 
to them himself. More discussion about the importance and paradigmatic 
implications of the analyst's own training analysis will be discussed 
under 'Countertransference1.
Intolerance towards deviations from Freudian dogmas rivals that
. severely ... , .
frequently found in religion. Discussion is sovond-y limited m  the name
of partial truth masquerading as the whole truth; opposition is demol­
ished by Freud when he assesses the resistance of psychologists and 
psychiatrists to his theories as follows: "Psychoanalysis wants to bring 
into consciousness what has been repressed in psychic life and he who 
passes judgement on it is himself a man who has such repression and may 
perhaps only just be able to maintain them." With this line of argument 
and attitude psychoanalysis severely limits the freedom and love which 
play such an integral and essential part in effective healing. There 
is something strangely and tragically paradoxical about the 'unanalysed' 
defensiveness of psychoanalysis, supposedly the most introspective and
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self-critical of all human studies*
On this point Jaspers and Christianity generally agree; hoth in­
dicate the dangers of what might be called 'ideological idolatry' with­
in psychoanalysis. This struggle for doctrinal supremacy is destructive 
not only of its rightful task but also of its relations with other dis­
ciplines (e* g. philosophy, theology and so on). "This kind of battle 
where people intrude personality into each other's psyche can become a 
malicious matter and a struggle for power and superiority. The impor­
tant thing is to force the other into the situation of being psycho­
analysed and communication is in fact not on the same plane."(p.773» 
Ibid.)* But if the dangers are great, so are the creative possibilities; 
even Jaspers admits that there is opportunity for establishing the deep­
est of human relationships within this same context.
(c) Jaspers also criticise Freud's theories themselves. Psycho­
analysis considers the past history of man's instincts to be determinant 
for man's present behavior. "Freud's approach was based on the assump­
tion that psychopathological experiences were motivated and that mo­
tives could be understood if one realized their historical connection 
with childhood experiences and with early instinctual motivation of 
libidinal and aggressive instincts." Freud's acute insight into re­
pressed sexuality completely overlooks the effects of repressed mind 
and spirit* Furthermore, ",**being human is far from being unambiguous, 
transparent and clear; it is something fundamentally dubious, equivo—
cal and obscure.”(p.775, Jaspers, General Psychopath.). Hence, ready­
made psychological categories and techniques tend to dehumanize the 
patient. To the extent that this is true, healing is hindered and God's 
will for man, namely to 'make and keep human-life human1 (Paul Lehmann), 
is hindered.
(3) Jaspers believes that "Man,is... a living, changing being who 
by his decisions and communications makes himself what he is, a being 
who is not split into three definite structures or two or more mythical 
instincts; he experiences himself always as the potential subject of 
future actions and decisions and the healthier and less neurotically 
restricted a man is the less are his future potentialities predictable." 
{p.4,21, Paper by Karl M. Abenheimer titled "Existentialism and Psycho­
therapy"). "Existence, namely, living according to the awareness of 
one’s rolatedness with the basis, the 'Urgrund1 or ’Ungrund’ of the 
transcendance, is the highest value of subjective behavior for Jaspers. 
This in itself is an existential choice since other possibilities for 
other individuals at other times are imaginable."(p.8, Essay by Karl M, 
Abenheimer titled "Reflections on Karl Jaspers' Concept of 'Existence'"). 
In other words, Existence is the freedom of an individual, the possibility 
of decision.
However, the other possibilities imaginable include self-deception 
and distortion' of reality by seclusion when faced by marginal life sit­
uations, that is, 'certain impassable, unchangeable situations that be—
long to our human existence as such'. "Seclusion from reality as given 
is indeed a seclusion from the very basis of being which manifests it­
self through reality. And 'sin is separation from God'. Falsity of 
this sort has been thought to be a universal human trait; like Ibsen, 
we look for the 'life-lie' which everyone needs and acknowledge Goethe's 
saying that no nne ever reaches such insight into truth and reality as 
would take away the conditions of his own existence. Others limit this 
world of radical self-deception to a particular group of persons who 
suffer from personality disorders,.,," Here we are faced with the dis­
tinction between the universal, existential predicament of estranged ■ 
mankind and the more specific pathological form of inauthenticity.
Within the latter category we find the neuroses, "Neurosis has 
been conceived as failure in the marginal situations of life. The goal 
of therapy has then been visualized as a self-revelation or as a self­
transformation of the individual through the marginal situation, in 
which he is revealed to himself and affirms himself in the world as it 
is."(p.330, Jaspers, General Psychopath.), "Everyone needs self­
illumination and self-reassurance through his inner activity. We all 
need to master life's problems, renounce and refuse as well as accept 
the reality of life as it is given. The neurotic minority alone need 
therapy,"(p.816, Ibid.),
Within Jaspers' very subtle and sophisticated system there are 
three concepts of particular interest to psychotherapy and theology:
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self-revelation, conversion, and loving communication. All of these 
occur on a general existential level and are experienced by relatively 
'healthy1 (non-neurotic) men and women, but they also may occur or even 
be aided by psychotherapy in helping the neurotic to move from self- 
deception toward authentic Existence.
Jaspers refers to 'Umkehr', meaning return, reversal, conversion.
"It is the courage to admit that one has gone in the wrong direction 
and that one has to change and renew one's outlook; what was rejected 
becomes valuable and what one fled away from becomes a goal. Such a re­
versal may be possible only for the sake of transcendence and the reality 
of the true self. "(p.8, K. M. Abenheimer's essay "Reflections on Karl 
Jaspers' Concept of 'Existence'"). This occurs not only under normal 
existential conditions but also within the psychotherapeutic relation­
ship. This 'turning' is essential to improvement and the abandonment 
of the false style of life (life-lie). Although this 'Umkehr' is a 
relative and conditional movement for the neurotic under therapy, this 
'conversion' finds its paradigmatic counterpart within the religious 
and unconditional symbol of 'repentance' and 'conversion'. The basic 
elements are almost identical; the recognition and admission of wrong 
direction, the need for change and renewal, and the adoption of authen­
tic goals. Within psychotherapy it means healing old neurotic wounds; 
within religion it means a cosmic healing of existential conditions, 
thereby overcoming ontological estrangement and effecting reconciliation.
In spite of this similarity, Jaspers' use of this concept runs into
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difficulty when viewed theologically. Jaspers' 'Umkehr' presupposes 
a courage which is largely grounded in man himself. Therefore man, 
whether subject to neurosis in addition to his existentiality or not, is 
to a great extent the locus and source of his own healing. Though 
approximating certain Christian truths, Jaspers has overshifted the 
source and center of healing until an almost Pelagian attitude prevails. 
Man's freedom remains essentially intact and unimpaired and man, whether 
trying to shake off a constrictive neurosis or striving toward self- 
realization and authentic existence, need only be awakened and he will 
initiate the required movements. This is far too optimistic to suit 
either the general existential condition of man or the neurotic man 
undergoing psychotherapy. To the extent that this attitude prevails 
in either situation the real possibilities and expectations will be hin­
dered.
Loving communication is af special concern to Jaspers and it must 
be considered in any situation where people confront one another verb­
ally or extra—verbally or are confronted by God in his self—disclosure. 
Loving communication exists, according to Jaspers, "when one dares to 
meet the other in defenseless openness and asserts oneself against him 
only in what is existentially inevitable, ancj^ rhen one thus remains open 
to the 'reality' of the other and to its appeal to one's freedom, then 
existential self-awareness may occur as a discovery of one's real self." 
(p.8, Abenheimer, "Reflections on Karl Jaspers' Concept of 'Existence'"). 
Such loving communication is possible between people everywhere, says
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Jaspers, but it cannot be scientifically or medically contrived. How­
ever, should this communication develop within the analytical relation­
ship, it is unvaluable to the progress of the healing process.
By way of review and also in preparation for criticism of Jaspers' 
concept of 'loving communication', let us consider the paradigm again.
The typical existential man seeks his real self from which he is estranged; 
the neurotic man must firsijbe extricated from his special predicament 
and restored to a relatively non-neurotic, existential condition from 
which he then continues toward his real self. In other words, recovery 
from neurosis is the first stage of his movement toward authentic self­
hood; the second phase begins when the neurotic conflict is healed. The 
neurotic needs to move from a pathological state (a special existential 
condition) to the existential condition and from there hopefully toward 
essential selfhood.. Most normal men begin at the existential level and 
move toward the essential goal. Christian theology believes that God 
in Jej3us as the Christ has lovingly communicated with man partly for the 
purpose of healing the breach between his existential and essential 
condition. This is the cosmic act of ultimate healing. Begun in Christ, 
this healing continues and waits for completion in Christ; meanwhile 
God's loving communication with and for us continues. God's healing 
acts and movements are normative for all healing and especially for 
interpersonal relationships as they exist in existential psychotherapy.
In moving from a neurotic to an existential condition a man undergoes 
a relative kind of healing which is none the less healing and which
finds its paradigm in God's larger act of healing. Healing in psycho­
therapy relies in part on a loving communication too. Furthermore, the 
'defenseless openness to the reality of the other' which characterizes 
Jaspers' 'loving communication1 as it exists in analyst-patient relations 
finds its ultimate paradigm in the Cross of Christ.
Insofar as Jaspers ascribes to man the courage to be defenselessly 
open to another and overlooks the ultimate source of this courage, 
namely the One who was unreservedly open to loving communication, then 
his concept is imperceptibly close to truth but is finally unsatisfact­
ory; this applies to extra-analytical communications but it is especially 
analytical
true of the aeajytaroa-l relationship m  which the constricted freedom and 
radical closedness of the neurotic patient requires even greater defense­
less openness in the analyst in order to break through and establish 
loving communication. Obviously this kind of attitude is especially 
important for the pastor in his therapeutic-counseling relationships and 
it must ultimately be grounded in his own experience of Christ's openness 
to him and loving communication.withihim# Having made these criticisms 
and qualifications, Jaspers1 concept of 'loving communication' will be 
invaluable to our understanding of the section titled 'Healing Through 
Personality'.
Self—revelation involves a reciprocal relationship between self 
and 'Transcendence*. There exists within the psyche a polarity of in­
tentional act and unintentional becoming, of intention (activity) and
occurrence (passivity). "Passive self-understanding provides the medium 
for actual self-revelation." This passive self-understanding or self­
illumination comes through a fuller awareness of Being, an illumination 
conferred by Existence itself, a call from Transcendence itself. This 
is a grace-ful event, a given, which at least appears to resemble its 
theological counterpart in Christianity. But the resemblence is only 
apparent because this illumination conferred by Existence itself is re­
ciprocal to the transcending movement of philosophical thought by mail. 
Therefore, though acted upon by Being itself (passive), man actualizes 
himself by the absoluteness of decision (active).
"I am only revealed to myself by an inner activity which transforms 
me. Apparent revelation, unembarrassed exposures of the inward self, 
lavish self-confessions, endless introspection and self-description, 
revelling in the observation of inner events, usually cover a lurking 
attempt at concealment with no intention to reveal the self. Revelation 
is not an objective event., .but rather a form of inward behavior, a grasp 
of the self, a self-election, a self-appropriation."(p.350, Gen. Psycho.) 
As such it is never completed or finished but remains open and in process
This self—revelation must be achieved but the question of 'how1 is 
most important. Jaspers points out that self—revelation should not be 
confused with interpersonal methods of psychoanalysis. "We cannot se­
cure what Existence itself must foster. However, since psychotherapy 
is an important source of self-understanding, it must be considered in 
order to give widest possibility of realization, especially for the neu—
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rotic.1
Such knowledge as comes the patient’s way through interpretations 
and the therapeutic relationship itself can only aid healing and in per­
sonal authentication through actual performance by will to act upon it. 
"Self-reflection may serve them on the way but in itself it is never a 
primary force, it only becomes e.ffective through actual being, which in 
turn lays hold of its help. But once self-reflection in the form of 
psychological study of the self becomes the whole atmosphere in which 
a person lives, there is no end to it since the person's psychic life 
is not yet Being itself but only a place where Being is envisaged. There 
is a dangerous tendency in psychotherapy to convert the psychic actuality 
of an individual into an end in itself. The person who turns his psyche 
into a god because he has lost both world and god finds himself standing 
finally in the void. He misses the gripping force of things themselves, 
of objects of faith, images and symbols, tasks to perform, of everything 
absolute in the world."
And in another quote Jaspers beautifully states the crucial dis­
tinction which underlies my thesis of paradigmatic relationship and 
which prevents it from from slipping into a secularized, immanental, 
and humanistic version of ’heilsgeschichte*. "Psychological self—reflection 
can never achieve that which only becomes possible through surrender 
to being* Here lie the radical differences between the purposeful 
manipulations of psychotherapists directed upon the psyche and the prac­
tices of priests, mystics, and philosophers of all times, directed
through the ages towards God or Being; between confidences, self-revel­
ations given to the doctor and confession in church the transcendent 
reality marks the difference. Mere psychological knowledge of possibil­
ities and the use of psychological influences to bring the desired end 
about can never realize the possibilities in me. The individual must 
set about things, not about himself (or only about himself as a means); 
he must set about God, not about faith; about Being, not about thinking; 
about something he loves, not love itself; about performance, not exper­
ience; about realization, not about mere possibility — or rather he must 
set about all these alternatives as means of transit, not for their own 
sakes alone.**(p.809-810, General Psychopathology). Otherwise a psycho­
logical egocentrism develops which makes the individual the measure of 
all things; this is injurious to psychotherapy and it also constitutes 
the existential condition (as opposed to the neurotic) best symbolized 
by the *sin of pride', an ontological category.
Herein Jaspers makes two important points. First, he disallows 
any mere intellectual engagement within psychotherapy, or even within 
life itself, as a possible way to healing or self—authentication or 
self-realization. Secondly, Jaspers postulates a fundamental freedom 
which, no matter how limited and constricted by neurosis, is essential 
to healing and true existence* In the neurotic this freedom is the 
seed which, though small at first, takes responsibility for itself and 
grows to larger proportions. According to existentialism, without some
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germinal freedom there can be no responsibility for oneself and conse­
quently no healing on the neurotic or existential levels by either psycho­
therapy or religion.
In one place Jaspers makes a statement that is of special import­
ance to our study; he says, "With certain neurotic phenomena the pro­
cess of becoming oneself is also a means to cure the neurosis. Depth- 
psychology at its limits coincides with the illumination of Existence 
itself and calls for personal closenwss and friendship of a unique and 
contemporary character."(p.817, Ibid.). With the need for a unique 
friendship I wholeheartedly agree. I also agree that the ’process of 
becoming oneself may^also be a means to cure the neurosis'; this is 
plainly seen when a patient enters upon &nd commits himself to a way 
of becoming (for example, a religious faith or Jaspers' way of self­
revelation) which also cures the neurotic deviation in the larger pro­
cess* During psychotherapy the patient may, for instance, develop a 
meaningful faith in Christ which will aid immeasurably and directly 
influence’ the psychotherapeutic process.
However, the thesis of this paper is not concerned with the direct 
influence or Christian faith (or any ultimate or pseudo-ultimate con­
cern ) or the absence of such on the psychotherapeutic process. Rather 
I am concerned with the paradigmatic relationship between the process 
of becoming oneself and the psychotherapeutic process in which similar 
principles are inherently active and similar movements are involved.
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From this perspective I would like to criticise the statement that 
•depth-psychology at its limits coincides with the illumination of Exist­
ence itself1* At this point Jaspers has made an error which I have tried 
to avoid. Whereas he posits an identity between the illumination of 
Existence itself1 and depth depth psychology at its extremities, I have 
attempted to maintain a paradigmatic parallel on a broader level but have 
purposely avoided an identity at any point between the two areas. I be­
lieve that depth psychology and existential psychotherapy may approach 
or point towards the illumination of Existence itself but can never co­
incide with it* Otherwise the infinite qualitative difference between 
God and man, between his work (Heilsgeschichte) and man's response (ul­
timate concern), between his healing acts and man's healing is lost and 
psychotherapy becomes part of religion. This leads to an intolerable 
confusion within psychotherapy and also confuses the pastor—therapist 
who needs to distinguish between his roles and maintain the integrity 
of each*
Paradoxically, Jaspers is not blind to the difficulties and temp­
tations involved* He writes: "If we are to study man properly we have 
to take into account both the openness of unrestricted possibility and 
the limitations imposed by the real impenetrability of what is not un­
derstandable* These limitations only receive' confirmation through the 
practice of psychiatry, the openness will only come to us through philo­
sophy* Psychotherapy cannot live simply on its own resources*"(p*811,
Ibid.). However, the philosophy of which he speaks is essentially Jas­
pers' own philosophy based on his own presuppositions; therefore, who 
is going to 'watch the watcher' in order to insure the greatest possible 
openness? Perhaps a theological criticism is required*
Jaspers' philosophy resembles a semi-theological system. The con­
cepts and terminology are reminiscent of Tillich; for example, he re­
fers to Revelation, Transcendence, Being ('Urgrund'), and even faith.
But Jaspers' God, or Being itself is abstract and impersonal and is met, 
if at all, at the 'limits'. The faith of which he speaks is philosoph­
ical and contrasts with religious faith by acknowledging no absolute 
or final revelation in time. This is truly the god of a philosopher 
and not the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. As such, it cannot pro­
vide the fundamental insight required to understand the healing para­
digm.
Thus far, our discussion has probed the origins and development 
of existential psychotherapy through phenomenology and existential philo­
sophy including the pioneering effort of Karl Jaspers, a spokesman and 
practitioner of both psychotherapy and existentialism* Jaspers’ pre­
liminary groundwork has been superceded by more recent movements in exist­
ential psychotherapy* These new movements include the New Viennese School
of Personal Analysis represented by V, E* Frankl ani Igor Caruso;
most,
Frankl's ’logotherapyl is probably the most popular and^promising part 
of this movemnnt. More closely associated with existential analysis as 
such is Viktor Von V/eizsacker and Ludwig Binswanger* Binswanger has
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drawn heavily upon the existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger which 
lends itself to a systematic and comprehensive development in therapy.
Let us now consider Binswanger*s existential analysis.
Binswanger!s system incorporates the subtlety and difficulty'as well 
as the profundity of Heidegger's philosophy including his Germanic neo­
logisms. Due to its close relation with Heidegger's philosophy Bins­
wanger 's thought is largely subject to the same shortcomings and criti­
cisms as Heidegger'8 work. With this in mind let us continue.
Binswanger's Daseinsanalyse (Existential Analysis) is essentially 
an analysis of Dasein which designates the mode of existence or being- 
in-the-world peculiar to human Beings. As such existential anaiysis 
supercedes phenomenology because it takes into consideration the entire 
structure of existence of the individual and does not restrict itself 
to analysing states of consciousness. "The distinctive character of 
existential analysis is, thus, that it is concerned with ontology, the 
science of being, and with Dag&in, the existence of this particular 
being sitting opposite the psychotherpist."(p.37* Existence).
Dasein signifies that man is the being who is there (da**there, 
sein=*being). This 'throwness* of my being is into a given time and 
place which is my 'world'. "World is the structure of meaningful re­
lationships in which a person exists and in the design of which he par­
ticipates ." As such, my relation to it is both passive and active, past 
and future; "...to be aware of one's world means at the same time to be 
designing it.- World is not to be limited to the past determining events 
but includes also all the possibilities which open up before any per—
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son and are not simply given in the historical situation."(p.59-60, Ibid.).
The world in which a man has his being (being-in-the-world) consists 
of essentially three modes or differentiations according to Binswanger. 
"First, there is Umweltt literally meaning 'world around'; this is the 
biological world, generally called the environment. There is, second, 
the Mitwelt. literally the 'with-world1, the world of beings of one's 
own kind, the world of one’s fellow men. The third is Eigenwelt. the 
'own-world, the mode of relationship to one's self."(p.6l, Ibid.).
‘Umwelt refers to the worlc^iround. As such it is the natural world 
of causality and natural law. One of the most common criticisms of ex­
istential philosophy and analysis is that it neglects this world of nature 
which surrounds man. This accusation, though justified at times, is not 
applicable when the Umwelt is fully dealt with by the existential ana­
lysts. This category or mode allows the analyst and pastor to take the 
objective world seriously without falling into Freud's error of forcing 
all psychological phenomenon into the ’procrustean bed' of biological 
determinism.
Binswanger has contributed much to the study of man, but, being a 
humanist, he is not inclined to draw upon the insight theology has to 
offer; this resource should be helpful to the pastor in understanding 
these different existential categories. For instance, the Umwelt refers 
to a particular part of God's created world; the Urrrv/e 11 is the world 
created by God and which has 'fallen' through the 'sin' of Man. As 
such our attitude and relation to the Umwelt may be regarded from the
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perspective of theological truth. The stoics renounced the natural 
world and the participation of the body in it. The external world and 
the suffering therin is mediated to man by his own body. Even Plato 
characterized the body as the 'prisonhouse of the soul'. Man became 
dividod into a higher and lower nature and with the general negation 
of matter came asceticism and abuse of the body. Even Christianity 
adopted specious attitudes facilitating the escape from and denial of 
the Umwelt through immortalizing the soul, and so on*
More recently scientific and philosophical insight has vindicated 
the Umwelt and prompted the rediscovery of Biblical truths which will 
be of help to the pastor in his exploration and understanding of his 
own Umwelt aB well as his patient’s. Medard Boss comments upon man's 
body and his corporeality: "If man is never, really an extant object, 
his corporeality cannot be just a body, enclosed in an epidermis and 
ending at its surface. Rather, the human body — including its so- 
called animal, vegetative and hormonal arrangements - must be understood 
as a specific sphere of human existence, namely, that sphere which exists 
in that mode of being which we call the 'material' one. Because the 
human body is a proper realm of Dasein, it is one of the media through 
which the world—disclosing life relationships which constitute existence 
are carried out."(p.402, Wyss, Depth Psychology). Such an existential 
unity of body and soul as propounded above is matched only by the sim­
plicity and concreteness of the story of man's creation in Genesis.
This Biblical-existential view of man's wholeness and indivisibility 
is normative for the pastor or analyst as he deals with his patient's 
or counselee's Umwelt. This does not mean that the therapist seeks to 
impose this concept on his patient or condemn any deviation from it; rat­
her, the therapist will keep this as a point of personal reference as he 
tries to understand the patient's own Dasein especially in relation to 
his Umwelt. One of the most common distortions of Umwelt found in neu­
rotics and psychotics, for example, is the retreat into disembodied in­
tellectuality and/or spiritualism.
In this position the individual experiences his self as being more 
or less divorced or detached from his body. "The body is felt more as 
one object among other objects in the world than as the core of the in­
dividual 's own being. Instead of being the core of his true self, the 
body is felt as the core of the false self, which a detached, disembodied, 
'inner1, 'true' self looks on at with tenderness, amusement, or hatred 
as the case may be. Such a divorce of self from body deprives the un— 
embodied self from direct participation in any aspect of the life of the 
world, which is mediated exclusively through the body's pereeptions, 
feelings and movements."(p.69, Laing, The Divided Self).
The Christian religion seems especially susceptible to and respon­
sible for attitudes which denigrate and degrade sexuality as something 
dirty and sinful per se. This has provided a ready-made escape for people 
with individuation difficulties; 'faith* wrongly becomes a matter of de­
nying the earthly and instinctual life and fleeing from the earthy and
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emotional Umwelt into a realm of nothing hut goodness and kindness, 
spiritual or intellectual heights, into purified aestheticism, into 
social or racial superiority resulting in an unreal, semi-deified man­
hood not 'rooted' or grounded in the created Umwelt.
Binswanger's second mode of world is Eigenwelt. This mode of self­
relatedness is grounded in the 'I-am' or ur experience as Rollo May calls 
it* Eigenwelt is based on the fact that man is the creature capable of 
an attitude towards himself via self-transcendence. Man is the being 
who can be conscious of and therefore responsible for his existence. 
Self-consciousness is intrinsic to man as a thinking being and the basis 
of his uniqueness. An outstanding treatment of this mode from a philo­
sophical-theological perspective may be found in Reinhold Niebuhr's The 
Nature and Destinsr of M a n ; Neibuhr analyses man's existential relation­
ship to himself from a normative, essentialist standpoint. This is help­
ful in understanding the essential-existential differentiation,' but we 
must turn to R. D. Laing and Binswanger to appreciate the difference 
between self—relatedness in a neurotic or psychotic man and self—related— 
ness in a 'sane' existential man.
Laing's description of the psychotic way of being—in—the—world is 
vivid yet realistic; regarding the psychotic's Eigenwelt, or relation 
with himself, he says: "He experiences himself in despairing‘aloneness 
and isolotion; moreover, he does not experience himself as a complete 
person but rather as 'split' in various ways1, perhaps as a mind more 
or less tenuously linked to a body, as two or more Selves, and so on."
(p.17, Laing, The Divided Self). The development of a false-self system 
and other defenses distorts the Eigenwelt still more and mokes the pas- 
tor-analyst's entry into and understanding of this mode of self-related- 
ness more difficult and risky. Even a pastor with extensive training 
in analysis will not likely deal with psychotic people therapeutically; 
even many psychiatrists and analysts avoid their treatment. But the 
difficulty of moving from one's own experience of being into another 
person's Eigenwelt is best illustrated in the extremity of the psychotic 
patient. The neurotic's Eigenwelt is less bizaar than the psychotic's, 
but the difficult task of orienting oneself as a person within the other's 
scheme of things via empathy and understanding is no less important and 
only slightly less difficult. A more complete description including 
examples may be found in Laing's The Divided Self and Binswanger's 
classic study of "Ellen West", Existence, p. 237#
Mitwelt . Binswanger's third mode of world, deals with the inter­
personal relationships of human beings. The quality of relationship 
is essentially one of 'meeting' rather than of 'using', of personality 
rather than instrumentality. Consequently Mitwelt is based on personal 
decision and commitment and mutual influence of the persons involved.
It is clear that a person's own identity can never be completely abstracted 
fron^iis identity-for-others and his identity-for-himself depends to some 
extent on the identity others ascribe to him. A breakdown in this Hit— 
welt is disasterous on all levels; Martin Buber from a philosophical view­
point and Harry Stack Sullivan from a psycho—social one have dealt with
the repercussions on man as man. One of the most penetrating discussions 
and descriptions of neurotic and psychotic Mitwelts is found in It. It. 
Laing's The Self and Others. In this book the origins of a broken Mit­
welt as well as the dynamics leading £6 deeper alienation are described.
I mention this book because the counseling pastor must have not only 
empathy but also understanding of the process before entrance into the 
patient's Mitwelt is possible.
Binswanger's three modes of world maintain a vital balance by being 
at once interrelated and mutually supportive. A breakdown in any one 
of the three has negative repercussions on the other two but, on the 
other hand, there is also the possibility of temporarily supporting the 
weakened mode or strenghhing it through the other two. This is most 
obvious in therapeutic activity which uses Mitwelt as the door to healing 
the greater personality. This balance in perspective also accounts for 
the superiority of the existential approach to psychotherapy. It avoids 
the orthodox psychoanalytic error of trying to reduce Dasein to Umwelt 
while paying scant attention to the other two modes of being—in—the—world; 
Rollo May also points out the temptation of the interpersonal schools 
(Fromm and Sullivan et. al.) to make Mitwelt the essence of Dasein.
The. key to Binswanger’s existential analysis i& the reconstruction 
of the subjective world of the patient, his own peculiar world—design.
This presupposes, as Rollo May puts it, 'that technique follows under­
standing 'and not vice versa as in orthodox psychoanalysis. This prin­
ciple not only applies to neurotics whose world—design is more obviously 
orderly and coherent but also to schizophrenics. "The remarkable result
of existential analytical research in schizophrenia lies in the discovery 
that even in schizophrenia the human spirit is not split into fragments..,* 
If the mental life of a schizophrenic, as existential analysis shows, 
is not merely a field strewn with ruins but has retained certain 
structure, then it becomes evident that it must be described.. .as a whole 
and as a Gestalt."(p.124, Existence). The implications for therapy are 
stupendous and health-giving: "We are now no longer stopped at the so- 
called borderline between that psychic life with which we can, and that 
with which we cannot, empathize. Quite a number of case reports show 
that our method has succeeded beyond earlier hopes in communicating with 
patients, in penetrating their life history, and in understanding and des­
cribing their world-designs even in cases where all this seemed impos­
sible before."(p.213, Ibid.).
The principle is valid for any analyst or pastor doing therapy or 
religious counseling. These helpers are required to orient themselves 
to the patient or counselee in such a manner as to leave open the pos­
sibility of understanding him. The object of this movement is not to
impose what we consider to be an authentic modality of existence on him 
or replace his inauthentic one; tiis new modality would be alien to 
the individual as well. Rather we seek to enter into his world design 
in such a way, namely lovingly and acceptingly, so as to allow the in­
dividual to realize his latent and best abilities and to shape his own
self. The object of establishing this existential communication is to
help the patient to see that in spite of all his difficulties he is 
essentially the same as any human being and is alone only in the sense 
that all men must be alone in the uncertainty and anxiety which adheres 
to their existence as such. This attempt to point out realistically the 
universal existential condition of man in order to help the neurotic shed 
his pathological condition constitutes the beginning of therapy. On the 
other hand, helping the neurotic or the existential man to appropriate 
the power and 'courage to be' in their own Dasein is the task and respon­
sibility of religion.
Nevertheless, this should not blur the seriousness of the patholo­
gical (as opposed to the universal-existential) condition. The terrible 
risks involved in entering the mode of existence of the patient should 
not be underestimated. One may become trapped in the modality and sur­
render his own relatively more free and authentic mode of being-in-the- 
vorld. The true openness of the pastor or analyst which is so important 
to healing also leaves him vulnerable to snares and hurt from his patient. 
Entering another's world—design does not mean that the therapist forgets 
himself or his own world—design but it does entail a risl^)f life and 
a sharing of suffering which is paradigmatically related to Christ's 
oim healing and caring and freeing work. This is the risk involved in 
being—for—others as Christ was for others. As the healing of man's 
existential condition was met in Christ's own incarnate manhood, so must 
the healing of the pathological condition of men be initiated from their 
Dasein. The balance between giving oneself and losing oneself (surrendering
one's own health or sanity) is vital and must be maintained without in­
juring the integrity of either person involved. At its best psycho­
therapy and the attendant encounter between patient and analyst is a 
work of love not unlike God's own healing work especially in Jesus as 
the Christ. The pastor as therapist and counselor has an advantage in 
translating the transcendent—vertical into the immanent-horizontal dimen­
sion of existence and history because he sees this translation in Christ.
He may work under the admonition of Christ to 'love one another even as 
I have loved you'. The 'Christ—formation' (Bonhoeffer) in the pastor 
should be the source of a unique freedom and courage to risk his 'sanity' 
and love for the sake of his patient.
To speak of the 'psychic incarnation' of the therapist in the pat­
ient's world-design would violate the paradigm and it also suggests an 
infinite qualitative difference.:between therapist and patient which simply 
does not exist as it does between God and man. However, the pastor is 
susceptible to the special and paradoxical danger of confusing his res­
ponsibility of being—a-man-for—others, especially in therapy and counseling, 
with his talk about God, or, in other words, with separating his person 
from his words. Paradoxically, the danger is greatest when dealing with 
existential concepts which, though having concrete meaning, may become 
philosophical abstractions. Rollo May points out the danger for exist­
ential analysts: "The temptation to use existential concepts in the ser­
vice of intellectualizing tendencies is especially to be guarded against, 
since, because they refer to things that have to do with the center of
personal reality, these concepts can the more seductively give the il­
lusion of dealing with reality. ...the necessary interrelation of ver­
balizing and acting is never overlooked. The 'logos’ must be made flesh, 
the important thing is to bje existential."(p.90, May, Existence). Thus, 
the pastor as a Christian engaged in existential psychotherapy must be 
doubly cautious.
Before bringing this section on existential psychotherapy to a close, 
let us consider some of the more important criticisms of the movement 
and its presuppositions. These fall under three general catagories; re­
lation to Freud, relation to Freedom, and relation to Commitment.
Relation to Feeud — First, most existential analysts deny or severely 
limit Freud's condept of the unconscious. This is partially justified 
when, as Rollo May puts it, the doctrine is used "...as a convenient 
blank check on which any causal explanation can be written or as a reser­
voir from which any deterministic theory can be drawn," However, the 
opposite error is just as disasterous; in contrast to Freud's reductionism 
and his epiphenomenal view of consciousness, existential analysis tends 
to set aside the genetic—causal view and regard the patient's world—design 
as the basic explanatory factor for physical behavior and psychic processes. 
Such a development may lead to the complete absorption of empirical psych­
ology into the philosophical side of existential analysis. Such a reduction 
and capitulation by science would mean the end of psychology as such.
To my mind Rollo May, an existentialist himself, holds a well-bal­
anced view of the matter by proposing that being is at some point indiv—
isible, that the unconsciousness is part of any given being, that the 
cellar theory of the unconscious is logically wrong and practically un- 
constructive; but the meaning of the discovery, namely, the radical en- 
largement of being, is one of the great contributions of our day and must
be retained. (p.91» May* Existence).
Relation to Freedom — This has two aspects; first, existential anal­
ysis postulates th^eality and existence of human freedom as ppposed to
deterministic views. This means that in analysis we and the patient have
to understand his past in terms of his present and not exclusively the 
other way round as in orthodox psychoanalysis. The danger of overstate­
ment threatens the integrity of some representitives of existential anal­
ysis. They believe man's freedom to be absolute and even suggest that 
infants are endowed with a fully developed freedom and sense of respon­
sibility for their world-design. This borders on absurdity; this subject 
will be treated in a later section.
Relation to Gommitment - This concept is crucial to the tasks of 
both psychotherapy and pastoral counseling. In psychotherapy we discover 
a psychological anomaly known as 'commitment—anxiety' which is analogous 
to the existential aversion to religious commitment encountered in pas­
toral counseling. This 'commitment—anxioty', therefore, has ontological 
as well as psychological connotations; whereas the psychological type 
is primarily rooted in early experiences withparents, the existential 
type is grounded in man's estranged finitude. Psychologically this com­
mitment—anxiety is characterized by a panic—reaction attached not to
separation from persons but to commitment to them. However, this com- 
mitment-anxiety is related dialectic ally to a separation-anxiety which 
faces the neurotic person with the dilemma of maintaining a wide psycho- 
logical-emotional distance while craving permanent, intimate relation­
ships with important people in his life.
The religious parallel is obvious; Man requires the loving presence 
of God and the concommitant healing but finds that he cannot tolerate 
his difficult and revealing presence. This existential commitment- 
anxiety and its attendant loss of 'being-by-relatedness' is overcome 
by God’s prior, unconditional commitment to us in Christ; the analyst's 
part in healing the psychological counterpart of this existential condi­
tion is predicated upon its paradigmatic relationship to God's healing 
act. But what, we may ask, does this mean in more explicit terms for 
psychotherapy?
Commitment incorporates both freedom, or the ability to decide, and 
that ti which the commitment is made and toward which one's freedom is 
exercised. In psychotherapy this has led to contention between ortho­
dox psychoanalysts and existential analysts. With the exception of 
some psychoanalysts who do stress the importance of the ^corrective 
emotional experience', they emphasize the supreme importance and priority 
of self-understanding attained through free—association, interpretation 
and other techniques. Their attitude might be formulated as 'know­
ledge precedes understanding'. Roi^o May, representing the existential 
analysts, maintains that 'decision precedes knowledge'. In treatment
this means that ..the patient cannot permit himself to get insight 
or knowledge until he is ready to decide, takes a decisive orientation 
to life.* and has made the preliminary decisions along the way." He makes 
an important qualification which saves therapy from becoming just another 
form of activism. "This is no 'decision as a short cut', no matter of 
premature jumping because to act may be easier amjmay quiet anxiety more 
quickly than the slow, arduous, long-time process of self-exploration." 
(p.87 -88, May, Existence).
According to my understanding, both the existential and orthodox 
psychoanalysts miss the essence of commitment and the dialectical relation­
ship between knowledge and decision, mind and will. Igor Caruso has 
nicely expressed it as 'a truth to be lived', or as 'truth for me'. But 
this brings us to the border between psychotherapy and religious counsel­
ing, Discovering what is blocking commitment and then removing that ob­
stacle to freedom is the task of psychotherapy; uncovering what one 
may commit oneself to unconditionally is a religious, or,as many exist­
ential analysts prefer to say, a philosophical question.
Thus, as the patient moves from a neurotic to a plain existential 
mode of existence, the pastor moves from fyis therapeutic role to his 
counseling role. According to the paradigm, these two modes of being— 
in—the—world (neurotic and existential) and the corresponding roles of 
the pastor (therapist and counselor) are analogically related. Whereas 
the pastor as therapist might look to Binswanger for guidance, the pas—
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tor as religious counselor and theologian might irell look to Paul Tillich 
for enlightenment,
Tillich has said, "Man becomes truly human only at the moment of 
decision," Just as the neurotic man makes penultimate decisions during 
psychotherapy which help to determine his healing, so also does the exist­
ential man make ultimate decisions which help to determine his healing 
at the hands of God, The healing part of God!s ‘Heilsgeschichte1 is onto- 
logically prior to man's healing efforts through interpersonal means ; 
this relation permits a theologian such as Tillich to speak helpfully, 
not authoritatively, to such a field as existential psychotherapy. The 
pastor who does psychotherapy is the double beneficiary of this para­
digmatic relationship,
Tillich doscrihea authentic Kigenwelt, or man’s proper aolf-rolnted- 
ness, as the ’courage to be as oneself. This means ’the affirmation 
of the self as a self; that is, of a separated, self-contcred, individ­
ualized, incomparable, froo, self-determining self!. Inauthentic Elgon— 
welt, as a part of a larger condition of estrangement (estranged Dasein 
which includes estranged Eigenwelt, Mitwelt, and Umwelt), refers to 
man’s self—estrangement and the inability to affirm himself. Under this 
condition man's life—space becomes empty and meaningless under the threat 
of non-being,
Tillich describes authentic Mitwelt and Umwelt together as the 
'courage to be as a part', "The courage to be as a part is the courage
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to affirm one's own being by participation", and especially by partici­
pation in the community. Inauthentic Mitwelt (and Umwelt) and breakdowns 
in participation may take neurotic or psychotic forms and in psycho­
therapy the analyst helps to mediate the patient's participation in com­
munity on all levels (i,e,, family, town, nation, mankind as a whole).
If the analyst is also a pastor, then he mediates the patient's relation­
ship to and participation in a very special community, namely the Church, 
As such, he may bring special resources to the task of healing on both 
the neurotic and existential planes (i.e,, koinonia, sacraments, Scrip­
ture, prayer, and so on). Needless to say, these two sides of man's 
self-affirmation are distinguishable but not separable, interrelated 
and interdependent. For a more complete description of these two modes 
of Dasein and their inauthentic forms, see Chapters IV and V of Paul 
Tillich's The Courage To Be.
According to Tillich, "Courage is the Self-affirmation of being in 
spite of the fact of non-being," However, this courage always in­
cludes a risk, whether the risk of losing oneself and becoming a thing 
within the whole of things (Dasein reduced entirely to Mitwelt or Um­
welt) or of losing one's world in an empty self—relatedness (Dasein
is
reduced entirely to Eigenwelt)."(p. 152, Courage To Be ). This^not only 
the risk taken by the patient but also the risk taken by the analyst 
in attempting to help the patient to a state of gretter self-affirmation.
On the neurotic level and in the course of psychotherapy the patient
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may find the courage to affirm himself, both as a part (Mitwelt) and 
as oneself (Eigenwelt); this courage may be grounded either in the power 
of himself or in the power of his world; both of these powers are rela­
tive and grounded in relative and limited sources, namely oneself or 
one's world. However, in spite of its relativity this power mny mitigate 
or completely remove the pathological condition and thereby effect a healing. 
In most cases this relative power will originate in the person of the 
therapist who, acting in his own pother, may renew the patient's confi­
dence in his own human possibilities. In its most potent and effective 
form this relative, anthropocentric power of self-affirmation can only 
mitigate the pathological condition of man and cannot deal with the 
existential predicament of estrangement from our essential being which 
is common to all men. On this relatively more healthy but still exist- 
entially conditioned level man must go beyond immediate sources of cou­
rage (i.e., self or analyst) and participate in the ultimate power which 
gives him the courage to affirm himself in spite of the presence of the 
negativities of existence.
Tillich argues that even this relatively limited courage of self- 
affirmation which is rooted in the power of oneself and one's world and 
accounts for some healing in psychbtherapy seeks to ground itself in the 
power of being—itself• Therefore even the courage found in psychotherapy 
or derived from the person of the analyst and used for limited purposes 
of healing is essentially a religious movement. "This means that every
courage to be has openly or covertly a religious root. In some cases 
the religious root is carefully covered, in others it is passionately 
denied; in some it is deeply hidden and in others superficially. But 
it is never completely absent. For everything that is participates in 
being—itself•"(p.152—153f Ibid.), Therefore, although relative courage 
derived from psychotherapy may heal pathological forms of escaping the 
threat of non-being, only courage rootbd in the ground of being can ul­
timately overcome the threat to existence by non-being; the former type 
is consciously or unconsciously, more or less, encompassed within the 
latter type and certified by it because "...there is no self-affirmation 
of a finite being, and there is no courage to be in which the groung of 
being and its power of conquering non-being is not effective."(p.156, 
Ibid.), And on the basis of Tillich's reasoning and in spite of an 
infinite^ qualitative difference between the courage of the former and 
latter types, the two are analogically related. This analogy and the 
characteristics peculiar to it have been expressed in my paradigm dis­
cussed above.
Whereas a tentative and relative courage in oneself, the analyst 
(or pastor), or the process and technique of psychotherapy itself may 
aid in healing a pathological condition, it cannot and should not pre­
sume itself to be able to overcome the general existential condition 
of man. The infinite qualitative difference between a finite source of
i
pour age and the ultimate source of courage indicates that a man can only 
become confident about his existence by ceasing to base his confidence 
in himself or in anything finite, including the Church. 'It is based
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on God and solely on God, who is experienced in a unique and personal 
encounter1.
The source of confidence and the key to God's healing work is the 
'total, personal, and immediate certainty of divine forgiveness1 or, 
in Tillichian terms, the 'acceptance of the unacceptable'. "One could 
say that the courage to be is the courage to accept oneself as accepted 
in spite of being unacceptable."(p.160, Ibid.).
The relation between God's healing acceptance of man and the anal­
ysts acceptance of his patient is beautifully expressed by Tillich:
"In the communion of healing, for example, the psychoanalytical situation, 
the patient participates in the healing power of the helper by whom he 
is accepted although he feels himself unacceptable. The healer in this 
relationship does not stand for himself as an individual but represents 
the objective power of acceptance and self-affirmation. This objective 
power works through the healer in the patient. He accepts the patient 
into his communion without condemning anything and without covering up 
anything. No self—acceptance is possible if one is not accepted in a 
person—to—person relation. But even if one is personally accepted, it 
needs a self—transcending courage to accept this acceptance, it needs 
the courage of confidence. Here...is the point where 4he religious 
'acceptance as being accepted' transcends medical healing. Religion 
asks for the ultimate source of the power which heals by accepting the 
unacceptable, it asks for God. The acceptance by God, his forgiving or 
justifying act, is the only and ultimate source of a courage to be which
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is able to take the anxiety of guilt and condemnation into itself. For 
the ultimate power of self-affirmation can only be the power of being- 
itself. Everything less than this, one’s own or anybody else’s finite 
power of being cannot overcome the radical, infinite threat of non-being 
which is experienced in the despair of self-condemnation."(p.161-162, Ibid.).
Thus we see that God’s work of healing, seen especially in the symbol 
of ffesus as the Christ, has ontological priority in its analogical rela- 
tionhhip to psychotherapeutic healing. Because of its comprehensive and 
unconditional nature, the healing Word of God may directly influence both 
the pathological and existential condition of man twward healing. In 
other words, by representing the objective power of acceptance and self- 
affirmation the analyst may inadvertantly help the patient to be grasped 
by the power of being itself without violating the rules of analysis.
This is a religious condition which is symbolized as 'faith'$ "Faith is 
the state of being grasped by the pwwer of being-itself.’’(p.l67, Ibid.).
In this man to man encounter in analysis the therapist, without breaking 
the rules concerning neutrality, may unknowingly mediate a divine—human 
encounter within his patient.
This is of special interest to th^astor who does therapy as well 
as counseling. Whereas counseling is explifcitly concerned with faith 
and God’s grace and the mediation of such via its religious symbols and 
practices, the pastor as therapist also predicates his work on God's work 
and acceptance of him in Christ. Therefore without violating the stan—
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dard rules of analysis he may in his analytic encounter with his patient 
mediate the acceptance which has ultimate healing power. This is the 
paradigmatic relation on which this paper is based,
A final word must be included concerning the pastor’s representitive 
function within the Church; "The Church, which stands for the power of 
being-itself • •,, claims to be the mediator of the courage to be. It is 
the Church under the Cross which alone can do this, the Church which 
preaches the Crucified who cried to. God..•,"(p,182, Ibid.), The God 
who acts through His Church also acts through the power of individual 
persons within the Church; the pastor mediates this 'courage to be through 
his several activities but especially through therapy and counseling.
This courage influences both the special neurotic condition of some 
men as well as the universal existential conditions of mankind. In the 
following section we s h a l l  briefly discuss th re e  basic irxistential r e a l i ­
t ie s  which th e  p a s to r  w i l l  c o n fro n t  in  h is  w ork b o th  in  i t s  e x is t e n t ia l  
and n e u ro t ic  fo rm s .
HEALING: PROM EXISTENTIAL TO TELEOLOGICAL
AND
FROM PATHOLOGICAL TO EXISTENTIAL
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Our three topics in this section include man's freedom, his anxiety 
(or Angst), and his guilt. Within each theme we shall discuss the funda­
mental characteristics of its existential form and the nature and means 
of healing it, whereby movement towards the teldological condition is 
initiated. Then we shall consider its pathological form and the nature 
and means of healing it through existential psychotherapy, whereby move­
ment from the pathological towards the existential is initiated. Both 
anxiety and guilt presuppose a basic freedom in man.
FREEDOM
At the outset let us consider the existential—theological meaning 
of freedom. Freedom may be seen as the condition or power of indetermin­
ate potentiality, a condition of sheer possibility — the possibility of 
making something out of Nothing. This freedom is not groundless but is 
rooted in man's creation in the image of God. Jaspers declares that 
'I come to myself as a gift*. "Freedom can be ignored and evaded, but 
never effaced so long as man remains human. Yet its ground is not a 
knowable structure; it is rather a mysterious origin which I can choose 
only in the sense of acknowledging and accepting it, not in the sense 
of producing it."(p.236, Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief).
This freedom originates in God and is rooted in our own self-trans­
cendence. By its nature it establishes an 'over-againstness' between
man himself. Man's freedom is not robtless, absolute, or demonic but 
it is a limited, restricted freedom tied to the finitude and temporality 
of historical human existence. Sartre's doctrine of man’s freedom is 
largely misunderstood but it captures the reality of the situation. In 
its ESSENTIAL form man's freedom and responsibility if total but not ab­
solute, complete but not unlimited. In its EXISTENTIAL form freedom in­
cludes the debilitating condition of 'Bad Faith' whereby freedom deceives 
itself and freedom becomes constricted and diminished. Or again, Karl 
Jaspers helps us when he writes: "I am autonomous but not self-sufficient: 
I become what I am. In the dizzy consciousness of myself in liberty,
I lean not only upon my actual situation in the world imposing its limits 
but also upon the Transcencence before which I stand; I stand in conscious 
ness of my liberty before my concrete situation andfbefore the enveloping
Six Existentialist Thinkers)•
Within the limits of his possibilities man should understand his 
personal existence as a task and a responsibility; this is the task of 
self—making, or self—creation. We have a hand in making ourselves what 
we are to become. Man’s essential humanity is not given to him; rather, 
he must attain his authentic selfhood through decision. But man's path 
to self-realization is, as Jaspers points out, hedged in by the exigencies
God and man, man world (including his fellow men), and within
situation which gives me my responsibility, my liberty."(p.49, Blackham,
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of necessity and finitude one one side and by God on the other. But free­
dom means that we can negate as well as affirm, we can destroy as well 
as construct. Freedom means that man can have kinship with Nothingness 
as well as with God. In this confrontation with void and non-being we 
face our contingency, finitude, and nihilation. The fact of inevitable 
death, as Heidegger pointed out, epitomizes this crushing question of 
non-being which pervades the whole of Being, This fearful possibility 
which is rooted in Nothing as well as Being leads to existential anxiety 
(angst) and finally to existential guilt. Thus we see that the vety 
'boundry situations' which are the condition of freedom are also an ob­
stacle to its authentic unfolding toward man's self-realization.
Under the circumstances described above man has two inauthentic 
alternatives, to forget that he is rooted in eternity and renounce his 
humanity or to identify himself with the Eternal and take flight from 
his humanity by becoming God. "For example, the fact that a man may 
have attempted to achieve a 'merely animal' existence, by trying to 
renounce Tesponsibility, shows that he is not a 'merely animal' existent. 
Furthermore, he can differentiate himself from every social role even 
when because of cultural conditioning, it is impossible to discard the 
role."(p.236, Roberts, Existentialism and|leligious Belief). The attempt 
to exercise absolute freedom is similarly unfruitful. (More extensive 
discussion of these two distortions of freedom can be found in Reinhold 
Niebuhr's The Nature and Destiny of Man). Paradoxically, either alter­
native leads to a fatal constriction of man's real possibilities.
This tragic element in human existence has been described theologically 
by Tillich as nnn's estrangement from the ground of his being, or Being 
Itself. Contrary to Jaspers who admits the possibility of a dispiplihed 
self-recowery, Tillich rightfully points out that this alienation caused 
by man's mususe of his freedom is impossible to overcome by man's efforts. 
"Once separition has taken place ...it is impossible for man to achieve 
by his own efforts a reunion with God, with the ground of being. Thus 
we are estranged, and action leads only to further estrangement. Reunion 
with being — the overcoming of estrangement - is possible only when rnahfs 
heart lets itself be grasped by the divine spirit, only when being itself, 
entering men, overcomes and conquers the resistance of estrangement and 
despair."(p.495* Peerman and Marty, A Handbook of Christian Theologians).
Those familiar with Tillich's theology will recognize the New Being 
in Jesus as the Christ as the one who overcomes the estranged elements 
(i.e., angst and guilt) in man's existential condition. Tillich takes 
pains to point out that such healing does not abrogate the authentic 
existential conditions of man's life such as finitude and temporality; 
rather, it heals the estranged elements within the existential which 
prevent man from moving toward his 'essential' or teleological humanity 
in ttie New Being of. Jesus Christ. This power of healing in the New 
Being is derived primarily from His triumph over non—being as represented 
in the Cross of death.
Healing the existential estrangement of man begins by appropriating 
the power of that which is given; even this presupposes a freedom which
is connected with the paradox of grace and faith. This ontological 
healing restores man by way of God's love to his rightful freedom and 
sense of responsibility.
Psychological healing as conducted by the psychotherapist attempts 
to move from the pathological condition towards the existential condi­
tion* Because the various forms of psychopathology are special types 
os distortion included within the larger and inclusive human predicament 
of existential estrangement, they too are primarily based on the onto­
logical concept of freedom and its misuse. This is especially true of 
the neuroses where responsibility and freedom are at least pattially 
and voluntarily renounced in favor of the neurotic pattern. Even in 
psychosis the person may be responsible up to the onset of the disease 
process.
The schools of psychotherapy which deny freedom as either an onto­
logical or psychological category necessarily reduce psychoneurosis 
to a physiological process based on conflicts between social conditioning 
and biological determinants. As a result their methods of therapy are 
also more mechanical. If a man's freedom and responsibility played
little or no part in the origin of his psychological difficulty, so 
schools
these say, then why should the patient become responsible for his
recovery? Consequently these psychotherapists try to increase the ego's 
adaptive powers but ignore the need for expanding the decision-making 
powers and sense of authentic responsibility in the patient. Existential 
analysis is more true to the total nature of man and therefore is more
comprehensive in its healing potential. It not only recognizes man's 
biological and sociological determinants but also acknowledges the onto­
logical ground of his freedom and his self-transcendence.
By adding some insights of his own to Heidegger's basic ontology 
Binswanger beautifully captures man in his total need. He expands upon 
and deepens the one-sided, naturalistic-evolutionary viewpoint of psycho­
analysis by adding the existential forms of BEING-ABLE-TO-BE (existence) 
and BEING-ALLOWED-TO-BE {love) to man's IIAVING-TO-BE (thrownness). Having- 
to-be covers the existential conditions of finitude and temporality as 
well as the bio-social limitations on man. But the other two categories 
capture the other dimensions of man's being.
Being-allowed-to-be (love), as we shall see in the last section 
of this paper, is the key to healing and the means by which man recovers 
and experiences his rightful freedom. Since love is both the end and 
means of healing and the only path to restored freedom, it is well to 
recognize that this love only heals when it does justice to and respects 
the freedom of the other person. Love makes man whole again and part of 
that wholeness is his freedom. When God extends his love in Christ in 
order to heal man's basic estrangement, He does it with full respect to 
man's freedom to respond with ultimate concern (faith); paradoxically, 
this love not dnly appeals to freedom but creates the conditions for its 
authentic expression.
Paradigmatically speaking, the love extended by the analyst to the 
patient also depends on the free fcsponse and cooperation of the patient
for its effectiveness. But the unsolicited love extended by the psycho­
therapist, like God's own love, helps create the confidence and trust 
which permits the free response, no matter how small the patient's power 
may be or how weak his response. Thus, the paradigm revehls that healing 
on either the ultimate plane or the psychological plane follows the 
same general pattern and principles.
Binswanger's concept of being-able-to-be (freedom), when applied 
to existential psychotherapeutic procedure and relations, makes freedom 
an integral and essential part of healing, while in a more naturalistic- 
oriented therapies it would be considered extraneous or ignored altogether. 
Existential psychotherapy calls for cooperation on the part of the patient, 
a commitment to the task of healing, and at least a feeble will-to-recover. 
However, it does not overlook the importance of freedom in the analyst; 
the analyst must be free enough from himself to be able to freely give 
himself initially t£ the patient. Analogically, God in his perfect free­
dom has willed to give himself in a saving (healing) way through the One 
who was 'a man for others'. The psychotherapist is also asked to be a 
mnn .for others in like manner for the sake of a more limited type of 
healing.
The analyst's freedom to love is the cornerstone of healing in exist­
ential psychotherapy just as it is in our ultimate healing at the hands 
of God. The analyst's freedom to love is related to the petient in three 
ways; first, it appeals to the freedom of the patient no matter how con­
stricted, diminished, or ambiguous it may be in his pathological condi—
tion. Secondly, it creates the conditions necessary for a response from
the analysand; and thirdly, it helps to transform the pathological restrictions
on his freedom thereby expanding his powers of decision and responsibility.
But freedom is only the presupposition of the other two conditions men­
tioned at the beginning of this section. Let us now consider 'anxiety'#
ANXIETY
Anxiety is, as Tillich puts it, 'the existential awareness of non- 
being* • Because being has ontological priority over non-being and non- 
being itself has no qualities apart from being, non-being is dependent 
on the special qualities of being which it negates. This line of rea­
soning allows Tillcih in his Courage To Be to 'distinguish three types 
of anxiety according to the three directions in which non-being threatens 
being'# "Non-being threatens man's ontic self-affirmation, relatively 
in terms of fate, absolutely in terms of death. It threatens man's 
spiritual self-affirmation, relatively in terms of emptimess, absolutely 
in terms of meaninglessness. It threatens man's moral self-affirmation, 
relatively in terms of guilt, absolutely in terms of condemnation. The 
awareness of this threefold threat is anxiety in three forms, that of 
fate and death (briefly, the anxiety of death), that of emptiness and 
loss of meaning (briefly, the anxiety of meaninglessness), that of guilt 
and condemnation (briefly, the anxierty of condemnation)." (p.49, Courage 
To Be)#
These types of anxiety are not Only related to one another but
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they are also all mutually interrelated with freedom as discussed in the 
last section. Anxiety and guilt are not conceivable without freedom and 
yet both negatively influence the freedom from which they proceed. In 
this section under anxiety we shall discuss anxiety in general and then 
the first two types of anxiety (death and meaninglessness) leaving the 
anxiety of guilt and condemnation until the last section. The categories 
of anxiety described above by Tillich are of the existential variety in 
contrast to the pathological variety treated by existential psychotherapy 
which will be discussed later*
Both fear and anxiety are related to the threat of annihilation 
which limits our being-in-the-world; however, fear has a definite object 
while anxiety is the ontological response to the more general threat of 
non-being. This existential situation in which being is limited and ul­
timately threatened by non-being is known as finitude and it is threat­
ened in basically two different ways, by nothingness and meaninglessness* 
Nothingness is ultimately experienced in the anxiety of death which 
is subjectively disclosed as an immanent possibility and an eventual 
inevitability. This fact of death is primarily asthreat to our tempor­
ality which is the central category of finitude. As such, man is unable 
to face this immanent possibility and attempts to either conceal or con­
trol it. One method of concealment is to objectify death and see it as 
a general and universal occurance which befalls all forms of life. On 
the otherhand, man may try to control death by determining the timing 
of his own death in the act of suicide, thereby thinking to gain advan-
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tage over its unpredictability while surrendering to non-being.
But Tillich points out that the anxiety of death is only the per­
manent horizon within which the anxiety of fate is at work. "For the 
threat against man's ontic self-affirmation is not only the absolute 
threat of death but also the relative threat of fate. Certainly the 
anxiety of death overshadows all concrete anxieties and gives them their 
ultimate seriousness. They have, however, a certain independence and, 
ordinarily, a more immediate impact than the anxiety of death. The term 
'fate* for this whole group of anxieties stresses one element which is 
common to all of them: their contingent character, their unpredictability, 
the impossibility of showing their meaning and purpose."(p.51> Tillich,
The Courage To Be ). Thus, we see in the primarily temporal anxiety 
of fate and death the dread of life in the former case andjthe dread in 
the latter.
Meaninglessness is primarily a threat to man's spaciality, the 
second coordinate or axis of finitude. Meaninglessness is a type of 
non-being whereby the structure of being is destroyed. Finite man is 
in danger of losing his space and even the place he might have had. 
'Without space there is no presence and, conversely, the loss of space
(includes the loss of temporal presence, the loss of being.1 This final
1
'spacelessness' means ultimate insecurity. The man who is being squeezed 
out of existence may react by attempting to create a spurious place of 
security in the natural and social milieu. These attempts have been 
clearly described by Erich Fromm in his book Escape From Freedom and 
by David Riesman in The Lonely Crowd.
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Another characteristic of the anxiety of meaninglessness id the 
loss of an ultimate concern, a standard which gives meaning to all mean­
ings* In the absence of an ultimate concern lesser realities lose 
their relative meanings resulting in a self-negating emptiness and a 
diminishing of meaningful life-space. This bleak picture of profound 
and radical existential anxiety calls for healing of an equally pro­
found and radical nature* This way is provided, as we have seen in 
previous sections, in the New Being in Jesus as the Christ through 
whom we receive the courage to affirm our being in spite of the fact 
of non-being. The way of healing does not mean that man transcends 
his finitude or creatureliness or the other conditions of human existence; 
rather, the only way of dealing with this threat of non-being, says 
Tillich, lies in the courage of taking it upon one's self.
But what, we may ask, is healed by our participation in our self- 
affirmation by Being-Itself? For the man suffering under the anxiety 
of fate and death this has two consequences: first, rather than surren­
dering to the annihilating character of death, man finds the power to 
accept the anxiety of having to die in him who was called the Christ. 
Secondly, this new birth in the One who overcame, not abolished, death 
and its threat of non-being permits us 'to live and move and have our 
being' not only on the ultimate level of finitude but also within the 
relative sphere of contingency and fate. In other words, if death it­
self is appropriated in such a way that it transforms the whole of man's 
life, then every decision has ’infinite worth’ and every moment is a
unique occasion for decisive action.
In a similar manner the healing of man's existential estrangement 
has two effects on the anxiety of meaninglessness: first, "man's anxiety 
about having to lose his space is balanced by the courage with which he 
affirms the present and, with it, space. Everything affirms the space 
which it has within the universe. As long as it lives, it courageously 
faces the occasions when not-having-a-place becomes an actual threat.
It accepts its ontological insecurity and reaches a security in this 
acceptance*"(p.217, Tillich, Systematic Theology. Vol.l)* Secondly, the 
finite individual obtains the power of universal participation in meaning 
through his ultimate concern in Jesus as the Christ, the one in and 
through whom ultimate reality becomes manifest. This mitigates the effect 
not only of absolute meaninglessness but also of relative emptiness. 
Tillivh writes, "Spiritual self-affirmation occurs in every moment in 
which man lives creatively in the various spheres of meaning. Everymne 
who lives creatively in these meanings affirms himself as receiving and 
transforming reality creatively."(p.53-5^» Tillich, The Courage To Be). 
Such is ontological healing as it moves from the existential toward the 
teleological*
We now turn to the concept of pathological anxiety and its healing 
through psychotherapy; this movement from the pathological toward the 
existential requires that we make a distinction between existential 
anxiety and non-existential anxiety in its neurotic or pathological form.
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To shed light on this problem we must turn again to Tillich who accurately 
describes the crisis in psychoanalytic theories of anxiety. He writes: 
"Many theories are under discussion today, Ther 
denominator in all the theories: anxiety is the awareness of unsolved 
conflicts between structural elements of the personality, as for instance 
conflicts between unconscious drives and repressive norms, between dif­
ferent drives trying to dominate the center of the persordity, between 
imaginary worlds and the experience of the real world, between trends 
toward .greatness and perfection and the experience of one's smallness 
and imperfection, between the desire to be accepted by other people or 
society or the universe and the experience of being rejected, between 
the will to be and the seemingly intolerable burden of being which evokes 
the open or hidden desire not to be."(p,69, Courage To Be), This clearly 
shows that pathological anxiety is related to but different from exist­
ential anxiety; however, the distinction must be made on an ontological
schools
basis which is lacking in most S=hoois of depth-psychology and psycho­
therapy.
This deficiency is illustrated in the work of Freud who was the 
first to identify anxiety as the central problem in neurosis. He cor­
rectly recognized anxiety as a universal emotional experience, and in 
his second theory of anxiety he correctly saw the ego as the locus of 
interpsychic conflict resulting in neurosis; "The ego perceives the 
danger signal, and the symptoms and inhibitions are then created in
|is, however, one common
the endeavor to avoid the anxiety."(p.103, Thompson, An Outline of Psycho­
analysis). Then Freud attempted to reduce all anxiety to its prototypal 
origin in the trauma of birth (from Otto Hank) and the fear of castration 
(from the Oedipal situation). "Even fear of death is an analogue of cas­
tration, since no one has actually experienced death but everyone has 
experienced a sastration-like experience in the loss of the mother's 
breast in weaning. He then speaks of the danger of castration 'as a 
reaction to a loss, to a separation*,' of which the prototype is the birth 
experience. This we are presented with a hierarchy: fear of loss of the 
mother at birth, loss of the penis in the phallic period, loss of the 
approval of the superego (social and moral approval) in the latency per­
iod, and finally loss of life, all of which go back to the prototype, 
the separation from the mother. All later anxiety occasions 'signify 
in some sense a separation from the mother. Freud's thought.•.holds 
that anxiety has its source t as far as a primal source is reactivated 
in later neurotic anxiety, in the fear of premature loss of or separa­
tion from the mother (or mother's love), and thence fear of the loss 
of subsequent values."(p.106-107, Ibid.).
Two comments are required: first, Freud, by reducing all anxiety 
to the earliest experiences in life, robs the later anxiety—producing 
experiences (such as death, etc.) of their existential integrity. The 
existential analysts are justified, for reasons already discussed, in 
stressing the relative autonomy of experience; the existential analysts 
are -wrong insofar as they ignore or deny the continuity of present ex—
periences with important childhood experiences. Secondly, Freud’s for­
mulation is at least one-half true but he has not linked it with ontology 
or the threat of non-being which it so vividly describes. The mother 
is, in fact, the primary means by which a child receives his sense of 
iieing as well as his sense of well-being. Freud unfortunately didn't 
draw the ontological implications.
Or again, Harry Stack Sullivan, the foremost exponent of the inter­
personal school of psychology and psychotherapy, in his definition of 
panic presents a perfect description of non-being impinging on being. 
"Terror is anxiety of a cosmic quality in the face of a primitively con­
ceived threat of danger. The terror-stricken person feels himself to 
be alone among deadly menaces, more or less blindly fighting for his 
survival against dreadful odds."(p.114, Ibid.).
These examples from Freud and Sullivan substantiattcTillich's be­
lief that an ontological basis is essential to our widest understanding 
of anxiety and the distinction between its existential and pathological 
forms. Fortunately existential psychotherapy has such an ontology which 
allows it to capture the wider meaning of the insights if Freud, Sullivan 
and other psychologists. Its conception of existential anxiety is essen­
tially the same as Tillich's; "In his classical contributions to the 
understanding of anxiety, Kurt Goldstein has emphasized that anxiety 
is not something we 'have' but something we 'are' ."(p. 50, May, Existence). 
However, in spite of its implicit distinction between existential and
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pathological anxiety, existential analysts do not have a working defini­
tion of pathological anxiety; for this we must again turn to Tillich.
Tillich describes pathological anxiety as '...a state of existential 
anxiety under special conditions'• FxistBhtial anxiety nan be met either 
authentically by a courage which takes anxiety into itself or inautben- 
tically by despair. Because despair is equally intolerable, the man may 
attempt to escape into pathological anxiety and neurosis; hence our defin­
ition of pathological anxiety and neurosis as "...the way of avoiding 
non-being by avoiding being.”(0.71. Tillich, The Courage To he). With 
this working definition of pathological anxiety to guide us, let us exa­
mine its manifestations in 'meaninglessness1 and 'nothingness' as en­
countered in existential psychotherapy.
Pathological anxiety is grounded in "...the symbol of the birth 
trauma as the prototype of all anxiety - an interpretation suggested 
by the etymological source of the word 'anxiety* (Angst) as 'pain in 
narrows', 'choking', as through the straits of being born. This inter­
pretation of anxiety as birth trauma was, as is well known, held by Rank 
to cover all anxiety and agreed to by Freud on a less comprehensive 
basis. There is no doubt that it carries an important symbolic truth 
even if one does not take it as connected with the literal birth of the 
infant*"(p.52, May, Existence). Therefore pathological anxiety of 
meaninglessness and nothingness on a psychological plane is the analogue 
of meaninglessness and nothingness on the plane of existential anxiety.
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Pathological anxiety of meaninglessness, like its existential coun­
terpart, means a psychological distortion of one's life-space. Bins- 
wanger describes tvo possibilities, both of which are likely to appear 
to a greater or lesser extent in the neurotic or psychoticThe first 
is described as the grave-world and in it one is beset by an annihilating 
narrowness, horror of enclosure and despair over the possibility ofes- 
cape. It is further characterized by loss of substantiality and loss 
of shadow, being 'squeezed-out' of 'spatial and emotional existence (in 
birth and in the home), and being a 'no-body* (one without a body or im­
portance)* The second possibility is that of unlimited expansiveness 
and annihilating openness. (Further discussion of these pathological 
conditions as described by an existentialist may be found in Binswanger's 
article, The Case of Ellen West, in Existence, A New Dimension in Psychia­
try and Psychology). Their relation to the birth trauma and other psycho­
logical experiences of spacial ar personal constriction is obvious*
The child's experience of 'being-made-small, either physically by the 
constriction of birth and the castration which the child fears or psycho­
logically by adults who 'belittle' (to make small) the child is an Oxperi- 
ence of non—being and may be met pathologically by self—constriction or 
by reaction to it in the form of exaggerated size.
Pathological anxiety of meaninglessness also signifies the loss of 
a sense of personal value and worthwhileness. This devaluation and loss 
of essential values in the life of the individual is closely related to
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the failure to obtain adequate interpersonal recognition and acceptance, 
especially from the mother as a child. Rejection by the parents and lack 
of love, the primary value, mny lead to the loss of subsequent values 
essential to the individual’s existence as a personality. This personal 
devaluation is the essence of pathological meaninglessness and one of 
the main problems encountered in psychotherapy.
Pathological anxiety of nothingness, like its existential counter­
part, is experienced in the face of death, but in this case it is a 'psycho­
logical death1 as Frieda Fromm-Reichmann has described it. She recognizes 
that this anxiety of 'psychological death', though not universal, is 
factually correlated with the universal experience of anxiety regarding 
the 'inconceivable experience of ultimate psychological separation' in 
death as a general phenomenon. In other words, the anxiety of 'psycho­
logical death' is grounded in the inclusive existential anxiety of noth­
ingness experienced in death itself.
This experience of nothingness in the face of 'psychological death' 
elicits a» feeling of helplessness and paralysis. "It means that the per­
son concerned is living in an unreal psychological world and that he 
feels he is in danger of pulling the people of his environment actually 
or in fantasy into the same threatening abyss of unreality. Being unable 
to successfully avail himself of the possibility of using new means of 
evaluating people and relating himself meaningfully to them amounts to 
Being blocked in the utilization of learning processes which serve growth 
and change. This absence of growth and change is tantamount to psycho­
logical stagnation and emotional sterility, i.e., psychological death."
(p.119, An Outline of Psychoanalysis)•
These are the primary pathological forms of the anxiety of nothing­
ness and meaninglessness; the third form, the pathological anxiety of 
guilt, will be discussed in the following section. Pathological anxiety, 
according to Tillich, in relation to nothingness produces an unrealistic 
security and in relation to meaninglessness produces an unrealistic certi­
tude. These all have a similar effect which is to reduce and weaken the 
range of self-affirmation. Tillich points out that self-affirmation 
is not lacking in the neurotic state; rather, it means that the individual 
'affirms something which is less than his essential or potential being'. 
Overcoming the estrangement wrought by the various types of existential 
and pathological anxiety is the healing task of religion and psychotherapy 
respectively.
Tillich provides the guidelines, limitations and goals for this 
task when he writes: "Pathological anxiety, once established, is an ob-
ject.v-Js,', of medical healing. Existential anxiety is an object of priestly 
help. Neither the medical nor the priestly function is bound to its vo­
cational representitives: the minister may be a healer and the psycho­
therapist a priest, and each human being may be both in relation to the 
'neighbor*. But the functions should not be confused and the representi­
tives should not try to replace each other. The goal of both of them 
is helping men to reach full self—affirmation, to attain the courage to 
be."(p.81, Courage To Be).
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Among all the schools of psychotherapy, existential psychoanalysis 
seems heat prepared to carry out this task as outlined above by Paul 
Tillich* This is true for two reasons; first, existential analysis rests 
upon an ontology which recognizes the distinction between existential' 
and pathological anxiety* Secondly, because the existential analyst is 
aware of the qualitative distinction between the two types of anxiety, 
he is less likely to attempt religious healing himself, but he will 
understand the greater need and refer his patient to a priest or pastor 
if necessary*
In terms of the paradigm of healing the psychotherapist is helping 
the patient to move from the pathological toward the existential, and 
God!s healing in Christ helps man move from the existential toward the 
essential or teleological. The psychotherapist helps the patient over­
come the anxiety of nothingness represented in 'psychological death' by 
uncovering his artificial security and the neurotic defenses on which 
it rests* The psychotherapist helps the patient overcome the anxiety 
of meaninglessness through his acceptance and concern for the patient 
which helps restore his sense of value and self-worth* The healing 
effected is relative and releases the pathological restrictions allowing 
a relative self-affirmation*
Overcoming the estrangement imposed by existential anxiety is the 
healing work of God, and religious healing by a minister is the communi­
cation of this message to men* Healing man's existential anxiety of death 
and nothingness is found in Jesus as the Christ who overcame the noth—
ingness of death in his own death and resurrection; these are the primary 
religious symbols of healing in this instance. Healing man's existential 
anxiety of meaninglessness is also found in Jesus and the Christ who is 
the object of man's ultimate concern and the source of his ultimate 
worth. 'Grace' and 'faith' are the primary religious symbols of healing 
in this instance. Thus by participating through faith in God's own 
self-affirmation in the New Being of Jesus Christ we enter into our own 
ultimate self-affirmation and receive the power to take existential 
anxiety upon oneself and accept the derivedness and dizziness of fini- 
tude •
Courage, or the power of self-affirmation in spite of non-being, 
does not eradicate existential anxiety but takes it into itself instead. 
Tillich says, "He who acts courageously takes, in his self-affirmation, 
the anxiety of non-being upon himself. Both prepositions, 'into* and 
'upon', are metaphorical and point to anxiety as an element within the 
total structure of self-affirmation, the element which gives self-affirma­
tion the quality of 'in spite of' and transforms it into courage."(p.71» 
Ibid.).
Most psychotherapists agree that removing all anxiety is not only 
impossible but also undesirable. The goal of therapy is not eradication 
of anxiety; rather, its aim is 'to guide people in understanding and 
then accepting and learning to live with and to utilize mild degrees of 
anxiety'. Many psychologists and psychotherapists including Karen Horney,
Erich Fromm, Freud, Jung, Adler, and especially Binswanger bave stressed 
the constructive aspects of anxiety. Roy Grinker sums up this outlook 
when he writes, "If anxiety is mild, it is stimulating and facilitates 
increased and efficient action or thought."(p.126, Outline of Psvchoannlysis) 
Existential anxiety is, therefore, an integral part of self-affirmation 
even at the psychotherapeutic level, and the courage to accept it, though 
remaining implicit in psychotherapy, is ultimately grounded in Jesus as 
the Christ.
GUILT
We have already seen that the fundamental quality of human existence 
is finitude and that existential anxiety originates in the wareness that 
finitude is one's own. Anxiety or 'dread' might, therefore, be described 
as the 'shadow' or freedom, a description used by Kierkegaard in The Con­
cept of Dread. In any case man's finite freedom is the ontological pre­
supposition of existential anxiety in general and of the existential anxiety 
of guilt in particular. Kierkegaard elaborates upon this: "Dread is
the dizziness of freedom which occurs when the spirit would posit the 
syhthesis, and freedom then gazes down ihto its own possibility, grasping 
at finiteness to sustain itself. In this dizziness freedom seccumbs.
Dread is the psychological state which precedes sin, comes as near as 
possible to it, and is provocative as possible of dread, but without 
explaining sin, which breaks forth first in the qualitative leap. Fur—
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ther than this psychology cannot go and will not. That very instant 
everything is changed, and when freedom rises again it sees that it is 
guilty, between these two instants lies the leap, which no science has 
explained or can explain. He who becomes guilty in dread becomes as 
ambiguously guilty as it is possible to be. Dread is a womanish debility 
in which freedom swoons.... In dread there is the egoistic infinity 
of possibility, which does not tempt like a definite choice, but alarms 
(aengster) and facinates with its sweet anxiety (Beaengstelse)."(p.319« 
Friedman, The Worlds of Existentialism).
Kierkegaard’s 'leap', as the way to the real self, incorporates the 
basic existential category of risk and daring decision whereby man risks 
losing himself or his essential being for the sake of the possibility 
of actualizing himself. "This situation," writes Tillich, "can be ob­
served in every moment in which innocence is put before the decision 
either to remain in a state of non—actualized potentialities or to 
trespass the state of innocence and to actualize them. In both cases, 
something is lost; in the first, a fully actualized humanity; in the 
second, the innocent resting in mere potentiality."(p.284, Four Existen­
tialist Theologians). The consequence of either of these alternatives 
is a despair which is life-negating and essentially defeating as des­
cribed again by Kierkegaard in Sickness Unto Death: "The Despair which
is Conscious of being Despair, as also it is Conscious of being a Self 
wherein there is after all something Eternal, and then is either in des­
pair at not willing to be itself or in despair at willing to be itself.
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This form of despair is: despair at not willing to be oneself; or still 
lower, despair at not willing to be a self; or lowest of all, despair 
at willing to be another than himself, wishing for a new self."(p,371> 
Friedman, The Worlds of Existentialism)#
This despair over losing one's true being is closely connected 
with that guilt which is an ontological part of human existence* When 
one deviates from his absolute telos, what one essentially is and there­
fore ought to be, he enters into a#state of existential estrangement in 
which everyone participates. Through guilt man's distelationship with 
God on a transcendent level extends to the immanent level where he stands 
in a guilty disrelationship with himself and with his fellow men.
Thus we see that S^ren Kierkegaard, the nineteenth-century genius 
who is popularly referred to as the father of modern existentialism, 
anticipated and contributed to the thought and understanding of the 
philosopher—theologian Paul Tillich who has attempted to systematize 
these insights concerning freedom, anxiety and guilt and also relate 
them to non-religious disciplines (e.g. psychology and psychotherapy). 
Whereas Kierkegaard was, to an extent, intuitive, romantic and random, 
Tillich, drawing upon subsequent scientific and theological insights, 
has consolidated the basic existential concepts and logically arranged 
them into a system.
Within Tillich's system the human situation we have been describing 
would come under the 'anxiety of guilt and condemnation', the third and 
last tjrpe of existential anxiety delineated by Tillich. As such, it 
is the response to the threat of non-being to man's moral self—affirrna—
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tion. This existential guilt implies, in its relative form, that man 
stands over against himself as judge, and it also implies in its absolute 
form, that God stands over against man as judge. Failure to actualize 
his essential being brings him under negative judgement both in relative 
and absolute terras; this failure in moral self-affirmation results in 
the encroachment of non-being vhich expresses itself in the feeding of 
guilt.
Unless man receives the courage to accept and overcome this exist­
ential guilt through Jesus Christ, he may attempt, as Tillich points out, 
to escape into either anomism (",.,the defiance of negative judgements 
and the moral demands on which they are based,,,") or legalism ("...a 
moral rigour and the self-satisfaction derived from it,,,11 - p,60, The 
Courage To Be), This is a problem for religious healing and it will be 
considered later. The final possibility of avoiding the non-being in 
existential guilt is escape into neurosis and pathological anxiety.
This crucial distinction between existential and pathological anxiety 
of guilt requires that we consider the psychological meaning of guilt.
There has bean a tendency in modern psychology and psychotherapy 
to deny existential guilt and explain away pathological guilt wholly in 
terms of neurotic guilt feelings« Freud believed guilt feelings to be 
the result of social conditioning whereby the child introjects the val­
ues and norms of the society as they are represented to him through 
the demands of the parents. These introjected values comprise the 
'superego* which harshly judges any anti—soci&l tendencies of the id
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■which seek expression through the ego. As a result, the id is repressed 
and judgement takes place below the level of consciousness thereby giving 
rise to seemingly 'free-floating' or groundless guilt feelings.
In spite of the fact that Freud considered all guilt to be neurotic 
in origin he did sehse its deep-seated nature and tried to explain it 
in mythological terms. Nevertheless, Martin Buber in The Knowledge of 
Man correctly assesses Freud's attitude towards guilt; "The denial of 
'the depth of existential guilt beyond all mere violation of taboo/ is 
what Freud sought to accomplish through relativizing guilt feeling gene­
tically, says Buber. It is characteristic of that 'advanced generation 
for which 'it now passes as proved...that no real guilt exists; only guilt- 
feeling and guilt convention'. This denial amounts to a crisis not only 
in the life of modern man but of man as such, for man is the being who 
is capable of becoming guilty and is capable of illuminating his guilt'." 
(p.50, Buber, The Knowledge of Man),
0 Hobart Mowrer, an American psychologist, appears to be the Christ­
ian's answer to Freud. In antithesis to Freud, Mowrer believes that the 
superego is repressed instead of the id, and this is the source of teu— 
rotic guilt feelings. Mowrer concludes that the neurotic feels guilty 
because he is in fact guilty, and it is the repression of real guilt 
that causes the problem of pathological guilt. A man chooses to be 'bad' 
and then represses the deserved guilt feelings which arise. Therapy for 
Mowrer consists in helping the person to readmit their real guilt to
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consciousness where it can be dealt with rationally and/or religiously. 
(See MowTer's The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion and The New Group 
Therapy).
However, Mowrer's so-called 'existential' approach to guilt i£ 
more apparent than real for two reasons; first, his ’real' guilt is 
neither ontological nor the result of the encroachment of non-being on 
moral being. Secondly, in spite of his use of emotive words like 'sin­
ner', societal values are normative for Mowrer. 'Sin' is the deviation 
from any given societal norm and therapy means alteration of behavior 
patterns in accordance with socially accepable conduct. Mowrer's theory, 
therefore, is just another instance of a psychology which cannot take 
full account of man's relation to guilt or address itself properly or 
effectively in psychotherapy to the problem.
The existential psychotherapists are better prepared to accept and 
observe the limitations imposed by the distinction between existential 
and pathological anxiety of guilt. Martin Buber, who like Tillich has 
directly contributed so much to psychotherapy, is the source of much 
wisdom on this subject. Buber recognizes that there is neurotic guilt 
derived from a set of mores and taboos imposed upon the individual by 
parents and society and incorporated into an internalized 'superego' 
(Freud) and even that there is social guilt (Mowrer); but Buber also 
acknowledges an existential guilt which cannot be comprehended through 
such categories of analytical science as 'repression' and*becoming con-
scious'. Buber writes: "There exists real guilt, fundamentally different 
from all the anxiety-induced bugbears that are generated in the cavern 
of the unconscious. Personal guilt, whose reality some schools of psycho­
analysis contest and others ignore, does not permit itself to be re­
duced to the trespass against a powerful taboo."(p.132, Buber, The Know­
ledge of Man)•
Buber's concept of existential guilt is basically interpersonal 
and dialogical. "'Existential guilt', writes Buber, 'occurs when some­
one injures an order of the human world whose foundations he knows and 
recognizes as those of his own existence and of all common human exist­
ence'. It is dialogical - the inseparable corollary of one's personal 
responsibility, one's answer - ability for authenticating one's own 
existence and, by the same token, for responding to the partner^of 
one's existence, the other persons with whom one lives."(p.47-48, Ibid.). 
Hence, according to Buber, the essence of existential guilt is found in 
the transcendent betweenness of the dialogical encounter, in the inter­
human.
Buber has captured the real depth of the Mitwelt type of existential 
guilt, but by absolutizing the dialogical relation he misses the other 
forms in which it exists, namely the Eigenwelt and the Umw&lt. Guilt 
on the level of Mitwelt is, as Buber points out, the guilt accrued for 
'failing to respond, for responding inadequately or too late, or with­
out one's whole self'. But this single category of Mitwelt does not
capture the guilt involved in one's Eifrenwelt or Umwelt.
Medard Boss, an existential psychotherapist, characterizes existential 
guilt mainly in terms of one's Eigenwelt and the forfeiture of one's po­
tentialities* Boss writes, "If you lock up potentialities, you are 
guilty against (or indebted to, as the German word may be translated) 
what is given you in your origin, in your 'care'. In this existential 
condition of being indebted and being guilty are founded all guilt feelings, 
in whatever thousand and one concrete forms and malformations they may 
appear in actuality."(p.53, May, Existence). Boss somewhat overstates 
his argument and Buber is justified in criticising Boss for remaining 
to much with.oneself and avoiding dialogical experience. But neither 
Buber nor Boss has captured the full picture of existential guilt be­
cause it also includes one's Umwelt.
Existential guilt with regard to one's Umwelt points to the guilt 
of estrangement in relation to nature as a whole. Again we are reminded 
that any perspective on existential anxiety must include the bodily, 
interpersonal and spiritual possibilities of experience, and the healing 
of guilt, whether existential or pathological, must extend to all three 
modes of Basein.
Pathological guilt in any or all of these modes is the result of 
existential guilt which has been repressed into the unconscious. The 
unwillingness to accept ontological guilt as one's own is at the root 
of this problematic and morbid Jjuilt. This situation becomes a vicious
circle which leads to nothing but deeper enmeshment, despair, and inten­
sified self-hatred; this predicament is clearly described by Malcolm 
France's The Paradox of Guilt: A Christian Study in the Relief of Self- 
Hatred. Rollo May helpfully contrasts neurotic and existential guilt.
He writes, "Normal guilt, in contrast to neurotic, is guilt that is ap­
propriate to the situation.... Secondly, there (is) no repression in­
to unconsciousness.... Thirdly, conscious or normal guilt does not in­
volve symptom formation.••. Fourthly, normal guilt has a constructive 
effect. Specifically, it can and should load to humility, sharpened 
sensitivity in relationships with fellow men, and increased creativity 
in the use of one’s own potentialities."(p.445, Friedman, The Worlds of 
Existentialism).
Having discussed guilt in general, what, we may ask, is the nature 
of guilt feelings? Existential guilt has an ontic character while guilt 
feelings are subjective and essentially psychological. As such, guilt 
feelings may signal the presence of either existential or pathological 
guilt. Guilt feelings associated with existential guilt call for reli­
gious attemtion and an ultimate healing; guilt feelings associated with 
pathological or neurotic guilt signals the presence of ontological 
guilt which has been repressed into the unconscious and this condition 
calls for the healing attention of psychotherapy.
Existential psychotherapy seeks to disentangle the existential 
guilt from the jbathological or neurotic guilt in the patient and then 
proceeds to help the patient resolve the unrealistic guilt through
technique and personal concern. This liberation of the conscience is 
accomplished in psychotherapy by what Buber call? ’self-illumination1, 
which means to 'illuminate the darkness that still weaves itself about 
the guilt despite all previous action of the conscience. This process, 
Buber twlls us, corresponds on the plane of faith to the confession of 
sin; however, it differs slightly because it must first uncover the 
guilty experiences which have been repressed. Thus, 'self-illumination' 
has basically two parts; first, there is the reactivation of the re­
pressed experience, and secondly, there is the educational task which 
is composed of 'conscience-vision' and 'conscience-courage'. Conscience- 
vision includes the recognition of the guilty quality inherent in the 
experience, and conscience-courage means helping the patient to accept 
this guilt by taking it into his consciousness. The development of 
Conscience-courage in the patient during psychotherapy is the relative 
counterpart of the absolute courage which takes existential guilt into 
itself on the ultimate or ontological level.
The process of self-illumination helps change neurotic anxiety into 
normal or existential anxiety and the development of conscience-courage 
means a greater capacity to tolerate normal anxiety. This opens the 
way for the patient to take his guilt seriously and deal with it con­
sciously and realistically. Hollo May reminds us that the goal of ther­
apy is not the absence of guilt feeling but rather the transformation 
of neurotic guilt into normal guilt, together with the development of 
the capacity to use this normal guilt creatively. "The patient after
therapy may well bear more anxiety than he had before, but it will be 
conscious anxiety and he will be abl& to use it constructively."(p.446, 
Friedman, Worlds of Existentialism). Or again, Karl Wenninger also denies 
that psychoanalysis of any kind can or should remove guilt altogether; 
"Psychoanalysis can indeed alleviate certain guilt feelings which are 
attached to the idea of an aggression which the individual never committed 
it cannot remove guilt feelings properly attached to the aggressions which 
a person does commit or has committed. Many of the unconscious guilt 
feelings which people experience are attached to the wrong thing, and 
one of our objections might be said to be to get people's guilt feelings 
attached to the 'right' things#"(p.171, Theory of Psychoanalytic Technique 
Being able to confront and wrestle with one's existential guilt is.a 
mark of\trhei:humhnity■and is the beginning of moral self-affirmation.
Healing existential guilt is the work of God in and through the New 
Being of Jesus Christ; existential guilt means that man is accountable 
for his existence and he is accountable alone; however, 'he is alone 
but he is not lonely'. "In his solitude he participates in the power 
which gives him the courage to affirm himself in spite of the presence 
of the negativities of existence."(p.158, Tillich, The Courage To Be).
This power is received through Jesus Christ who has taken the negativity 
of guilt upon himself when he was made sin for our sakes. Thus, he took 
our guilt and condemnation upon himself, becoming at the same time, para­
doxically, judge and savior (or healer). Through him we receive our con­
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demnation as well as the total and immediate certainty of divine forgive­
ness. Accepting acceptance (forgiveness) though being unacceptable (guilty) 
is the basis for the courage of confidence. "The courage to be in this 
respect is the courage to accept the forgiveness of sins, not as an ab­
stract assertion butjas the fundamental experience in the encounter^with 
God. The acceptance by God, his forgiving or justifying act, is the only 
and ultimate source of a courage to be which is able to take the anxiety 
of guilt and condemnation into itself. Here...is the point where the 
religious 'acceptance as being accepted' transcends medical healing."(p.l6l- 
162, Ibid.).
However, whereas an analyst may incidentAlly transcend the relative 
healing of pathological guilt by representing the objective power of accept­
ance and self-affirmation, this is the explicit task or the religious 
healer or minister. His goal is to help make God's forgiveness just as 
real and lively as his existential guilt. Hatred so strong and relent­
less can only be overcome by love more relentless still. Both the Old 
and New Testaments provide ample evidence of the religious experience 
of love as being stringent. Christians sometimes err in supposing that 
God is hard in judgement.but gentle in forgiveness; "His judgements are 
gentle, but His forgiveness will not be satisfied until all man's defenses 
are broken down, the hideous self-hatred exposed, and reconciliation 
brought to those places where he feels engulfed by badness. The exp­
erience of forgivenBSS comes most strongly to those who have been forced 
by circumstances to return to passive loss of good identity. It is the
hardness of love which takes us there."(p.95, France, The Paradox of 
Guilt). In his book titled The Dynamics of Forgivennss J. G^ Emerson 
calls this 'realized forgiveness'.
Although God's absolute forgiveness has ontological priority over 
the relative, interpersonal forgiveness which takes place between men, 
'realized forgiveness' may be initiated on this horizont^^and its ul­
timate source only later revealed on the vertical plane. In other words, 
if a guilty man experiences acceptance, forgiveness and love from anot­
her whether it be a psychotherapist, pastor or otherwise, he may only 
later recognise this experience as the working of Grace.
Consequently the importance of interpersonal relations for communi­
cating forgiveness can hardly be overestimated, and ,conversely, the 
effect of isolation is devastating. Malcolm France points out that 
"...many people feel their loneliness to be an accusation in itself.
To be isolated is to be guilty already; guilt and isolation feed each 
other and create despair."(p.17, The Paradox of Guilt).
This accentuates the importance of the community of faith and the 
pastor who represents this community in the task of healing existential 
guilt. Besides personal resources there also exist formal and tradi­
tional means for helping the Church and its ministers in the task of 
healing existential guilt. These means are threefold; first, we have 
the sacraments of the Lord's Supper and Baptism. These are of primary 
importance in dealing with guilt and its healing through the life and
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death of Jesus Christ.
Secondly, we have concession. Buber writes: "The confession of sin 
is spoken by a man when, seeking reconciliation with God, he directly 
or indirectly steps before the absolute judgement. That may happen in 
the chorus of the commuhity, as at the Jewish Day of Atonement, or in 
the whispers of the confessing man into the ear of the confessor, or 
even in solitude by those who feel themselves as standing before God 
and their speech as addressing God: 'the confessing one is always removed 
from the anonymous publicity of society, but by no means feferred to him­
self, He has one over against him who receives his confession, answers 
it, 'forgives* him,..#"(p;137, The Knowledge of Man),
Lastly, there is healing power available in the symbols found in 
religious language. "It is almost a truism to assert that religious lang­
uage is symbolic. But it is less of a truism to assert that for this 
reason religious language expresses the truth, the truth which cannot 
be expressed and communicated in any other language."(p,286, Tillich,
Four Existentialist Theologians), The great effectiveness of symbols 
comes from the fact that they not only point to what they symbolize but 
also participate in its power. Some symbols only represent the exist­
ential predicament of man while others point to the healing answer to 
that question.
For example, Tillich tells us that the mythological symbol of crea- 
tureliness represents man's finitude as it is experienced in anxiety.
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Temptation symbolizes the anxiety of existential decisions (freedom) while 
sin represents man's status of estrangement. Other symbols represent 
the solution to the existential problem. "The symbol of creation shows 
the source of the courage to affirm one’s own being in terms of power 
and meaning in spite of the ever-present threat of non-being."(p.287, Ibid.). 
Other symbols such as salvation (meaning whole and healed), redemption, 
savior, Christ, etc. represent reconciliation, forgiveness, acceptance, 
and other such ultimate realities. • Tillich even points out that the 
symbol of God is the basic and all-embracing symbol of religion. "In 
relation to creation, He is creator; in relation to salvation, He is 
savior; in relation to fulfillment, He is the eternal. God, in the light 
of this question (the questions implied in human existence), is the power 
of being itself, prevailing over against non-being, overcoming estrange­
ment, providing us the courage to take the anxiety of finitude, guilt, 
and doubt upon ourselves."(p.291, Ibid.).
By using such symbols a pastor can not only help a man to under­
stand his existential anxiety of guilt and the possible solution to it, 
but he can also aid in healing it by helping the person to tap the perwer 
also available through the symbols. This applies not only to guilt but 
also to freedom and the various types of anxiety already discussed. The 
symbols found in religious language are not only the key to understanding 
mem's existential predicament but are also a means of healing it.
Nevertheless, healing takes place through the meeting or communion
of personalities. The 'meeting1 of which I speak includes and at the 
same time transcends that which is captured by sociological analysis.
The personality of which I speak includes not only biological and psycho­
logical categories but also an ethical and spiritual reality. This is 
the subject of our next section on 'healing through meeting'.
HEALING: OF PERSONS THROUGH MEETING
By way of summarising our work thus far and at the same time intro­
ducing this very important section of the paper I again turn to the para­
digm of healing by which I have attempted to gain a theological perspective 
on existential psychoanalysis and its implications for pastoral theology 
and counseling. The truth of the paradigm itself as well as its practical 
value for this discussion rests on three basic propositions concerning 
ontological, relational and healing priorities.
First, I propose the ontological priority of God, the Ground of Being. 
For this I turn to the existential school known as 'personal analysis’.
They postulate an objective Absolute which is God and believe that at 
the existential level spirit is directed towards the Absolute, towards 
God. On the initiative of God there is established an ever expanding 
and more differentiated relationship between God and man which also per­
mits an ever more differentiated relationship between man and his world. 
Thus openness vis—a—vis personal Being is the ontological basis for 
openness vis—a—vis the world and not viceversa. For instance, whereas 
for psychoanalysis God is also a father imago, "...in reality God is not 
~ luther imago but a father is an imago of God. ••.the father is not 
the original image of all godlaness. On the contrary: God is the original 
image of all 'fatherliness1. Only ontogenetically, biologically, bio­
graphically is the father the first - for ontologically God is the first. 
And so, although psychologically the father-child relationship is prior 
to the man-God relationship, ontologically it is not illustrative but 
derivative, Ontologically speaking my father in the flesh, who created 
me in the flesh, merely happens to be, as it were, the first representa­
tive of Him, who created everything; and so, ontologically speaking, 
my natural creation is only the first symbol and thus in a certain sense 
the imago of the supernatural creator of all nature,"(p.382, Wyss).
I have used the foregoing extended quotation not only to establish 
the ontological priority of God but also to point out the particular 
type of God-man relationship subsumed under the symbol of father-son 
relations, f'his will be helpful in developing our paradigm later because 
•many transference relations in analysis are of the father-son type.
The second proposition is essential to the paradigm in general and 
especially to the explication of this particular section of the paper.
I refer to Karl Barth's analogia relationis, the 'analogy of relationship'. 
Through this doctrine Barth proposes a relational priority grounded on 
the inter-Trinitarian relationships. The triune God exists in Himself 
in three distinguishable 'modes' of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit which 
are inseparably related to one another and whose internal relationships 
serve as the prototype or model for all created, secondary, and derivia— 
tive relationships. For example, Barth believes that the "...essential 
humanity of man is found in his togetherness as I and Thou, male and
female; he finds in this togetherness the imago Deit for it corresponds 
to an analogous relationship of I and Thou in the triune God himself."
(p.985, Magill). Furthermore, God overcomes man's existential estrange­
ment by establishing an I-Thou relationship with man especially through 
the person of Jesus Christ in whom the existence of man in his proper 
relationship with God is actualised.
That the inter-Trinitarian relationships are primary analogues of 
secondary or extra-Trinitarian relationships is further demonstrated in 
God's work of reconciliation and salvation in Jesus Christ. Barth sees 
in Jesus Christ both the electing God and the elected man; in Jesus Christ 
God says 'Yes' to mankind* In this primary and affirmative I-Thou rela­
tionship beiteween God the Father and God the Son we find the basis for 
our self-affirmation and our authentic I-Thou relationships with God 
and with our fellow men. As Tillich says, "The divine self-affirmation 
is the power that makes the self-affirmation of the finite being, the 
courage to be, possible. Only because being-itself has the character 
of self-affirmation in spite of non-being is courage possible. Courage 
participates in the self-affirmation of being-itself, it participates 
in the power of being which prevails against non-being."(p.175, Tillich, 
Courage To Be).
Since psychotherapy largely revolves around the analyst—patient 
relationship, the divine I-Thou relation and its paradigmatic relation­
ship to all other I-Thou encounters will aid our theological understanding
of analytic relationships including their limitations and possibilities. 
Later in this section the analogia relationis will be helpful in evalua­
ting the kind of relationships which may develop in an analysis; but now 
we turn to the third proposition of priority on which the paradigm rests.
The third proposition concerns the priority of healing and includes 
the wider context of healing as described in the paradigm; it is concerned 
with both 'Heilsgeschichte1 and analysis as wholes which provide the 
contexts for the more specific interpersonal relationships discussed 
under analogia relationis. Insofar as salvation means healing and healing 
is an element in the work of salvation, God's healing has priority over 
other kinds of healing and especially types like existential psychoanalysis 
in which interpersonal relationships are so important. Tillich expressed 
this analogy with an economy of words: "With respect to both the original 
meaning of salvation (from salvus, healed) and our everpresent situation 
it may be adequate to interpret salvation as 'healing'. It corresponds 
to the state of estrangement as the main characteristic of existence.
In this sense, healing means reuniting that which is estranged, giving 
a centre to what is split, overcoming the split between God and man, man 
and his world, man and himself. This understanding includes the ele­
ments of salvation which were emphasized in other periods; it includes, 
above all, the fulfillment of the ultimate meaning of one's existence, 
but it sees this in a special perspective, that of making salvus, of 
i'healing'. If Christianity derives salvation from the appearance of
Jesus as the Christ, it does not separate salvation through the Christ 
from the processes of salvation, i.e., of healing, which occur through­
out all history."(p.93> Tillich, Systematic Theology. Vol.III).
HEALING ACT OF GOD - HEALING ART OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 
AN ANALOGY
The word 'analogy' has several characteristics and definitions which 
may enlighten our study. First, the Greek word from which it is derived 
refers to that 'which was earlier'; this may refer to the ontological 
or even the historical priority of God's acts as compared to the art of 
psychoanalysis. Secondly, 'analogy1 refers to similar parts of different 
origins; the healing act of God originated in His own inscrutible Will 
and proceeded from the superfluity of his gratuitous love for mankind; 
psychoanalysis and modern psychotherapy, according to Franz Alexander, 
appears as a self-curative reaction of Western society to the immense 
complexities of adjustment. Furthermore, 'analogy' refers to a similarity 
or likeness of attributes and relations; examples of this may be found 
in the first section of this paper and in the analogia relationis.
Lastly, the word refers to 'having a like course, tendency, or purport'. 
(Shorter Oxford Englidh Dictionary)•
Insofar as the object of God's healing is the existential negativity, 
meaninglessness, guilt and general estrangement of man and psychoanalysis 
deals with the healing of pathological conditions, they manifest a 'like 
course or tendency'. Again I must reiterate that I am not proposing by
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the use of the paradigm that the healing act of God and the healing art 
of analysis are perfectly analogous in every way or identical in any part 
at all; there are several areas of dissimilarity as discussed in the 
first section of this paper. On the other hand I submit that this study 
may draw attention to important ways in which each half of the analogy 
of healing can correct and enlighten the other. For example, psychoanalysis 
helped theology rediscover the meaning of 'grace' in terms of the uncon­
ditional acceptance of the patient;-or again, psychoanalysis has drama­
tized the concreteness of healing as part of the increasingly abstract 
and spiritualized concept of 'salvation'.
Reciprocally, theology can help existential analysis and psychoanalysis 
in three ways; first, theology's task is to recognize the real value 
and possibilities of analysis while at the same time bringing the ultimate 
criterion to bear in pointing out its limitations. Tillich again informs 
us: (it) "...cannot be that there is no saving power apart from him but 
that he is the ultimate criterion of every healing and saving process."
And again: "The New Being in the Christ transcends every relativity in 
its quality and power of healing. Therefore, wherever there is saving 
power in mankind, it must be judged by the saving power in Jesus as the 
Christ."(p.194, Tillich, Systematic Thcoloyy, Vol.Il).
Secondly, the theologian needs to show the analyst how he needs 
grace - the power to heal - and the ultimate source of it in order that 
the therapist may really address himself meaningfully to man's root 
problem and thus do more than merely relieve the patient's symptoms of
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his deeper suffering. Thirdly, since interpersonal relationships play 
such an important part in analysis, theology may point out what it means 
in these man-to-man encounters to be ’a man for others' in Bonhoeffer's 
Christological sense.
Apart from the mutual benefits to theology and psychotherapy as de­
rived from this study I hope that pastors and especially those who do 
some psychotherapy in conjunction with their other pastoral duties may 
receive double benefit. To these several ends we continue our discussion. 
Transference —
Above all else psychotherapy places primary importance on the per­
sonal factor in the process of healing. The interpersonal relationship 
consists not merely of observation but also of participation, not merely 
intellectual understanding but also emotional involvement. This relation­
ship is the basis for corrective change and healing and it mediates the 
curing or saving effect of psychotherapy.
We remember that the patient's neurosis is an unsuccessful attempt 
to solve a problem in the present by means of behavior patterns which 
originated in the past and were found to be more or less inadequate.
The analyst is interested in the past as the source of these rigid, 
stereotyped behavior patterns; but his primary concern is for helping 
the patient find a solution for his present problem by correcting the 
unsuccessful pai^rns and helping him to take account of the differences 
between present and past. Bven for existential analysis and especially
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for orthodox psychoanalysis this amendment of behavior and process of 
emotional reeducation takes place in a situation designated as 'trans­
ference1 and 'counter-transference'. These special relations are predi­
cated upon involvement by both patient and analyst, whether it be con­
scious or tinconscious.
Transference is a special kind of neurosis in which 'the original 
pathogenic conflicts of the early family relationships are repeated 
with leseer intensity'; it is based’on the distorted perception of the 
present in terms of the past. Although any person may be the victim 
of a neurotic's transferences, the analyst or counseling pastor is esp­
ecially susceptible because of the permissive atmosphere and the authority 
wielded by men in these roles. As a psychoanalytic phenomenon transfer­
ence "...consists roughly of two parts: (l) the development of the trans­
ference neurosis, and (2) its resolution."(p.280, Alexander, Fundamentals 
of Psychoanalysis). The permissive attitude of unconditional acceptance 
of the patient is conducive to the development of the neurosis; the 
resolution of the transference neurosis is the key to a new kind of 
relationship which is at once satisfying and adapted to reality.
Gilbert Russel accurately describes the essence of the transference: 
"There are projected upon the analyst feelings of love and hate, of 
£ear and anger, of hope and desire - feelings which were repressed as 
the consequence of earlier (usually infantile) experiences which inhibited 
their overt display. The classical transference is of affect derived
from the patient's relationship with his parents, hut which remained 
unconscious, and is now transferred to, or projected upon, the analyst - 
who is 'loved' and/or 'hated' as Father could not he consciously loved 
or hated. These emotions were not expressed in the past on account of 
the fear attached to them; and therefore they cannot at first be felt 
in the analysis, but appear in disguise. Repressed aggression, for in­
stance, will show itself not, to begin with, in open hatred vented upon 
the doctor, but in covert manifestations.... The analyst's business 
is to bring this hate into the open and not allow it to go on masquera­
ding in 'safe', i.e. indirect and ambiguous, fashion. The patient must 
become conscious of it as hate; and that means feeling he hates the 
doctor instead of loving him."(p.133, Christian Essays in Psychiatry).
It is important to recognize that the projection of these images is an 
indication of a lack of any realistic or authentic relationship with 
the person who bears the projected image*
This transference neurosis and the basic mechanism of projection 
on which it is based is of considerable interest for the psychology 
of religion. Although God is ontologically prior and a father is an 
imago of God, the father-child relationship is psychologically prior 
to the man-God relationship. Therefore man is liable to project unreal­
istic images onto the blank screen of the universe or superimpose these 
images on what he knows of the living God, Freud suggests that God is 
a projected, neurotic holdover from childhood, a magnified version of
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the image of the human father. As such, the projection is infantile and 
distorted and man's relation to it is unrealistic. Feuerbach also sug­
gests that man projects himself in an objective way and then relates him­
self to this projected image which he calls god; God, for Feuerbach, is 
man's essential humanity made large.
These projections as described by Freud and Feuerbach are widespread 
and belong to mankind as existential beings. However, since neurosis 
is a special mode of escapism from man's existential predicament, the 
neurotic is even more prone to such projections and transferences onto 
both the analyst and God. Therefore, one may see that healing a neurotic 
condition may also allow greater openness to a real relationship with 
the living God based on an experience of who hejis in reality. This is 
especially true if the truths of God are mediated through the attitude 
of unconditional acceptance by the analyst/pastor and in other ways re­
lated to the paradigm. Whereas in analysis the unrealistic transference 
will hopefully destroy itself by battering against the real, accepting 
person of the analyst, the real, unyeilding person of Christ must stand 
firm before the projected images of the neurotic individual and semi- 
neurotic, existential mankind. This is best accomplished by the pastor 
in his preaching and celebration of the sacraments; but this is not, I 
repeat, not a part of psychotherapy as such; only the resolution of the 
transference to the analyst should be undertaken by the analyst. The 
correction of the distortion of the God—man relationship falls to the
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pastor as pastor and not to the pastor as therapist*
An observation mny be in order here. Just as a neurotic transfer­
ence in an analysis must be resolved and the relationship sustained on 
a more realistic person—to—person level, so also must a neurotic trans­
ference to God be resolved in the course of teleological healing* Never­
theless, a distinction must be made; whereas the transference to the analyst 
by the patient may take the unrealistic form of a father-son relationship 
which should be transformed into an’I-Thou rclatiohship of man-to-man, 
of analyst to patient, the transference to God, when transformed into 
an I—Thou encounter on a realistic basis, may be, if appropriate, symbol­
ized by a Father-son relation between God and man. In other words, whereas 
a father-son relationship would always be inappropriate to existential 
analysis, the God-man relationship may be characterized by a father-son 
relationship as long as it is authentic and not regressive and distorted* 
f Therefore the paradigm is still applicable in this instance because it 
is based on the basic truth of relationship which is the ability to see 
the other and one’s self in reality and not in projection*
Especially in orthodox psychoanalysis the development of the trans­
ference neurosis is encouraged by the principle of minimized and strictly 
passive participation on the part of the analyst. This ideal of neutrality 
is especially symbolized by the relative positions, postures, and parts 
played by the parties involved. The patient usually lies on a couch (re­
presenting his submissiveness). and tries to free—associate, which encourages
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projection and transference. By restricting his sparse comments to 
interpretations and by sitting behind the patient the analyst achieves 
a greater degree of distance and objectivity while giving the patient 
a relatively blank screen upon which to project* This arrangement is 
technically sound and is designed to maximise the patient's transference 
by not interfering visually with the patient's free associations and 
neurotic tendencies; it also minimises countertransference from the 
analyst by encouraging an understanding yet objective-neutral attitude* 
Thereby the analyst is relieved of the pressure of having to face patients 
all day long* These are all sound reasons for a psychotherapy which re­
lies so heavily upon the development and resolution of the transference 
neurosis for its curative effects.
However, as we shall discover later, the therapeutic relationship 
is one which does not wholly consist of projections; it is also an 
existential I-Thou relationship between two people or it is no relation­
ship at all. Therefore there is much that commends the Jungian and 
existential analytical method of sitting face to tface with the patient. 
Facing each other not only helps keep one foot in reality thereby pre­
venting the disintegration of the relationship into pure projection and 
irresolvable transferences but it also takes cognizance of the face as 
being the primary medium of I-Thou encounters.
The importance of this 'facial' encounter between analyst and pat-
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ient is psychologically grounded in infancy, where the neuroti^probaialy 
had its origin, and ontologically grounded in the face of God, where the 
existential conflict had its origin. Regarding the importance of the 
face in infancy Frank Lake writes: "It became evident that the adequate 
growth of selfhood and a sense of personal identity depended upon the 
faithfulness and regularity with which the mother presented herself 
and particularly her face, to look full into the face of her baby. The 
infant came to life as a person in the light of the mother's countenance. 
Conversely, to be identified, not with a loving being, but with a mother 
whose painful absence shattered all confidence, was to be identified 
with non-being."(p.XX, Lake, Clinical Theology). And again: "It is her 
face, her eyes and mouth, her whole familiar countenance as a 'gestalt', 
a 'whole image', intuitively sought for and ultimately recognized, which 
is sought. ’Being-itself', which is the essential quest of the ego for 
a source—person through whom to become a person, for a ’Thou’ to come 
to meet the necessitous 'I', is mediated in a face-to-face encounter."
(p.527, Ibid.).
Therefore the analyst can become, through his face to tface encouhter 
with the patient, the source-person through whom the patient can assume 
his authentic 'I-ness' after failing in soipe way to establish it in his 
earliest primary relationship to his parents and especially his mother* 
Not only does a sense of personal being arise in a relationship between 
an attentive mother and a responsive child but the countenance of the 
mother, if joyful and affirmative, helps instill 'courage to be' in the
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being of the child. "Spirit is built up in the baby by face to face 
encounters with a mother whose countenance transmits unmistakably her 
joy in her chiId,she delights at looking in his eyes and evoking a re­
sponse. She creates in the baby, who innately desires this synthesis 
with the source—person, a satisfaction which gives the fundamental courage 
to be, and is itself an upbuilding of the powers of the spirit."(p.627, 
Ibid.).
Although the basic and formative experience with the mother described 
above is unique, relatively unrepeatable and cannot be completely altered 
or repaired by a therapist during the patient's adult life, there are 
possibilities of the therapist strengthening and reinforcing tiraces of 
this fundamental power of being and ontological courage* But if there 
are clear analogies between parent—child relations and analyst(pastor)- 
patient relations, then these can also be cautiously but profitably ex­
tended to God-man relations. Dr. Lake brilliantly sets forth the pos­
sible difficulties on two of these levels in an extended passage from 
his Clinical Theology: "The human spirit is formed, in so far as its 
proneness to neurotic disorder and depression is concerned, within the 
first three years or so of life. This is universally true.... There 
are two vital needs of every child in these foundation years, which could 
be summed up as the face of the mother and the voice of the father; the 
smile of loving recognition and the word of guidance. As Erikson 
writes, 'Next to the recognition bestowed by the gracious face, the af­
firmation of the guiding voice is a prime element of man's sense of iden­
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tity.1 These years are not exactly pre-verbal, though their all-important 
beginnings are. At least we do not expect the child of three to have 
acquired much knowledge of revelation truth about the Face of God from 
'holy history'. Yet the infant at three has acquired many permanently 
imprinted attitudes of expectancy or non-expectancy towards vital relation­
ships* It has learned to expect a welcoming face or a rejecting, scorn­
ful, angry face, with correspondingly powerful defensive manoeuvres to 
mitigate the encounter which promises to be too terrible. When the loving 
face of mother by which the baby lives and without which its spirit dies, 
is absent for too long, the mental pain may be too severe to be retained 
in consciousness. The loving face &s obliterated from the mind by pro­
longed absence but the threatening faces which take its place cannot be 
tolerated in consciousness. They undergo splitting off, repression 
and fixation and so remain forever a threat to the security of the inner 
world. These are the skeleton faces in the cupboard of memory. Unfor­
tunately for God, this 'death mask* usually becomes one of the faces of 
God, if not his only face. These bitter memories, of supposedly or act­
ually unloving faces seen in the foundation year, when the human spirit 
must come to 'being' and 'well-being' through the 'umbilical cord' of 
visual encounter, or die, are at the root of all compulsive unbelief, 
of all neurotic defenses, and, ambiguously, of much of what becomes our 
sin. Here are the beginnings of man's distortion of the truth about 
the ultimate personal reality, God Himself."(p#179»180, Ibid.).
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But if these pristine impressions which are fundamental to the 
character and the subsequent development of the child can become twisted 
and distorted, so also can they reflect what the parents and/or the analyst 
have seen of the true God whose Face is revealed in Christ's. This loving 
communication which is formative in childhood and in analysis finds its 
paradigm in the history of God's progressive revelation of Ilis true Face 
to man. Throughout the Bible and especially in the Old Testament we dis­
cover that the Face (panim) of God .denotes personal involvement and the 
"...experience of divine lovingkindness in inward communion with his God." 
(p.71, Eichrodt, Theology of the O.T.). Our face to face encounter wilih 
God in Jesus Christ is the ultimate source of healing for our personal 
being and broken relationships.
Corrective Emotional Experience —
The analyst's face is important to his healing work and, although 
sitting behind the patient may gain certain advantages during the devel­
opment of the transference neurosis by minimizing reference points, later 
in the analysis, especially during the resolution of the transference, 
the reference points provided by the person of the analyst and his face 
are essential. The 'hiddenness' of the analyst which is helpful early 
in the analysis may become harmful later in the process. Thus the con­
cept of the analyst as an objective, blank screen is a scientific myth 
and an absurd abstraction in the real world of human beings. But if 
this total denial of the humanity of the analyst leads to static non­
intervention and general stagnation, active intervention by the analyst
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in the resolution of the transference also has dangers to match its great
possibilities.
precipitated
Having x>rfcci-pated the transference neurosis, the analyst is then 
concerned with resolving it. Most therapists are careful to avoid responses 
and personal traits which tend to unconsciously perpetuate the originally 
destructive or authoritarian situation in the patient; other analysts 
are concerned nait only with responding to the patient’s neurotic reaction 
in a different way from that of the persons with whom the conflicts were 
originally connected hut in an opposite way to that of the parents which 
caused the neurotic development. Thereby the patient not only relives 
his original conflicts in his relationship with the analyst but^due to 
the radical difference in response from the therapist^the patient redog— 
nizes how inappropriate and unrealistic his behavior and attitude are 
toward the analyst; in this way the harmful effects of the parental at­
titudes and neurotic responses originating in childhood are counteracted*
The analyst provides a genuinely new frame of reference, not only 
in the name of technique but in and through his own personality* As Janet 
M* Rioch puts it: ?Step by step, each phase 6f the long period of emo­
tional development is exposed..*; the interconnecting, overlapping refer­
ence frames are made conscious; those points at which a distortion of 
reality, or a repression of part of the self had to occur, are uncovered.
The reality gradually becomes ’undistorted’, the self, re—found, in the 
personal relationship between the analyst and the patient*”(p*492, Out­
line of Psychoanalysis)•
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In this context of healing the objective yet understanding attitude 
of the analyst is one of the most important therapeutic factors. But 
'understanding' as used above does not refer to a stereotyped attitude 
or unchanging atmosphere that is invariably encountered in every analyst's 
office. If the foundation of the relationship could be described by any 
one word, it would probably be that of TRUST. The emotional-peraonal 
context of healing is a trustable relationship. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, 
a famous psychoanalytic theorist, -writes, "...therapy offers to patients 
a 'relationship of security beyond what they have ever had. Therapy must 
offer a specific way by which they can trust the world and themselves'." 
(p. 1037f Lake, Cliniaal Theolojrv).
Given this general context of trust, there remains the freedom to 
meet not the neurotic needs of the patient but rather his real needs as 
dictated by his unconscious conflicts. This freedom of the analyst and 
patient is a novel human relationship essentially unlike any other human 
relationship. Although this trust and freedom are predicated upon an 
attitude of acceptance, this acceptance is in danger of slipping into 
overindulgent permissiveness. Rollo May comments: "The acceptance by 
another person, such as the therapist, shows the patient that he mo longer 
needs to fight his main battle on the front of whether anyone else, or 
the world, can accept him; the acceptance frees him to experience his 
own being. This point must be emphasized because of the common error 
in many circles of assuming that the experience of one's own being will 
take place automatically if only one is accepted by somebody else. This
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is the basic error of some forms of 'relationship therapy1. The attitude 
of 'If—I—love-and-accept—you, this-is-all-vou-need1, is in life and in 
therapy an attitude which may well minister to increased passivity. The 
crucial question is what the individual himself, in his own awareness 
of and responsibility for his existence, does with the fact that he can 
be accepted,"(p,45, May, Existence).•
By moving to the theological level through the paradigm we should 
be able to increase our understanding of healing. In spite of the many 
differences between ontological healing and healing of neurosis, there 
are several analogies to be drawn, Fir&t, although God has detached him­
self and has hidden his face from mankind at various times for various 
reasons, he has not abandoned us but has confronted us most perfectly 
in His Son, Secondly, His person and His relationship with us as mani­
fest in His saving history and especially in Ilis Son provides the new 
and normative frame of reference through which rediscovery is made and 
healing is measured. At this point there exists a very significant 
and infinite qualitative* difference between God's healing and man's healing 
through psychoanalysis for which there is no parallel or analogy in the 
paradigm. In a paradoxical way God himself^ in his Son^has overcome the 
existential conditions of mankind and, in one sense, has already healed 
mankind; in another way, this healing, though perfected and finalized 
in Christ, still awaits consummation and calls for man's participation 
in faith and hope and love until that time. The analyst cannot claim 
any parallel with regard to his work or his patients.
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Thirdly, the relationship of healing with God is novel and unlike 
other
any^relationship, human or otherwise. Fourthly, the healing relationship 
is predicated on 'trust' and on a love which is unsolicited, unconditional, 
and unilateral in the beginning. This acceptance by God does not mean 
automatic healing of the existential prddicament of man any more than 
it does on the neurotic level; it depends on man taking responsibility 
for himself after being accepted. This is included in the symbol of 
'faith'.
However, if rightly seen, God's love and unconditional acceptance 
are uncompromising and are not amenable to manipulation. Depth psycho­
logy teaches us that the neurotic can use the analyst and the anilysis 
to meet his own twisted needs; analogously, the history of God's healing 
dealings with mankind shows that eisistential and sinful man, like the 
neurotic, tends to manipulate the Gospel, the Law, and the Cross to suit 
his infantile dependency, his will-to-power, and sadomasochistic tenden­
cies, For this reason thejlatitude of behavior permitted the analyst 
in trying to counteract neurotic tendencies is also analogous to the 
different ways that God expresses himself on behalf of mankind. This 
points up the need to encounter the whole God and his acts as recorded 
in the Old and New Testaments, a God of moral seriousness as well as 
profound love and forgiveness. The integrity of God's wrath and indig­
nation as described throughout the Bible needs to be vindicated and re­
cognized as an integral and necessary patt of God's total healing pur— 
psse. Therefore, just as a stern but unmistakably accepting attitude
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may be assumed by the analyst in order to counteract the patient’s exper­
ience of a guilty parent who has overindulged the child because of his 
unconscious rejection of the child, so also has God acted firmly and even 
harshly at times toward sinful mankind; yet this severity finds its place
in the larger context of love and the wider purpose of cosmic healing,
does
what the analyst^in accordance with the principle of corrective emotional 
experience and does in the name of healing the mind finds its paradigm 
in the acts of God,
Fifthly, healing by verbalization (linguistic symbols) in analysis 
has its counterpart in the symbols contained in the Sacraments and Scripture, 
Whereas various symbols used in analysis, whether archetypal (jungian) 
or Freudian or of some other type, permit the patient to contact his psjc hie 
roots contained in his unconscious, the religious symbols point to and 
participate in the Ground of Being in which man exists. Symbols aid the 
healing process by allowing men to encounter the roots of their existence 
on two different levels, one psychological and one ontological, without 
which a movement towards 'wholeness* is impossible. Just as psycholo­
gical symbols help overcome the fragmentation of the mind, help restore 
a new center of equilibrium, and integrate psychic energy hitherto dis­
sipated in tragic opposition, so also do religious symbols help release 
the ultimate power 6f Being Itself which alone can overcome the tragic 
ontological opposition within man.
Lastly, insofar as existential psychotherapy is a healing art based 
on interpersonal relationships, it is significantly analogous to God's
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work in Christ. What seems destructive and negative in the Cross ul­
timately becomes constructive and affirmative; the initial stage of ag­
gravating the patient's neurosis and tearing down his defenses is fol­
lowed by the construction of new emotional foundations and renewal of 
his interpersonal relations.
Furthermore, the paradigm also shows us that just as the patient 
and analyst encounter one another from the position of mutual weakness 
and not-knowing — as opposed to ignorance or lack of otherwise amilable 
knowledge — rather than from strength or knowledge, so has God met us 
in Christ# The weakness and doubt of Christ from the Cross is the be­
ginning, paradoxically enough, of the power and faith of our salvation 
(and healing) in Him. God's healing presence with man does not proceed 
directly from his omnipotence and omniscience and transcendence but 
Bather proceeds from the weakness and not—knowing of Emmanuel, or'God 
with us*# In like manner do we encounter one another in analysis and 
pastoral counseling; we meet in my not-lmowing and in your not—knowing, 
my doubts and your doubts, my weakness and your weakness, a coming to­
gether from which we can proceed together.
But this relationship as defined above does not make the patient 
any less a patient or the analyst any less a professionally trained and 
skilled analyst any more than it makes man less than the healed and 
Christ less than the healer. This brings us to the problem of counter­
transference in therapy.
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Countertransference —
Distortions in the therapeutic relationship come not only from the 
patient hut also from the analyst who is a person with an unconscious of 
his own. This phenomenon is called countertransference and it can be 
roughly defined as the converse of transference: 'the repetition of pre­
viously acquired attitudes toward the patient, such attitudes being ir­
rational in the given situation.1 A more precise definition might be 
stated as follows: "When, in the patient—analyst relationship, anxiety 
is aroused in the analyst with the e C f ect that communication between the 
two is interfered with by some alteration in the analyst's behavior (ver­
bal or otherwise), then countertransference is present. " ( p . C o h e n f 
Outline of Psychoanal.). As such it is based on the neurotic distortion 
of personal relations due to mistaken identification of the other person.
Obviously such a distortion is harmful to the healing process and 
is very unlikely to be interpreted or even discovered like the patient's 
transference. With regard to the paradigm, it is obvious that God does 
not suffer from anything analogous to countertnansference; rather, he 
sees man as he really is. However, the concept is of importance to the 
pastor who is involved in psychotherapy or counseling. The pastor does 
have an unconscious and therefore he is limited by his own complexes 
and resistances.
The problem is, as Karl Menninger puts it, how one may deal with 
something which by definition he doesn't know about. Here paster s can 
learn from the psychoanalytic practice of undergoing a training analysis.
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As part of his preparation for professional certification the candidate 
undergoes an analysis of his own for both didactic and healing purposes. 
The object of this training analysis is to partially heal and/or to point 
out the more serious blind spots and infantile needs so that he is pre­
pared to make the proper allowance for them in his work.
The principle of a training analysis reflects the wisdom of the old 
religious dictum, "Physician, heal yourself."(Luke 4:23), The logic • 
behind a training analysis is similar to the theological proposition 
that commitment based on experience should be prerequisite to baptism 
or admission to the ordained ministry, (Nevertheless, initiation, whether 
analytic or religious in nature, may breed a sense of exclusiveness and 
pride instead of common purpose as it has done so many times in both re­
ligion and psychoanalysis.) However, because of the unconscious nature 
of the problem, it is not possible for an analyst to adequately heal him­
self; he relies, as do his patients, on interpersonal communication with 
another person. Therefore analysts commonly continue their own analysis 
with another member of the profession. This method of mutual help creates 
a community which is not altogether unlike the Church and its sense of 
mutual support and ministry to one another.
Although dealing with the existential condition of sin rather than 
with the pathological condition of neurosis as such, the Church's wis­
dom concerning the unseen mote in one's own eye is applicable to the 
infinite capacity for self-deception manifest in psychopatholegy. Just
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as psychotherapy has helped the Church rediscover the meaning of 'grace1 
by its attitude of unconditional acceptance, so might the truth contained 
in the doctrine of the 'priesthood of all believers' be re—vitalized by 
analogy with the spirit of the analytical community. "Dr, Robert Waelder 
has emphasized this point. No analyst can see everything; each one's 
vision is limited by his personality. Members of a group are mutually 
self-corrective. As Waelder puts it, 'Since we are all partially blind, 
the best we can do is to support each other so that the vision of one 
may make up for the myopia of the other, and vice versa'•"(p*90, Menninger, 
Theory of Psycho. Technique). However, this is not meant to idealize 
the psychoanalytical societies and associations; like the Christian com­
munity, they too at times have become ingrown and suffered from a col­
lective myopia which is correctable only from a stable, external frame 
of reference#. God's Word provides this for the Church; it stands over- 
against the Church, judges it, and calls for continual repentance and cor­
rection.
The religious truth contained in the priesthood of all believers 
helps remind .the pastor of his own larger religious needs and of the minis­
try of other Christians to him; similarly, this religious truth permits 
Him to mediate the concern, love and support of the larger Christian com­
munity to those whom he meets and treats in every aspect of his work as 
a pastor. The truth about countertransference which he applies directly 
to his specialized work as psychotherapist also helps him in two ways; 
the pastor recognizes his need for support from other psychotherapists,
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and he recognizes the importance of expanded self-awareness in order to 
minimize countertransference while dealing with patients.
Before concluding this section let us consider the importance of the 
pastor-analyst's character and beliefs for his work. Ideally, as we have 
said before, the patient, like a child, should be encouraged in his develop­
ment and differentiation as a separate individual and should not be forced 
to conform to a prearranged pattern. He should be allowed to discover and 
realize his own potentialities. However, during analysis and especially 
a long one, an identification with the analyst may become operative which, 
even upon successful completion of the analysis, will be the source of per­
manent values and characteristics for the patient. Therefore, Menninger 
reminds us that "...we cannot ignore the fact that what the analyst be­
lieves, what he lives for, what he loves, what he considers to be the purpose 
of life and the joy of life, what he considers to be good and what he 
considers to be evil, become known to the patient and influence him enor­
mously not as ’suggestion' but as inspiration."(p.91» Ibid.).
This phenomenon has both negative and positive possibilitiesj lit 
us conaider three negative possibilities first. First, the pastor-analyst 
is expected to assume a fatherly or even a godlike role with his patient 
and this can degenerate into a relationship which only satisfies the doc­
tor's need for power and the patient's need for dependency. The second 
negative possibility is that the pastor-analyst will either reciprocate 
the patient's identification or project some unrealized part of himself 
onto the patient. The psychotherapist may come to believe that the 'salva-
tioi/of the patient lies in recreating him in his own image, but a relation­
ship based largely on identification and projection is essentially narcis­
sistic and therefore not conducive to healing. In both instances the analyst 
and/or pastor oversteps himself and acts as a god. However, concerning the 
first possibility paradigmatically, the real, living God is not interested 
in catering to our infantile dependency but seeks instedd to bring us to 
maturity in Christ. Regarding the second possibility, the true God is con­
cerned with restoring man to his 'imago dei1 but only as it is revealed in 
his Son on the basis of freedom to believe and love, hardly a divine nar­
cissism.
The third negative possibility is that the pastor-analyst will take 
advantage of the patient's identification with him to convert his patient 
to a particular philosophy of life or set of religious beliefs. This is 
nothing short of indoctrination which Anthony Storr describes as 'didactic, 
coercive, and authoritarian* "Some psychiatrists have compared the analytical 
process to a conversion experience, and have supposed that such effectiveness 
as they concede it to possess depends upon the indoctrination of the patient 
with a set of dogmas.... In other words, they suggest that a successfully 
treated patient is a convert to a religion; and that the therapist must 
be a fervent believer, intent on acquiring proselytes, who desires nothing 
so much as to imbue his patients with his wwn dogmatic beliefs."(p.156,
Storr, The Integrity of the Personality). The inadequacy of these shallow, 
non-ontological, humanistic religious systems, whether propagating the
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principles of one particular analytical school or some other values, has 
already been criticized theologically earlier in this paper. However, at­
tempting to indoctrinate a patient even in the name of the true God and 
his only Son is still unjustified. This should be noted especially by pas­
tors who do psychotherapy and/or counseling.
It is by no means inevitable that the pastor-analyst will impart his 
value-system to his patients, but neither should the influence of the thera­
pist on thejpatient be underestimated. Karl Menninger provides an interesting 
illustration of thes point: "Otto Fenichel (wrote), 'It has been said that 
religious people in analysis remain uninfluenced in their religious philo­
sophies since analysis itself is supposed to be philosophically neutral..*. 
Repeatedly I have seen that with analysis of the sexual anxieties and with 
the maturing of the personality, the^ttachment to religion has ended.' Of 
course, Fenichel saw it (as a temporary phenomenon, at least). His personal 
preoccupation with and devotion to psychoanalysis were well known. And his 
patients strove to please. I have seen the reverse of Fenichel*s observation, 
for my patients strive to please, too."(p.94, Menninger, Theory of Psycho­
analytic Technique). Because the patient is so sensitive to cues from his 
pastor-analyst, the pastor, an obviously committed man, muat take special 
care that his own conscious or unconscious wishes for the patient do not 
subtely coerce the patient to a religious commitment which is based on 
loyalty to the pastor-analyst rather than on the patient's own freedom and 
mature decision.
With these dangers in mind let us consider the positive possibilities
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facing the pastor-analyst. We have already said that th^f>atient is likely 
to emulate the pastor-analyst as a model for his own life and some of these 
traits and values may he permanently acquired. The analyst at this time 
may become the medium for what some existential analysts call the 'savior— 
archetype'. In the Christian pastor and/or analyst this may manifest it­
self in a more specific form called the 1Christ-archetype’•
This archetypal image is derived from Jungian depth—psychology and is 
supposed to be an important factor in all psychotherapy. On the one hand 
this archetype exists in the psyche of the patient. Igor Caruso describes 
this: flIn his seardh for a redeemer, the neurotic meets his therapist. It 
is by no means wholly neurotic to long for a healer, who could assume the 
burden of neurotic guilt, descend into the neurotic hell in order to re­
deem finally the neurotic through his triumph over guilt. It would be 
neurotic to project exclusively this archetype towards the analyst, or 
towards a myth explicable in terms of depth psychology. We are not justi­
fied in regarding this yearning expectation on the part of struggling and 
suffering humanity as a mere psychological superstructure of some difficulty 
in individual development, or even only as a neurosis. The longing for 
redemption is based on an eschatological, messianic archetype."
On the other hand, the archetype influences the pastor-analyst himself, 
"The analyst.•*must in some way correspond to his patient's 'Christ-arche- 
type'. And that he does. He is able to help in so far only as the 'Christ- 
archetype' is alive within him. It is reasonable to suppose," says Caruso, 
"that this archetype is not always and not immediately — not even with the
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analyst - connected with an objective savior."(p.163, Existential Psychology).
Therefore the pastor and/or analyst is associated with the archetype 
in essentially two ways; first, he partially fulfills the archetypal image 
in his own person and secondly, he mediates the 'objective savior1 as Caruso 
describes it. In the first instance the analyst fiilfills the worthwhile 
human traits which adhere to his person as such; in the second instance the 
analyst mediates an image based either on various savior-models i£ he hap­
pens to be non-Christian, or on the Christ-model if he is a Christian. There­
fore, the archetype is fulfilled and communicated to the patient not merely 
in the spiritual-religious terms of the Christ-model itself but both as 
Christ-formation in the analyst and, though related to the Christ-formation, 
as his own unique personhood. To some extent he becomes an alter Christus. 
thereby allowing the patient to form a new relationship and a new being
aroun^ himself. However, on thej^rounds of his own humanity he will contin­
ually encounter insuperable limitations; therefore he must continually point 
away from himself and toward the Christ or let the Christ in him express
Himself to the other through the person of the analyst.
I remind the reader that this archetypal relationship takes place 
wholly through the person of the pastor-analyst and is definitely not didactic 
or explicitly instructive; as such, it does not violate the rules of analysis 
or become confused with religious counseling per se. However, there is a 
serious and ever-present danger for both the non—clerical therapist and 
especially for pastors doing intensive or semi-intensive psychotherapy. He 
myy develop what might be called a 'Savior' or 'Christ—complex' in which he
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becomes intoxicated with his importance and power and sees himself as all- 
healing and life—giving. "lie is," as Caruso puts it, "in danger of becoming 
fascinated with his own role as redeemer. The psychoanalyst's terrible tempta­
tion, which is not made any easier by the fact that in most oases it remains 
unconscious, is to become God and play Christ."(p.170, Ibid.). Instead of 
representing Christ and mediating the Christ in his own life to the patient, 
he attempts to impersonate Christ. Rather than being a co—healer with Christ 
in the sphere of psychopathology, he attempts to supplant Him,
But if the 'Christ-archetype' is an important healing factor in psycho­
therapy, it is equally important in pastoral counseling where the ultimate 
question^ arise. The pastor's roles as 'physician of minds' (that is if he 
does any psychotherapy) and 'physician of souls' should not be confused 
even though the archetype is present in both. Even though Christ may be 
mediated to the patient in the former role, the immediate task is not the 
healing of man's existential condition of estrangement. Rather, healing 
the ultimate conditions of human existence through Christ properly and explicitly 
belongs to the 'apostolic function' of the pastor as physician of souls.
We must be cautious not to confuse God's healing in depth with the 'depths' 
referred to in depth psychology and depth analysis, Godi'cosmic healing 
ultimately includes the psychological depths of man but it refers in fact 
to the total creation and especially to the existential depths of humanity.
Before leaving this very important section, some critical comments 
are in order. The archetype to which Caruso refers belongs to Jungian 
psychology and forms a part of the larger collection of primordial racial
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images found in what is referred to as the collective unconscious# As such 
it is more properly and accurately described as a 'savior—archetype1 rather 
than a 'Christ—archetype 1, It is a vague image incorporating a number of 
ideal generic values such as wisdom, compassion, leadership, hope of future 
redemption and other eschatological, messianic features.
The psychological basis of the 'savior-archetype' helps explain the 
development of various religious and even modern ideologies which embody 
messianic elements, whether they are personified or not. But the savior— 
arehetvpe fits Buddha as well as Christ. To my mind there is no Christ- 
archetype which incorporates such iwiique and specific things as the Incarna­
tion, Crucifixion, and Besurrection. As a psychologically determined re­
sponse to the needs of a certain race or even of mankind as a whole, the 
savior archetype is understandable and relatively valuable. But as a key 
to understanding the true meaning of God's self-disclosure in a saving way 
in and through his Son, Jesus Christ, the archetype is of no value# As 
Kierkegaard and then Barth have said so beautifully, there is an infinite 
qualitative difference between God and man, between man's religions and 
God's revelation, between a 'savior-archetype' and the Word made flesh#
Christ is not a response to psychologically determined needs but is the 
answer of God to th<^>roblem of sin and estrangement; the healing Christ and 
the scandal of the Cross are not products of man's mind but are God's solu­
tion to man's deepest existential problems. The savior-archetype only becomes 
a so—called 'Christ—archetype' when it is filled and at the same time trans­
cended by the living Christ and itiediatbd through the personality of an analyst
and/or pastor in whom He has taken form.
In closing this section a warning must be extended to those pastors 
without specialized training in psychology or psychotherapy. These pas­
tors should not attempt to do intensive psychotherapy, but they should 
be aware of the development of transferences and countertransferences in 
their counseling and other pastoral relationships. Also, the following 
section on 'Existential Encounters' applies as much to the pastor who does 
counseling as it does to an existential psychotherapist.
The Existential Encounter —
We have learned that both religion and psychology deal with m^n's re­
lation to reality, God being the Encompassing Reality of our lives; likewise, 
we have discovered that both, religion and psychotherapy are concerned with 
healing on levels of existence which are different but paradigmatically re­
lated to one another and primarily to God's healing acts in history. Healing 
on these levels depends largely on a 'meeting* or encounter between the 
parties involved; we have already treated the nature and importance of trans­
ference and countertransference for thejhealing encounter.
The relationship between patient and analyst based on transference and 
countertransference, though constituting a relation, is basically neurotic 
and therefore distorted. Early in thcjdevelopment of psychoanalysis there 
was an attempt to minimize the 'human equation' and restrict the 'meeting' 
to that of transference and countertransference and their resolution. This 
was encouraged by trying to moke the analyst an impassive nonentity with
whom it was difficult to 'meet' in relationship. Karl Menninger tells us: 
"Fraud's recommendation of emotional aloofness and coldness, like a surgeon 
'who puts aside all his own feelings, including that of human sympathy,, 
and concentrates him mind on one single purpose, that of performing the opera­
tion as skillfully as possible' set an ideal which analysts, for a time, 
strove to achieve."(p.85, Theory of Psychoanal. Tech.).
With the advent of existential analysis more account was taken of the 
therapist as a present, communicating,- and fully human teing. Although the 
concept of transference has been somewhat changed and placed upon an onto­
logical basis, its truth has been preserved; and expanded upon by the exist­
entialists. As Bq IIo May says; "In existential therapy 'transference' gets 
placed in the new context of an event occuring in a real relationship be­
tween two people. The concept of 'transference* as such has often been 
used as a convenient protective screen behind which both therapist and 
patient hide in ordei to avoijd the more anxiety-creating situation of dir- 
rect confrontation."(p.83, Existence). In other words, the encounter or 
'meeting' of the patient and analyst is not exhausted by explaining the 
transference or countertransference relation.
Before proceeding further with our discussion, let us again consider 
the theological side of our paradigm. For this we shall rely on a modi­
fied version of Buber's 'I-Thou' relationship. In the section on the 'ana- 
logia relationis' we discovered that God has designated man to be a cove­
nant—partner and man can exist as man only in this covenant relationship.
Barth observes that 'real man is never solitary but is always man in rela—
204
tion, confronted by another for whom he exists, namely, God and his fellow- 
man', Furthermore, we discovered that the inter-Trinitarian relationships 
are prototypal for man's relations..
God in the fulness of his Being and eternal 'I-ness' has addressed him­
self to mankind ijn and through Jesus Christ; in Jesus Christ we find both 
the addressing 'I' of God and the 'Thou' of Man which is addressed; through 
Jesus Christ and mankind's participation in Him we become the 'Thou' of God's 
address* Therefore, it is in being addressed as 'Thou' by the creative and 
redeeming divine 'I1, Christ being both the addressing God and the Man ad­
dressed, that man assumes his own 'I-ness' which, in turn, is the axis of 
his own relatedness, i.e., I-Thou and I-It. Man's 'I' proceeds from the 
'Thou' of God's 'I-Thou' address to man in Christ. Furthermore, God not 
only provides the prototype of I-Thou relations but also provides the proto­
type of I-It relations. In Ills self-disclosure God, the eternal and indis­
soluble Subject, graciously makes Himself an 'object' or 'It' for man.
Though leaning heavily on Buber's thought for out discussion, wo discover 
that the fundamental fact of human existence is God with and for man and 
only then is Buber's postulation of man-with-and—for-man possible.
Based on God's archetypal relations, man may address himself both to 
God and to his fellow men both in terms of I-Thou and I-It relations. Man 
is fulfilled not only'through direct, mutual encounters, or I-Thou relations, 
but also through relating himself to the objective world by I-It relations. 
Accordingly, in this paper I subscribe to Buber's viewpoint that I—It relations 
are not evil or undesirable per se. but only become so when they predominate
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and prevent one from turning to the Thou. For further study on the I-Thou 
concept see Buber’s classic work I and Thou and also Between Man and Nan. 
Henceforth I shall assume that the reader has some acquaintance with this 
system of thought and I will proceed with its implications for existential 
psychotherapy, .
Let us now consider two principles of healing encounter which will 
guide the remainder of our study. The first principle attempts to show that 
the healing love of God is inclusive and therefore encompasses all other 
healing love. The analyst’s love as mediated through his I-Thou relation 
to the patient may be understood in terms of God’s healing love towards 
mankind. This topic will be dealt with later in this section; therefore let 
us pass on to the second principle immediately,
Man's I-ness is derived from his primal, ontological relation to God; 
man's psychological I-ness or sense of personal being, which is mediated to 
the child through the parents, reflects analogically the primal relation 
with God. Similarly, Karl Barth finds the primal T—Thou relation to God 
reflected analogically in male and female. Therefore our second principle 
may be formulated as follows: the relation which binds man to the divine 
Thou also binds him in a similar way to other Thous in the human community 
in which he lives. This seems to support the paradigm of healing proposed 
and developed in this paper.
God's healing relation to man through his I-Thou is paradigmatically
orr
related to the healing relation centeredAthe T-Thou of analyst-analysand.
But the analogy may be expanded even further; just as man's immediate I-Thou
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relation to 6oc^ is complemented by an indispensible I-It relation consisting 
of theological conceptualization and symbolization, so also may the I—Thou 
encounter between the analyst and analysand be complemented by the I—It of 
techmical and theoretical understanding. Psychological as well as exist­
ential healing requires and utilizes both I-Thou and I-It relationships.
This brings us back to the subject of transference as a mode of meeting 
within psychotherapy. To the extent that the analysis is a joint task under­
taken by two people and transference is only a part of that relationship, 
the transference itself, as well as any countertransference which develops, 
is only an I-It relation alongside other relations. In spite of the patient's 
transference neurosis (i-It), the important thing is that he may break 
through to an I-Thou encounter with the therapist: "If...he were to con­
ceive the desire for a meeting — always provided that the therapist was 
himself inwardly prepared for such a meeting - then this would constitute 
a first and decisive indication that a cure was possible, for the neurotic, 
who had previously been incapable of any meeting, would then be in a position 
to make a genuine contact. From this (flans) Trub argues that the restrictions 
imposed on transference by Freud's scientific conception must be removed 
and the concept of transference extended to allow for the possibility of a 
meeting, which is a prerequisite for a successful cure."(p.411, Wyss, Depth 
Psychology). Therefore the transference is only destructive as a mode of 
I-It relation when it does not repeatedly lead to I-Thou encounters with 
the analyst and when it dominates all other modes of relation in the analysis 
and in life.
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But more importantly, we see the great responsibility of the analyst 
or pastor to be inwardly prepared for such a meeting whenever the occasion 
arises. This meeting on the 'abyss of human reality' is a dread—filled 
act of freedom and is not to be taken lightly by the analyst or pastor or 
anyone involved in healing through meeting, Buber himself points out riot 
only the necessity of I-It relations but also the need for I-Thou encounter:
"The 'psychotherapist1, whose task is to be the watcher and healer of sick 
souls, again and again confronts the naked abyss of man, man's abysmal lability. 
It is understandable enough that he strives to objeciivize the abyss that 
approaches him and to convert the raging 'nothing-else-than-process' into 
a thing that can, in some degree, be handled. In certain cases, a therapist 
is terrified by what he is doing because he begins to suspect that, at least 
in some cases, but finally, perhaps in all, something entirely other is de­
manded of him. Something incompatible with the economics of his profession, 
dangerously threatening, indeed, to his regulated practice of it. What is 
demanded of him is that he draw the particular case out of the correct method­
ological objectification and himself step forth out of the role of professional, 
superiority, achieved and guaranteed by long training and practice, into the 
elementary situation between one who calls and one who is called. The abyss 
does not call to his confidently functioning security of action, but to the 
abyss, that is to the self of the doctor, that selfhood that is hidden under 
the structures erected through training and practice, that is itself encom­
passed by chaos, itself familiar with demons, but is graced with the humble 
power of wrestling and overcoming, and is ready to wrestle and overcnme
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thus ever anew. Through his hearing of this call there erupts in the most 
exposed of the intellectual professions the crisis of its paradox. The 
psychotherapist, just when and because he is a doctor, will return from the 
crisis to his habitual method, but as a changed person in a changed situation. 
He returns to it as one to whom the necessity of genuine personal meetings 
in the abyss of human existence between the one in need of help and the helper 
has been revealed. lie returns to a modified methodic in which, on the basis 
of the experience gained in such meetings, the unexpected, which contradicts 
the prevailing theories and demands his ever—renewed personal involvement, 
also finds its place."
Or again: "In the immediacy of one human standing over against another, 
the encapsulation must and can be broken through, and a transformed, healed 
relationship must and can be opened to the person who is sick in his relations 
to otherness — to the world of the other which he cannot remove into his 
soul. A soul is never sick alone, but always a between-ness also, a situa­
tion between it and another existing being. The psychotherapist who has 
passed through the crisis may now dare to touch on this. This way of fright­
ened pause, of unfrightened reflection, of personal involvement, of rejection 
of security, of unreserved stepping into relationship, of the bursting of 
psychologism, this way of vision and of risk is that which..." the true 
psychotherapist must trod.(p.9^-95,97» Buber, Pointing the Way).
Both the pastor who does analysis and the Christian analyst should be 
uniquely qualified to step out in openness to the ambiguities and contra­
dictions whcih will be encountered in the patient's Thou. Because their
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own I ’s are grounded in their meetings with the Eternal Thou, they should 
be able to mediate the Thou which transcends their own personal existence 
and which is the ultimate source of their courage to be with and for others# 
This may be done without confusing the analytic situation with that of for­
mal pastoral counseling or the I—It of religious didacticism so foreign to 
the analysis; rather, the ultimate presuppositions of the analyst—pastor's 
life are mediated through his Thou-ness and readiness to meet the patiept 
in full and passionate reciprocity.
Nevertheless, these heavy requirements laid upon the pastor or analyst 
do not make him more than a man or less than a psychotherapist. The full 
humanity of both analyst and analysand forms the broad basis and the con- 
mon situation on which the therapy builds. On the other hand, because it 
is a therapeutic relationship, there is a certain inequality and a limited 
rather than a full mutuality. Experiencing the other side in the helping 
relationship is necessarily one-sided, Bviber writes: "The patient cannot 
equally well experience the relationship from the side of the therapist 
or the pupil from the side of the teacher without destroying or fundamentally 
altering the relationship. The one-sided inclusion of therapy is still an 
I-Thou relationship founded on mutuality, trust, and partne&ship^n a common 
situation, and it is only in this relation that real therapy can take place.
A common situation, however, does not mean one in which each enters from 
the same or even a similar position. In psychotherapy the difference in 
position is not only that of personal stance, but of role and function, a 
difference determined by the very difference of purpose which led each to
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enter the relationship. If the goal is a common one - the healing of the 
patient - the relationship to that goal differs radically as between thera­
pist and patient, and the healing that takes place depends as much upon the 
recognition of that difference as upon the mutuality of meeting and trust."
"The I—Thou relationship must always be understood in terms of the 
quite concrete situation and life-reality of those participating in it*
Here the full reality of the concrete situation includes the fact that one 
is a sick man who has come to the therapist for help, the other a therapist 
who is ready to enter a relationship in order to help. This excludes neither 
Erich Fromm’s conviction that the therapist at the same time heals himself 
in some measure through his own response to the patient, nor Carl R. Rogers’ 
feeling of the equal worth and value of the client (which leads Rogers, mis­
taken in my opinion, to stress the full mutuality of the client-therapist 
relationship), Rut is does preclude accepting the therapist's feeling of 
mutuality as equivalent to the actual existence of full mutuality in the 
situation between therapist and patient# The ’scientific1 impersonalism 
that characterized the orthodox conception of the psychoanalyst is rightly 
rejectid by many present-day therapists. But this should not lead us to 
a sentimental blurring of the essential distinction between therapy and 
other, less structured types of I—Thou relationships. In the latter, as 
Buber puts it, there are'no normative limitations of mutuality', but in the 
former the very nature of the re&ationship makes full mutuality impossible." 
(p32-33, Buber, The Knowledge of Man).
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Therefore, we see that the I-Thou relationship does not obliterate the 
essential distinctions between the parties involved in the partnership of 
healing or foster a spurious equalitarian principle at any cost by indiscrim­
inate superimposition on every level in every way. Our paradigm again proves 
to be applicable and helpful; the ’infinite qualitative difference' between 
God, the healer, and man, the healed, must not be lost, and for the sake of 
healing neither must the relative difference between psychotherapist and 
patient be obscured, even in the name- of I—Thou relatedness.
The ontological situation preserves the integrity of the Godhead in 
his I-Thou encounter with mankind just as the 'concrete situation and life- 
reality' of the analysis upholds the separate identities of the participants 
even in their I-Thou meetings. However, the paradigm has its limitations 
and God, the healer of man's inclusive existential condition, is not sub­
ject to being healed Himself in his relations ■with man as is the therapist 
’through his response to the patient1. On the other hand, the pastor who 
does psychotherapy or counseling must remember that he is still a man and 
not God, therefore making him subject to the limitations and conditions of 
his humanity. The pastor, though being a 'man of God', must be careful 
not to identify himself with God or confuse his healing role with God’s 
side of the paradigm. Admittedly the combined pastor-analyst is in a unique 
position, but this does not abrogate his manhood or the conditions thereof.
Any inequality that arises between the pastor and another man during therapy 
or counseling is based on difference in professional role rather than on 
their common humanity.
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Buber further elucidates the difference in mutuality between therapist 
and patient: "In order that lie may coherently further the liberation and 
actualization of that unity in a new accord of the person with the world, 
the psychotherapist, like the educator, must stand again and again not merely 
at his own pole in the bipolar region, but also with the strength of present 
realization at the other pole, and experience the effect of his own action..,
The specific 'healing' relation would come to an end the moment the patient
succeeded
thought of, and oueceded in, practicing"'inclusion' and experiencing the 
event from the doctor's pole as well. Healing, like educating, is only pos­
sible to the one who lives over against the other, and yet is detached,"
(p.32, Buber, Ibid.),
Buber cogently points out the disasterious results of confusion in role 
and responsibility within psychotherapeutic relations. Hiis is substantiated 
by paradigmatic comparison with God's healing relationship to man on the 
ontological level. Indeed, man's attempts to assume the role of God or to 
project himself into God's place have not only erided in failure but have 
hindered God's healing efforts on our behalf. God's relation to man as well 
as the therapist's relation to the patient is, ontologically speaking, based 
on a polar tension between 'distance' and 'relation together' whereby each 
partjr is enabled to enter into relation with another who is at a distance 
from, and opposed to, him. If the dynamic balance is lost between these two 
poles, either 'distance' becomes so great that there is no gelation possible 
or the distance is dissolved and separateness becomes absorbed into an iden­
tity, In the first instance God and the psychotherapist become so inacces-
siblc that they are of no help, and in the second instance they become so 
identified with the other that they bring no health to the relation,
Buber's comments on the psychotherapeutic relationship, when seen in 
terms of the paradigm of healing, reflect the logic of the Incarnation, which 
is the key to God's saving (healing) acts in history; God in Christ shares 
the estranged situation of man in the fullest possible way without actually 
becoming helplessly disabled Himself by the problem. Whereas the analyst 
must stand at the other pole and 'experience the effect of his own action',
God in Christ has graciously stepped into man's world and experienced the 
effect of His own action. In Christ God stands over against man and at the 
same time stands for man. However, the paradigm breaks down insofar as God 
acts in an objective way in man's stead; the psychotherapist cannot effect 
a healing for his patient by acting objectively outside the immediate aware­
ness of the patient as did God,
The above quotation from Buber's thought is reminiscent of Binswanger's 
attempt to reconstruct and experience the patient's Dasein for himself as 
a necessary part of healing. Although Buber and Binswanger seem to iaany 
ideas in common, therr agreement is more apparent than real; a comparison 
is necessary to see where they differ and to determine their relative merits. 
Both men have introduced very important and useful insights to philosophy 
and psychotherapy but there are three areas where they differ significantly.
First, Buber is more sympathetic, and to my mind rightly so, toward the 
hypothesis of an unconscious section of the mind whereas Binswanger retains 
the concept only in the most tenuous way.
Secondly, Buber's discussion of man's being-in-the-world, though differing
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from Binswanger's view, is adequate, hut he largely neglects what Binswanger 
calls man's heing-beyond-the-worid in love.
Thirdly, and most importantly, Buber has separated himself from those 
theologians and existential psychotherapists who tend to make the I—Thou re­
lationship just another dimension of the self, along with one's relation to 
oneself and to one's environment. This refers most specifically to Binwanger's 
modes of Dasein, namely Umwelt, Mitwe It, and Fifen we 11, which we have already 
discussed, Binswanger's modes are highly schematic and comprehensive while 
Buber's concepts deal very profoundly with what might be described under the 
Mi tweIt in Binswanger!s system. Buber has been very helpful but he has vir­
tually ignored the Umwelt and especially Eigenwelt. Buber has so heavily 
freighted the interpersonal relations of I-thou meetings that he has overlooked 
whole categories of human experience and reality. Buber's thought, especially 
that related to psychotherapy, has been characterized as making an 'ontolo­
gical absolute out of the We'; by absolutizing 'between-ness' Buber acts as 
a corrective for Freudian tendencies and compensates for their neglect of 
this subject. But to my mind Buber's thought needs not only a corrective 
of its own but also something to complement its narrowness. Binswanger's 
system is certainly not flawless but it does more satisfactorily account 
for the full complexity of man and the therapeutic situation.
An existential encounter in psychotherapy between analyst and analysand 
is irrevocably tied to and founded on a phenomenological analysis of the 
patient's world—design. Concerning this relationship in existential psycho­
therapy two questions are required, Maurice Friedman asks the firsts "...is
the existential part of existential psychotherapy found in phenomenological 
analysis of the patient's world-design or in the therapist—patient relation— 
ship, or in both?"(p,3 6 8 , The Worlds of Existentialism). In my opinion 
they are both existential and indispensible for the healing task.
The second question concerns the main dangers inherent in the above 
mentioned elements in existential psychoanalysis• The special danger in 
phenomenological analysis is that the patient will be degraded and considered 
as a mere object of research. The danger peculiar to the relationship be­
tween patient—analyst is of loving the patient at the expense of adequately 
perceiving him and seeing through him. A "...greater willingness to enter 
into a dialogue with the patient i.e. a conversation, a meeting, is fraught 
with the danger that, although the patient may be lovingly accepted, he may 
well be spared the confrontation with himself which is the fruit of perception. 
The difficulty facing psychotherapy here, the need to strike a balance be­
tween perceiving and loving, the need to see through the patient whilst yet 
lovingly accepting him, the need to regard him not only as an object of trans­
ference but also as a human being in his own right, should not be underesti­
mated." "By passing through the different stages of this felationship, 
the stages of perception, withdrawal and objectivization on the one hand 
and the stages of acceptance, understanding and loving on the other, the 
therapist passes through the Gestaltkreis, which, once it has been established 
as a total act, is able to guarantee psvchotheaapeutic success in an exist­
ential sense. The same holds true for the patient: whether he feels himself 
accepted' by the therapist as a human being or whether he finds himself forced
by the therapist's interpretation of his behavior - which is based on the 
therapist's perception of the patient as an object - into a confrontation 
with himself, in either case he passes through one side of the circular pro­
cess which in its entirety forms the cirsle of Gestalt (Gestaltkreis).
"And so the basic factors involved in psychotherapy, no matter what 
its origin, are perception and love." (p.560-56l, Wyss, Depth Psychology).
ACCEPTANCE, CONFIRMATION, ANT) LOVE IN THE MEETING
Acceptance: Having put Buber's philosophy of personal relationship into
its full and proper context insofar as it applies to the psychotherapeutic
situation as a whole, let us return to the dialogical side of psychotherapy 
and examine three key concepts. Acceptance is an essential part of healing 
both on the existential and psychological levels. God has accepted man
out of love and in spite of himself and not because of any unconditional
self-worth. The locus of value is not inside man but external to him.
Any worth which accrues to man comes from God's grace and from Christ.
In psychotherapy many analysts who hold humanistic views, such as Carl 
Rogers, attribute an inherent positive value to man and accept him on that 
basis. Although they 'unconditionally' accept the patient in his actuality 
and just as he is in the moment, it proceeds from a respect and liking for 
him as a separate person which in turn is based on certain humanistic pre­
suppositions. Consequently, their acceptance is, in an ontological sense, 
not unconditional but is based on belief in an underlying worth which com­
mends their acceptance until the inherent goodness of the man can be re—
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vealed. This viewpoint has pragmatic value; it usually provides enough ac­
ceptance to help heal neurotic people, and it has reminded the Church of the 
real meaning of grace.
A pastor or Christian doing psychotherapy, because of his deeper under­
standing of the human predicament, should he ahle to extend a real uncondi­
tional acceptance to a patient or counselee. The paradigm is again helpful 
in pointing out that whereas God has accepted m m  in spite of himself, a 
Christian therapist should accept the patient because of his own acceptance 
from God and not because of the inherent*worth of the patient per se* Never­
theless, unconditional acceptance, whether extended by God or the therapist, 
is not a panacea and does not guarantee that the recipient will be more ac­
cepting of others, "Thejmost recent investigation...failed to support the 
hypothesis that increasing acceptance of self (as mediated through the ac­
ceptance of the therapist) leads to an increasing acceptance of others,’1 
(p.491, flail and Lindzey, TIieori.es of Personality^  parenthetical remarks 
mine. This has its parallel in Christianity as well: God's acceptance and 
forgiveness do not automatically guarantee that a man will become more ac­
cepting or forgiving of hthers.
Confirmation: At this point Buber's distinction between acceptance and
confirmation is enlightening and supports our paradigm of healing. "Rogers
emphasizes an unqualified acceptance of the person being helped, whereas
Buber emphasizes a confirmation which, while it accepts the other as a per—
means
son, may also wrestle with him against himself. True confirmation^that I 
confirm my partner as this existing being even while I oppose him." It
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means communicating to the patient, 'I accept you as you are, but this does 
not mean 'I don't want you to change'; rather, it means, 'I discover in you 
just by my accepting love, I discover in you what you are created to become', 
"Confirming a person as he i_s is only the first step. Confirmation does not 
mean that I take his appearance at this moment as being the person I want 
to confirm. I must take the other person in his dynamic existence, in his 
specific potentiality. In the present lies hidden what he can become. This 
potentiality, this sense of his unique direction as a person, can make itself 
felt to me within our relationship, and it is that which I most want to con­
firm. In therapy this personal direction becomes perceptible to the thera­
pist in a very special way. In the strongest illness that appears in the 
life of a person, the highest potentiality of this person may be manifesting 
itself in negative form. The therapist can directly influence the develop­
ment of those potentialities. Healing does not mean bringing up the old, 
but shaping the new: it is not confirming the negative , but counterbalancing 
with the positive."(p#27,39> Buber, The Knowledge of Man).
Buber's statement lends an ultimate perspective to the therapist's 
task and reflects the wisdom of God's own healing plan. In order to assist 
healing on the psychological level the therapist needs only a relatively 
limited vision of his patient's potentiality, but the discovery of a man's 
ultimate potentiality through the eyes of faith is necessary for healing on 
the existential plane of life. Speaking paradigmatically, God, in a manner 
similar to that of the therapist, confirms man not only in his created po­
tentiality and imago dei but also in his new possibilities in Christ.
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Love: This subject might veil have been treated at the beginning or 
in the middle of this paper because it is the touchstone not only of effective 
existential psychotherapy but also of theology, authentic interpersonal re­
lationships, and the total formation of personality on every level of life.
Its importance can hardly be overestimated but underdtanding and elaboration 
are required: for this reason I hope that this section will draw to^ethor 
the several strands of thought developed in this paper. Let us first exa­
mine 1love' theologically,
"GOD IS LOVE:" $ohn 4:8,16, In these simple words Scripture expresses 
what Paul Tillich describes as the ontology of love, which means that, since 
’love' belongs to the structure of Being Itself, every special being with 
its special nature participates in the nature of love since it participates 
in Being Itself, In fact, Tillich argues that the 'Love structure of Being— 
Itself presupposes differentiation because He who loves must have an indepen­
dent being in relation to him who is loved', "Love is real only if there 
is a 'serious otherness* as Hegel called it. In less romantic terms this 
means that the Ground-of-Being is the principle of Love but that Love is 
actual or serious only in relation to the beings#1J who have serious other­
ness because of their freedom.
However, man's participation in Love has not been perfected by his free­
dom but has led, as we have already seen, to a basic estrangement of man from 
his true self and the ground of his being. Here we have the wider and ul­
timate existential context in which the more specific and circumstantial
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task of psychotherapy is conducted. In psychotherapy there also exists a
both
'serious otherness1 based^on the relative freedom of the analyst and patient 
and on a neurotic estrangement found primarily within the patient. Therefore, 
by analogy, the way is prepared for the paradigm of healing in which the in­
tegrity of God's healing is neither confused nor identified with that of the 
psychotherapist.
Psychotherapy properly deals only with healing psychopathological con­
ditions which are, for the most part, -special types of estrangement derived 
from attempts to escape the universal, existential predicament of man. But 
insofar as Love, which is Being—Itself, is the ground and precondition of 
universal healing, or ’salvation', the healing love manifest in psychotherapy 
is dependent upon and related to Love itself.
Tillich distinguishes four types of love, namely libido, eros, philia,
and acape, which are in reality aspects of one true leve and forms of man's
\
authentic self-realization. God's healing takes place through the reality 
of the New Being which heals man's existential estrangement from his essential 
self and overcomes the separation between God and man. According to Tillich 
God's love towards us is basically agape. On the other hand, man's love to­
ward God is the love of love, "...but neither agape nor philia nor eros, nor 
libido alone, but all of them united."(p.308, Tillich, Four Existentialist 
Theologians)•
In existential psychotherapy the healing of man's neurotic condition 
is also dependent on these £our types of love. They correspond very closely, 
in fact, with Binswanger's three modes of being—in—the—world which require
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healing, or restoration to wholeness, disorder in one's Dwelt is overcome 
in the libido type of love which culminates in and is epitomized by the 
ecstacy reached in the sex experience. Therefore healing extends to all 
estranged forms of relations between the natural world of objects about us 
and our bioLogical needs, drives and instincts. Libido love overcomes by 
ecstatically uniting oneself with material realities. In spite of the dan­
ger of its limitlessness and lack of measure and form, Tillich argues that 
the Dionysian element must belong to the divine Love, (see p.307, Four Exist­
entialist theologians),
Restoration to wholeness in Binswanger's mode of Kigenwelt, or relation­
ship to one's self, is accomplished through the eros type of love, "The 
character of the eros type of love is also the love of love but it is not 
disinterested love. It participates in the ultimate. And in this partici­
pation the self is affirmed and denied at the same time."(p.307, Ibid,),
The philia type of love is instrumental in overcoming estrangement in 
the world of one's fellow men, or Mi twe It in Binswanger's scheme. This 
culminates in friendship which 'depends on the participation of both sides 
as equals in an embracing unity', this unity itself being an independent 
reality known as 'partnership' in Buber's terms.
The arraue type of love, according to Tillich, transcends ",..the given 
self of the loving and the loved toward the unity of fulfillment. It is 
self-sacrificing not for the sake of the other Self as such, but for the 
sake of the ultimate destiny of the other Self. The union of agape is 
the union with the other Self in the realm of the ultimate meaning. In
092
this sense a.^ ape has always the forgiving element in itself."
In existential psychotherapy these types of love are brought to bear 
on the separate modes of Dasein especially as they exist in the patient.
The libido type of love is present not in terms of a sexual relationship 
between analyst and patient but rather in terms of the analyst's relatively 
unified Umwelt and the patient's disturbed Umwelt which requires unification. 
The eros type of love is present in the analyst's own relatively self—inte­
grated Eigenwelt which he brings to the analysis; this eros type of love is 
the goal of potential fulfillment for the patient's own distorted Eigenwelt.
The philia type of love is found in the psychotherapeutic relationship 
as the alliance or Vrnd formed between patient and analyst in their equality 
as human beings. It is this common humanity which allows the therapist to 
construct and gain access to the world—design of the patient through their 
shared MitweIt.
The philia, libido, and eros types of love cooperate in the psycho­
therapeutic task of healing the psychopathological conditions of the patient's 
existence. This is the proper and limited task of psychotherapy. But this 
still 1 eaves man's existential predicament unchanged; there is something 
missing, ^illich says, "All this has in itself the tragic perversion and 
frustration, the self-centeredness which contradicts the return to unity.
Only agape can overcome it. The ultimate meaning of our being can only 
be fulfilled in the paradoxical leap beyond the tragic-demonic frustration.
The symbol of God sending his Son to the Cross, the symbol of the suffering 
God, is the expression of the agape type of love. This is the foundation
and the corrective of the other types. without it they end in tragedy, 
frustration and despair. -Agape does not remove the other types of love, 
but it makes them possible,"(p.312, Ibid.),
Therefore, the agane type of love is the key to healing in psychother­
apy as well as in the healing of the general condition of existential es­
trangement. The therapist's love for the patient includes, or should include, 
agape which transcends both parties 'toward the unity of fulfillment'. Tech­
nically speaking, this 'fulfillment' has limited goals such as overcoming 
pathological anxiety and the resultant symptoms or some similar criterion 
of maturity. In reality, however, the analyst has tralue—commitments which 
determine his view of the ultimate destiny of the patient and which condition 
his openness and acceptance of the patient within the analytic situation. 
Hopefully these ultimate presuppositions held by the analyst are truly ul­
timate and are not relative values posing as absolutes. However, once the 
pathological condition is overcome by these different types of love, we 
pass from psychotherapy to religious counseling and religious training in 
an effort to heal the cleavage between man's essential (or teleological) 
and existential self.
In existential analysis Binswanger recognized the importance of love 
for all the modes of being-in-the-world and established it upon an ontological 
basis similar to Tillich's. Hingwanrrer improved upon Heidegger's concept 
of Sorge, or 'care', by postulating a 'transcendence of love*, a 'being- 
beyond—the—'world' which recognizes a mode of positive transcendence not found 
in Heidegger. "Binswnnger argues that the individual only comes to under­
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stand himself through love...* He writes: 'Determination in respect of 
Being is not a blessing bestowed by Existence but a blessing bestowed by 
Love.1 Binswanger's conception of love is Christian, it is love of one's 
neighbor, love of oneself, love of God, as propounded?by Augustine and Pas­
cal ."(p, 408, Wyss, Depth Psychology),
Therefore, we can see that the power df love and unconditional accept­
ance infuses every level of healing, whether pathological or existential* 
Love is not only the Teleos and sign of maturity but the instrument of 
healing as well*
TERMINATION AND CONTINUATION
We began this paper with a comparison of the healing relationships 
within the 'Contractual-Covenantal Paradigm'. With the emergence of a new 
and healtd self (psychologically, not ontologically) from a successful analy­
sis the time comes for the termination of the psychoanalytic contract be­
tween the patient and analyst. This usually occurs when the process of re­
covery has reached a point of diminishing returns in relation to the time 
and money invested by the patient.
There are several criteria for determining the degree of wholeness ap­
propriate to the discontinuance of treatment. On the negative side, these 
criteria are concerned with the arrest of self-destructive techniques and 
disintegrative trends as well as the disappearance of symptoms. On the pos-
itive side, these criteria are concerned with the degree of maturity attained 
in the relationship* In the classical schools of therapy the index cdmmonly 
used is that of full genital sexuality an^ the ability tress.
Others use a more comprehensive standard: Karl Menninger writes, "There is 
a progressive shift from infantile passivity to adult activity, from the 
assumption that love is something taken to the realization that love is also 
given, from the passive expectation of being loved'for one's own sake' to 
the active satisfaction in giving love without the expectation of a quid 
pro quo in return* No one ever gets as much love as he wants, no one gives 
as much love as he might."(p*164,178, Theory of Psychoanalytic Technique).
The existential psychotherapists see the goal of therapy in terms of 
fulfilled potentialities, self-realization, self-actualization, and other 
such vaguely conceived notions* Whatever the criteria may be, they should 
encompass a relative unification at the leitel of Umwelt, Mitwelt, and Ejgen- 
welt* However, these more adequate multi-dimensional appraisals of psycho­
logical wholeness are more subject to distortion and misunderstanding than 
the simpler criteria.
Theology has the task not only of learning from psychology and psycho­
therapy but also of bringing its critical judgement to bear upon these dis­
ciplines* Whenever the goals established for psychotherapeutic healing 
extend to man's basic existential estrangement and ultimate questions of 
life, theology must remind psychology and psychotherapy of their proper 
roles and limitations*
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But healing of one's self towards self-actualization, whether talcing 
place on the ultimate level and/or the penultimate level of psychotherapy, 
is a life-long task and not a state achieved once and for all. Although 
the psychoanalytic contract is terminated and the patient becomes independent
of the analyst, the task of freeing and expanding one's ego functions con­
tinues through the process of self-analysis,
On the other side of the paradigm we have G0d's Covenant with man. In 
contrast to the psychotherapeutic contract the Covenant is not terminated 
by mutual agreement; at most it is violated and broken by man but it is not 
discontinued. The Covenant is dependent on the faithfulness of God whereas 
the psychotherapeutic contract depends largely on the will of the patient. 
Although healing can continue outside the psychotherapeutic contract, all 
healing of ultimate conditions must take place under the Covenant; a patient 
can become independent of his analyst but no man can become separate from 
God in this way; rather, a being becomes free for and not from the ground
of his being, or Being Itself,
This difference notwithstanding, we can see certain paradigmatic rela­
tions between contract and Covenant, Whereas in psychotherapy the goal is 
defined in terms of a maturity already described, in the healing of man's 
badic existential estrangement under God's Covenant the goal is also one 
of maturity and responsibility. This trend is especially noticeable in 
the so-called 'secular age* in which man is descried as 'coming of age'.
In the ongoing task of healing and moving toward wholeness on the primary 
existential level man is not made guiltless but is made more responsible
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for living with his existential guilt and anxiety nnder grace. Within 
the context of the Covenant the healing of existential estrangement means 
shedding the tutelage of representitive authorities and assuming a role of 
relative independence and responsibility; this is analogous to what takes 
place in th^irocess of psychotherapeutic healing.
A second and shared feature of the paradigm of healing through contract 
and Covenant is its dynamic and unfinished nature. Healing is always in 
process and never completed; Tillich reminds us: "But no men are totally 
healed, not even those who have encountered the healing power as it appears 
in Jesus as the Christ." Just as the man undergoing psychotherapy must 
responsibly face new situations in his everyday life, so also must everyman 
face the existential reality of ultimate questions and repeatedly decide to 
love in the present moment; this is the essence of healing.
Healing on its several levels calls for reconcilation based on love 
in its several forms, namely libido, eros, and philia. ^ut the presupposition 
for all of this is the agape of I Corinthians 13 which describes not only 
an attitude but a man, a man who brought, through conflict itself, a higher 
level of being and who, by fulfilling the Old Covenant, became the New Cove­
nant and raised to wholdness our broken relationship with God. This des­
cribes the healing presence of Jesus Christ, the Man-For—Others.
CONCLUSSION
My interest in the subject of healing was originally stimulated by Paul 
Tillich’s observations regarding God’s salvation through the reality of the 
'New Being' as revealed in Jesus Christ and its relation to the field of 
existential psychoanalysis. He raised many interesting questions, but my 
smoldering interest in this subject broke into flames of passionate concern 
only after I was undergoing my own analysis during my theological studies.
Under these circumstances healing became an existential experience and cap­
tured my imagination as a pastor looking toward the task of pastoral counseling.
As the locus of a particular kind of healing, existential psychotherapy 
must be properly related to and limited by the ultimate healing described 
by Christian theology. Furthermore, the growing influence of existential 
psychotherapy and its insights on the field of pastoral theology and counseling 
calls for theological clarification in order to avoid confusion in task and 
responsibility. This paper, therefore, has originated from not only my own 
questions but also from ’truths—for—me' encountered in faith and psychoanalysis.
There are, however, certain limitations and dangers inherent in this 
paper. j have implemented what I call the 'Paradigm of Healing'
by means of which I point out analogies, parallels, and differences between
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God's healing acts and the healing art of psychotherapy* The purpose of the 
paradigm is to provide a superstructure or framework which permits access 
to the subject of healing on both the ontological and psychological levels. 
The paradigm can be misused in two ways; it can lead to distortions and un­
truth if parallels are overdrawn and parts of it are pushed to their logical 
extremes* Also, if the schematic model is seen as the essence of this 
study and the real foundation is overlooked, then the reader has missed the 
point and purpose of this paper which is to gain a theological perspective 
on existential psychotherapy. The paradigm of healing, as a comparative 
rather than a definitive model, is the vehicle forjfche task and not the end 
itself.
Secondly, at certain places in this paper I may have pointed to the 
obvious thereby insulting the reader and for this error I apologize. Thirdly, 
the breadth of the study did not permit greater development and discussion 
in depth on any given subject. This is an inherent problem in a study of 
such scope and I hope that I have not aggravated this difficulty with my 
own style of writing. In any case I hope that the reader may be stimulated 
to pursue further study in this important area.
In concluding this paper I wish to quote a passage from J.A.C. Murray's 
book titled An Introduction to a Christian Psychotherapy (p.176-177) which 
may not only summarise some important points but will also aid the Christian 
psychotherapist and the pastor engaged in psychotherapy and/or pastoral 
counseling. Murray writes* "It has become evident that the latter science
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(psychotherapy) is a true proparatio Evangelica, and that there is no funda­
mental dissimilarity between its healing purpose and that of religion. When 
the mind is blocked and warped, all its perceptions blunted, and its powers 
alienated and misused, we shall best make straight the way for the Gospel, 
if we first remove, by the powers committed to our hand, the obstructions 
which thus hinder it. We do not heal, any more than does the physician heal 
the body; it is the inscrutable vis medicatrix Christi for which we do but 
open up the way. And if we have been given new knowledge of the structure 
and functions of the human mind, in health and in sickness, we do right to 
make our new knowledge serve the highest purpose of that mind, and open it 
towards God, Through all its use of technique of the analyst, this essential 
aim‘can neyer be forgotten, A 'patient1 to the doctor, is a child of God 
to the Christian therapist, and his need is viewed not only in the light of 
science, but in the light of Eternity also. At every stage of analysis, 
whatever the means used in its course to lay bare the seat of disorder, both 
therapist and psychopath will have to 'practice the presence of God', No 
Christian psychotherapy can ever usurp the prerogative of the Godpel, or 
he, in itself, a means of salvation. It can only point to the one universal 
Means; and if, to do so, it clears the mist from the maladjusted mind with 
reiterated and emphatic success, and enables that mind better to see its 
God, its need is clear, and its blessing is assured,"
FINIS
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